Hurtt v. Stirone

• Decision Date: 14 January 1965
• Parties: W. C. HURTT, Appellant, Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Estate of William G. Rider, Individually and Trading as Rider Supply Company and as Rider Construction Company, Bankrupt v. Nicholas A. STIRONE. Appeal of Nicholas A. STIRONE.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

206 A.2d 624

416 Pa. 493

W. C. HURTT, Appellant, Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Estate of William G. Rider, Individually and Trading as Rider Supply Company and as Rider Construction Company, Bankrupt v. Nicholas A. STIRONE.

Appeal of Nicholas A. STIRONE.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 14, 1965.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 16, 1965.

Lloyd F. Engle, Jr., Wilner, Wilner & Kuhn Pittsburgh, for Nicholas A. Stirone, appellee.

David McNeil Olds, Blair S. McMillin, Reed, Smith, Shaw & McClay Pittsburgh, for W. C. Hurtt, trustee, appellant.

Before BELL, C. J., and MUSMANNO, JONES, COHEN, EAGEN and O'BRIEN, JJ.

EAGEN, Justice.

This case presents two appeals from a judgment entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County.

The factual background is as follows:

The plaintiff, Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Estate of William G Rider, individually and trading as Rider Supply Company and Rider Construction Company, bankrupt, brought this action in assumpsit in his capacity as trustee to recover a sum of money paid by Rider to the defendant as the result of extortionate threats.

Rider was engaged in construction work, and also in the business of supplying building materials to general contractors in western Pennsylvania. He became involved with the defendant, a 'labor leader' in the same area, during the course of negotiations for the award of a sub-contract to supply ready-mix concrete to a construction company, Ragnar Benson, Inc. (Ragnar), for incorporation into a steel mill to be built by that company. Rider was awarded this sub-contract on a bid of $11.75 per cubic yard of concrete delivered, and, pursuant thereto and to subsequent additions delivered in excess of 60,000 cubic yards of concrete. Rider then paid $31,274.13 to the defendant, calculated on the basis of $.50 per cubic yard of concrete which Rider had delivered to Ragnar.

It is the recovery of this money that forms the basis of this action. Plaintiff's evidence established that the money was paid to the defendant by Rider as the result of extortionate threats made by the defendant, to the effect that unless Rider complied, the defendant, by virtue of his position as labor leader, would cause Rider to lose the sub-contract with Ragnar, and other business which the defendant could influence. Defendant admitted receiving the money, but denied making the alleged threats and asserted that the payments were consideration for efforts on his part to secure the Ragnar contract for Rider.

At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court directed the jury to return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $31,274.13, plus interest not to exceed 6% from January 1, 1954. The jury returned a verdict in the total sum of $38,779.92 ($31,274.13 plus interest not to exceed $7505.79), which included the principal sum plus interest at the rate of 3%.

The defendant filed a motion for a new trial based upon alleged trial errors. The plaintiff filed a motion to mould the verdict, contending that, under the circumstances, he was entitled to recover interest at the rate of 6%. Both motions were dismissed by the court en banc, and from the judgment entered upon the verdict, both parties appealed.

DEFENDANT'S APPEAL (NO. 219)

As a result of the money payments involved herein, the defendant was twice tried and convicted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania for violation of the Hobbs Anti-Racketeering Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951: United States v. Stirone, 168 F.Supp. 490 (W.D.Pa.1957), aff'd 262 F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1958), rev'd 361 U.S. 212, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960); and, United States v. Stirone, 311 F.2d 277 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied 372 U.S. 935, 83 S.Ct. 881, 9 L.Ed.2d 766 (1963). At the trial on the criminal indictment, similar factual issues were involved and the defendant's testimony was the same as given in the trial of the present action.

At the instant trial, the record of the defendant's conviction was admitted in evidence, over objection, as some evidence of duress to secure the payments involved, and also to impeach defendant's credibility. However, in charging the jury, the trial court ruled, on the basis of Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 412 Pa. 222, 194 A.2d 423 (1963), that the record of the criminal conviction was conclusive evidence of the fact of the alleged extortion and, therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdict for the recovery of the sums so paid. It is this ruling that is primarily questioned here.

The question for determination, therefore, may be stated in this manner: In a civil suit against a convicted extortioner to recover the extorted money, is proof of the conviction of the extortion conclusive evidence of the fact of extortion?

Research discloses that decisions in other jurisdictions reflect a marked disparity in result. See, 18 A.L.R.2d 1287. The majority of jurisdictions exclude the record of the criminal conviction and rule that it has no probative value for any purpose. See, 50 C.J.S. Judgments § 754b. However, the rationale is based more in history and technicality than in logic. Moreover, there is a growing tendency to decide each case upon its particular facts, with a view toward applying the exclusionary rule only where reason and logic so demand. See, Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314, 57 A.L.R. 490 (1927), for a well reasoned discussion. See also, Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711, 80 A.L.R. 1142 (1932); Local 167, I.B. OF Teamsters, etc. v. United States, 291 U.S. 293, 54 S.Ct. 396, 78 L.Ed. 804 (1934); and Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 Harv.L.Rev. 818 (1952).

In Pennsylvania, judgments in criminal cases for years were held inadmissible to establish the facts in a civil case. See, Estate of Gartner, 94 Pa.Super. 45 (1928), and Commonwealth v. Moran, 251 Pa. 477, 96 A. 1089 (1915). But the tendency of recent decisions is away from enforcing a rigid rule. See, Mineo v. Eureka Security Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 182 Pa.Super. 75, 125 A.2d 612 (1956), and Greifer's Estate, 333 Pa. 278, 5 A.2d 118 (1939).

Very recently this Court unanimously held ^[1] in Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., supra, that a public servant and his surety bondsman were conclusively bound as to the fact of guilt, established by the record of the individual's prior criminal conviction for criminal misbehavior in office introduced in a civil action, involving the same facts and issues. The parallels of the present case to that are striking. In each case, the record of conviction of the defendant was offered by the plaintiff, in the civil action, to bar the defendant from avoiding restitution, as opposed to the record of conviction of the plaintiff, as was the situation in Mineo, supra. So too, in each case the defendant was seeking to avoid payment of a sum of money to the plaintiff by asserting nonliability on the basis of the facts already established to the contrary in prior criminal proceedings.

In Mineo, 182 Pa.Super. at page 86, 125 A.2d at page 618, the Court said, 'We are of the opinion that when one is convicted of a felony and subsequently attempts to benefit from the commission, the record of his guilt should be a bar to his recovery.' We are equally of the opinion that when one has been convicted of a felony, the result of which is of financial benefit to him, the record of his guilt should bar his avoidance of restitution therefor. This was implicit in the ruling of the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission case, supra, and we not directly so hold. In Mineo, the basic fact in issue was whether or not the plaintiff's assignor had started the fire; in the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission case, it was whether or not Torrance had violated the trust of his office; here, it is whether or not the defendant extorted money from Rider. The parallel is persuasive.

The same principles of public policy enunciated in Minco, supra, and Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, supra, apply with equal force to the present case. The defendant was presented with more than ample opportunity to overcome the charges lodged against him while he was swathed in a cloak of presumed innocence. His case was twice presented to a federal jury which found him guilty of extortion beyond a reasonable doubt, upon the same facts which are now urged as the basis for his civil liability. To now hold that the effect of those jury determinations is nil not only would be to fly in the face of reason, but also would be a general indictment of the whole American jury system. We are not now prepared to say that the mere technical effect of the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel regarding identity of parties is sufficient to overcome the policy which requires us to give conclusive effect to the prior conviction herein. The defendant should not now be heard to deny that which was established by his prior criminal conviction, without proof that his conviction was procured by fraud, perjury or some manner of error now sufficient to upset the conviction itself. Defendant has had his day in court and has failed to instill even a reasonable doubt in the collective mind of his then jury. No valid reason exists why he should be given a chance to try his luck with another jury.

In so deciding, we recognize a valid existing distinction in cases involving the record of conviction of relatively minor matters such as traffic violations, lesser misdemeanors, and matters of like import. Especially in traffic violations expediency and convenience, rather than guilt, often control the defendant's 'trial technique.' In such cases, it is not obvious that the defendant has taken...