Husbands v. Indiana Travelers' Accident Ass'n

• Decision Date: 01 December 1921
• Docket Number: 24,060
• Citation: 133 N.E. 130,194 Ind. 586
• Parties: Husbands v. Indiana Travelers' Accident Association
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

133 N.E. 130

194 Ind. 586

Husbands v. Indiana Travelers' Accident Association

No. 24,060

Supreme Court of Indiana

December 1, 1921

Rehearing Denied May 13, 1924.

From Marion Superior Court (A4,869); W. W. Thornton, Judge.

Action by Laura J. Husbands against Indiana Travelers' Accident Association. From a judgment for defendant, the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court. (Transferred to the Supreme Court under § 1394 Burns 1914.)

Affirmed.

Charles A. Dryer, for appellant.

William S. McMaster and Elmer E. Stevenson, for appellee.

Ewbank C. J. Myers, J., absent.

OPINION

Ewbank, C. J.

The appellant sued the appellee on a membership certificate of her deceased husband in the appellee association, in which certificate, the appellant was named as beneficiary in case of the death of the insured. A section of the constitution of the appellee association provided for the payment to the beneficiary named in such certificate of the sum to be realized from an assessment on the members, not exceeding $ 5,000, "whenever a member shall through external violent and accidental means, receive bodily injury (subject to exceptions not here involved), which shall, independently of all other causes, result in death within twenty-six weeks", etc.

The material allegations of the complaint, so far as they need to be considered, are that appellant's husband was a member of the appellee association, in good standing, and "that on the 25th day of October, 1918, and while said policy was in full force and effect, the said William M. Husbands received a bodily injury through external, violent and accidental means, to wit: that on (said date) he went to the basement or furnace room of his residence for the purpose of shaking down the ashes in the furnace and replenishing the same with coal; that he did shake down the ashes in said furnace with the shaker attached to said furnace with great force and violence * * * and his violent physical exertion in shaking the ashes down in the furnace caused the rupture of a blood vessel in his right lung, which injury then and there wholly disabled said William M. Husbands and caused his immediate death; that said William M. Husbands and the (appellee) each duly performed all the conditions of said policy to be by each of them performed", and that due notice was given and proof made.

Upon proper request, the court made a special finding of facts to the effect that appellant's husband was insured as alleged, that he died on the date as stated, and that due notice was given and proper proof was made, and also the following facts: That on the day in question, at seven o'clock in the morning, after eating his breakfast, the insured went to the furnace room in the basement of his residence; that he descended a stairway from the kitchen; that the furnace had an iron shaker attached to it, which was an elbow shaped iron bar, and extended up two feet along the side of the furnace, six to twelve inches distant therefrom and was attached near the furnace door; that when in operation, this shaker had a movement to and from the furnace, and required much physical strength and force to move it back and forth in shaking down the ashes; that immediately the insured shook down the ashes by means of the shaker, "using more force and strength than was necessary when such furnaces were in good working order", and thereby caused ashes "to fill that part of the furnace room where it was located, some of the ashes settling on said William Husband's coat and vest"; that while so occupied, he "immediately" left the furnace room and ascended the stairway to the kitchen, and on some of the steps of the stairway some drops of blood fell from his mouth and nostrils; that when he reached the kitchen, blood was gushing rapidly from his mouth, nose, throat and lungs, his eyes were bulging, and, after being helped down on the floor, he died in the kitchen within fifteen minutes after he left the furnace room; that his face was white and the blood covered his face, hands and clothing; that the wrenching and straining of his body by the violent exertion in shaking the furnace was unintentional on his part and was unforeseen and unexpected by him; that at the time of the death of the insured and prior thereto, his right lung was diseased and the tissue thereof was degenerated, due to the ravages of tuberculosis, and the walls of some of the blood-vessels therein were thereby weakened; and that said hemorrhage was from the rupture of a bloodvessel in his lungs caused by the said means, and did "independently of all other causes, result in his direct and immediate death." The special finding also recited the conclusions of law that said wrenching and straining of appellant's body by his exertion was "accidental", and that the rupture of the bloodvessel, as stated, "was caused by said * * * accidental means." But nothing was found as to the ashes having any effect upon the insured except to settle on his coat and vest, nor that he sustained any violent injury except the rupture of a bloodvessel, caused by his exertions in operating the shaker on the furnace.

The trial court stated conclusions of law on the facts found, to the effect that "the law is with the defendant and the plaintiff is not entitled to a judgment thereon", to which the appellant duly reserved exceptions, and which it has assigned as error.

The sole question for decision is whether the facts found make out a case of bodily injury "through external, violent and accidental means * * * which, independently of all other causes, resulted in death", within the meaning of the policy sued on.

There is a line of decisions as to the effect of insurance policies binding the insurer to pay indemnity in case of "accidental death" or of "death by accident." And there is also a line of decisions holding that a contract to pay indemnity in case death results from a bodily injury caused by "external, violent and accidental means" binds the insurer to pay in case death is caused as the accidental result of means not intended to cause it, on the ground (as these decisions state) that an accidental result produced by intentional acts which are not manifestly dangerous and from which death would not ordinarily follow is necessarily produced by accidental means. See Rowe v. United Com. Trav Assn. (1919), 186 Iowa 454, 172 N.W. 454, 4 A.L.R. 1235, and authorities cited. But the courts of Indiana are committed, we think, to the doctrine that so far as death is concerned, such a policy covers only cases where death resulted from bodily injury caused by the "accidental" application of external violence,...