Hurt v. Pullman Standard, Inc., Civ. A. No. 83-AR-1979-S.

• Decision Date: 06 April 1984
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 83-AR-1979-S.
• Citation: 582 F. Supp. 856
• Parties: James Earl HURT, Jr., Plaintiff, v. PULLMAN STANDARD, INC., a corporation, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

582 F. Supp. 856

James Earl HURT, Jr., Plaintiff, v. PULLMAN STANDARD, INC., a corporation, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 83-AR-1979-S.

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, S.D.

April 6, 1984.

Joe R. Whatley, Jr., Stewart, Falkenberry & Whatley, and R. Gordon Pate, Hare, Wynn, Newell, & Newton, Birmingham, Ala., for plaintiff.

James B. Kierce, Jr., James R. Clifton, Stone, Patton, Kierce & Clifton, Bessemer, Ala., William J. Marshall, Jr., Pullman Standard Inc., Chicago, Ill., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ACKER, District Judge.

Defendants Pullman Standard, Inc. (formerly Pullman Incorporated) (Pullman) and Pullman Incorporated Non-Contributory Pension Plan (Pullman Plan) have filed a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff, James Earl Hurt, Jr. (Hurt) has countered with a motion for partial summary judgment. The Court has carefully considered the materials in support of and in opposition to the said motions and finds that the case is an appropriate one for disposition under Rule 56, F.R.Civ.P.

Hurt filed suit against Pullman and Pullman Plan alleging a violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. Hurt claims that he is entitled to a disability pension. Inter alia, he alleges that "since March of 1980, plaintiff has been totally disabled by bodily injury or disease so as to be prevented thereby from engaging in any employment with Pullman Incorporated within the category of employees in which he was last employed". As will hereinafter appear, this is a necessary allegation of fact in order for Hurt to be entitled to a disability pension under the Pension Agreement. Not only does Hurt claim that he is entitled to a disability pension, but demands damages, including punitive damages, for an alleged breach of a fiduciary duty and a bad faith breach of that duty causing him mental anguish and emotional distress.

The undisputed pertinent facts are these:

1. On March 27, 1980, Hurt injured his left wrist while working for Pullman. His injury was covered by workmen's compensation. There were four separate surgical procedures performed on the wrist during the next three years. Finally Hurt was certified by Pullman's doctor as fit to return to his duties as of January 27, 1983, at which time Pullman terminated Hurt's temporary total disability compensation.

2. Hurt disputed the termination of workmen's compensation benefits, and on April 12, 1983, Pullman filed an action in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, Bessemer Division (CV 83-194), seeking inter alia, a declaration of the respective rights of the parties. Pullman expressly alleged:

A dispute has arisen between the parties as to the kind, nature and extent of any disability suffered by defendant Hurt.

Hurt not only asserted in said CV 83-194 that his disability was permanent and total, but filed a counterclaim against Pullman. Inter alia, Hurt's counterclaim contained the following allegations:

Defendant Hurt avers that the plaintiff Pullman has failed to provide the benefits owed to the defendant Hurt pursuant to that relationship employer-employee and pursuant to the duties imposed upon it by law.

* * * * * *

Defendant Hurt avers that defendant has made repeated demands on plaintiff Pullman for plaintiff to fulfill its fiduciary obligations to the defendant as well as its common law and statutory obligations. Defendant avers that plaintiff has repeatedly refused to do so, and said refusal has included an arbitrary and capricious refusal to do so ...

In his prayer Hurt sought in his counterclaim:

... all sums due him by law, and in addition the sum of One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00) in punitive damages for: (a) the willful and wanton breach of the fiduciary relationship existing between said plaintiff and defendant; (b) for bad faith on the part of the plaintiff in its dealings with the defendant; (c) for the plaintiff's arbitrary and capricious refusal to fulfill its obligations due the defendant under the law.

3. The Pension Agreement upon which Hurt necessarily relies provides, in pertinent part:

Any participant who shall have at least fifteen (15) years of continuous service and who shall have become totally and permanently disabled shall be eligible to retire on or after September 30, 1977 and shall upon his retirement (hereinafter "total and permanent disability retirement") be eligible for a pension computed in accordance with paragraph 13 of Section III hereof. A participant shall be considered to be totally and permanently disabled (as "totally and permanently disabled" is used herein) only if he has been totally disabled by bodily injury or disease so as to be prevented thereby from engaging in any employment with the Company Pullman within the category of employees (e.g. production and maintenance, clerical and technical) in which he was last employed and (a) said disability shall have continued for a period of six (6) consecutive months and, subject to paragraph 3 of Section XIII hereof, in the opinion of a qualified physician selected by the Company Pullman, will be permanent and continuous during the remainder of his life... (emphasis supplied).

The same Pension Agreement states that the pension plan is financed by Pullman through contributions to trust funds which are held by Pullman. Pullman Plan is no more than a name for the plan. The Pension Agreement contains the following language:

Benefits under the plan are provided by Pullman ... which is the plan administrator, trustee and agent for service of legal process under the plan. (emphasis supplied).

4. The state court in said CV 83-194, in its findings of fact, made the following significant finding:

Sifting all the evidence in the case, the Court finds and concludes that Mr. Hurt was able to return to work as of January 27, 1983 and that he has suffered a 40% permanent partial disability to his left hand. (emphasis supplied).

The court in said CV 83-194 went on to determine that Hurt was no longer entitled to any temporary total disability compensation and entered judgment in favor of Pullman both on its complaint and on Hurt's counterclaim. No appeal has been taken from the final decree.

On these undisputed facts, Pullman and Pullman Plan seek summary judgment on the basis of res judicata or collateral estoppel, or both. Pullman and Pullman Plan persuasively argue that Hurt's present claim should have been pleaded as a compulsory counterclaim in state court in said CV 83-194 pursuant to Rule 13(a), A.R.Civ.P. Rule 13(a), A.R.Civ.P., is patterned after Rule 13(a), F.R.Civ.P., and is identical in all pertinent respects. It defines a compulsory counterclaim as any claim which "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim..." In Alabama, the logical relation test is applied to determine whether or not a particular claim is compulsory. Ex parte Fletcher, 429 So.2d 1041 (Ala.1982); Brooks v. Peoples National Bank of Huntsville, 414 So.2d 917 (Ala.1982). The same rule applies in the Eleventh Circuit, by adoption from the Fifth Circuit. Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir.1981); United States v. Aronson, 617 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1980); Revere Copper and Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir.1970). Under this test a logical relationship exists for the purposes of Rule 13(a) if "the same operative facts serve as the basis of both claims or the...