Husinga v. Federal-Mogul Ignition Co.
| Decision Date | 15 June 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:06-CV-44.,3:06-CV-44. |
| Citation | 519 F.Supp.2d 929 |
| Parties | Wesley HUSINGA, Trustee in Bankruptcy, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL-MOGUL IGNITION CO., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa |
Robert W. Stewart, Lowenbaum Partnership LLC, Clayton, MO, Martha L. Shaff, Betty Neuman & McMahon, LLP, Davenport, IA, for Defendant.
Before the Court are the following motions: Defendant, Federal-Mogul Ignition Company's Second Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk's No. 65) and Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk's No. 97). Plaintiff filed a Resistance to Defendant's Second Motion for Summary Judgment on April 18, 2007 (Clerk's No. 96), and Defendant filed a Reply on May 15, 2007 (Clerk's No. 104). Defendant filed a resistance to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on May 14, 2007 (Clerk's No. 100) and Plaintiff filed a Reply on June 7, 2007 (Clerk's No. 109)1. Plaintiff requested oral argument, however, the Court finds that such argument would not materially aid the resolution of the pending motions. Accordingly, the matter is fully submitted.
Joseph Canterbury ("Canterbury") filed the present action on September 12, 2005, in the Iowa District Court in and for Des Moines County, Iowa. Defendant removed the matter on October 11, 2005. Jurisdiction is proper under both 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and § 1332. Canterbury's Complaint asserted the following claims; violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq.; violation of the Iowa Civil Rights Act ("ICRA"), Iowa Code Chapter 216 et seq.; violation of the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, et seq.; wrongful discharge under Iowa common law; and violation of the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Act ("IWPCA"), Iowa Code Chapter 91A.1 et seq.
On March 3, 2006, this Court entered an Order granting in part and denying in part a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Defendant. See Clerk's No. 25. Specifically, the Court granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss with respect to Canterbury's wrongful discharge claim under Iowa law, concluding that it was fully encompassed and thus, preempted, by Canterbury's federal claims and by his ICRA claim. See id. On November 29, 2006, Defendant filed its First Motion for Summary Judgment, arguing that Canterbury lacked standing to assert the claims in the Complaint because he had filed a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy petition after his termination from Defendant's employ, thus giving the Bankruptcy Trustee, Wesley Husinga, exclusive standing to bring Canterbury's claims against the Defendant. In an Order dated April 16, 2007, the Court agreed that Canterbury lacked standing to pursue his claims against Defendant, or to personally benefit therefrom. See Clerk's No. 90. The Court, however, declined to grant summary judgment in favor of Defendant on the remaining claims themselves, and instead permitted Canterbury to Amend the Complaint to substitute the Bankruptcy Trustee as the real party in interest in this action. Despite this substitution, the Court will refer to Canterbury throughout this Order as "Plaintiff."
Joseph Canterbury was hired by Defendant at its Burlington, Iowa facility on or about October 11, 1999.2 See Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts at ¶ 1 (Clerk's No. 93).3 Canterbury did not suffer from any medical conditions relevant to this case at the time he was hired by Defendant. Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiff, along with the other production and maintenance employees at Defendant's Burlington facility, are represented by the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW Local Union No. 1237 (the "Union"). Id. ¶ 3. Defendant and the Union were parties to a Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") covering the period March 16, 1998 through March 10, 2001 (the "1998 Union Contract").4 Id. at ¶ 4, Article V of the 1998 Union Contract, entitled "Seniority" and § 5.4(e) thereof provides: "An employee shall lose his seniority and his employment will be terminated if ... he fails to apply for a leave of absence by the end of seven (7) calendar days of absence, unless substantiating circumstances make application impossible."5 Id. at ¶ 5. Article XIV of the 1998 Union Contract, entitled "Leaves of Absences" and § 14.3 thereof provides:
Leaves which qualify as a leave under the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 shall be provided in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Such leaves may be granted, for good cause, including any extensions thereof, for a period not to exceed a total of twelve (12) weeks, including disability.
Id. at ¶ 6.6 Plaintiff received a copy of the 1998 Union Contract, containing the "Seniority" and "Leaves of Absences" provisions on or about the date of his hire. Plaintiff believes that he read the 1998 Union Contract.7 Id. at ¶ 8.
Defendant and the Union were also parties to a CBA covering the period from March 11, 2001 through March 12, 2005 (the "2001 Union Contract"). Id. at ¶ 9.8 Article V of the 2001 Union Contract and § 5.4(e) thereof provides:
An employee shall lose his seniority and his employment will be terminated if ... he fails to apply for a leave of absence by the end of seven (7) calendar days of absence, unless substantiating circumstances make application impossible. The seven (7) day period begins with the first day of absence from scheduled work and ends at the end of the employee's regular shift on the seventh calendar day. Application within the seven (7) day period shall be made to the Human Resources Department during regular business hours. Application within the seven (7) day period during non-business hours may be initiated by leaving a voice message on the Human Resources Department phone (ext.374).
Id. at ¶ 10.9 Article XIII of the 2001 Union Contract, entitled "Grievance Procedure," and § 13.1 thereof provides:
The term "grievance" shall mean any misunderstanding, difference or dispute between one or more employees and the Company concerning the violation, interpretation or application of this Agreement the National Agreement, or supplements to either of them, and such dispute shall be handled in the following manner. ... It is agreed by the Union and the Company that the provisions of this Article will be followed to arrive at a solution to any misunderstanding, difference or dispute. Any action contrary to this Article as well as Article XII shall result in appropriate disciplinary action.
Id. at ¶ 14. The grievance procedure is further outlined in §§ 13.1.2, 13.1.3, and 13.1.4 of Article XIII of the 2001 Union Contract:
13.1.2 Step 1. An employee, or one designated member of a group of employees, having a grievance may request the Supervisor to call the appropriate Steward to handle a specified grievance with the supervisor. The Supervisor will send for the Steward without undue delay, and thereafter, the employee, the Steward and the Supervisor shall attempt to adjust the grievance. The verbal answer of the Supervisor shall be given within twenty-four (24) hours.
13.1.3 It is understood and agreed, however, that the individual employee or the designated member of a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances directly to their Supervisor and have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the Union, so long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of this Agreement, and provided further, that the Union is given an opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
13.1.4 If the Supervisor's verbal answer is not satisfactory, the grievance may be reduced to writing by the Union, signed by the employee, the Steward, and the Supervisor. A written answer shall be given within three (3) working days.
Id. at ¶ 15, Article XIV of the 2001 Union Contract, entitled "Leaves of Absences," and § 14.3 thereof, are identical to the Article XIV of the 1998 Union Contract.10 See id. at ¶ 16. Plaintiff received a copy of the 2001 Union Contract, took it home with him, and assumes he read it. Id. at ¶ 17.
As referenced above, Defendant also maintained a Plant Attendance Policy. Id. ¶ 18. Canterbury received a copy of that policy at the time of his hire. Id. ¶ 19. At the time the 2001 Union Contract was adopted, Defendant implemented a Plant Attendance Policy, dated March 11, 2001 (the "2001 Attendance Policy" or the "Plant Attendance Policy"). Id. ¶ 20. No orientation was provided to employees regarding this policy. PL's Statement of Material Facts ¶ 8. The 2001 Attendance Policy assesses points for various attendance infractions, and is deemed a "no-fault attendance policy." Def.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 21; Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 9. Disciplinary action would result after a certain number of points have been accumulated, though points would not be assigned to a worker "for absences which qualify for leaves under the [FMLA]." Def.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 21-22. The 2001 Attendance Policy does not explain any employee rights or obligations under the FMLA, nor does it mention the ADA or the ICRA. Pl.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 9. Regarding absences, the 2001 Attendance Policy provides:
When unable to report for work call 753-5401 and the appropriate extension for your department/area leaving the following information: name, clock number, supervisor's name and specific reason for reporting off. Failure to report off will result in two (2) points charged to the employee's record for each day of absence.
Def.'s Statement of Material Facts ¶ 23. Thus, Canterbury always left a message regarding absences on an answering machine and never spoke to a live person. Id. ¶ 26.
Ronald Vorwerk11 signed the attendance policy "for the company" and it is also signed by a...
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