Huskinson v. Huskinson
| Decision Date | 28 April 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 10328,10328 |
| Citation | 92 Idaho 920,453 P.2d 569 |
| Parties | Robert D. HUSKINSON, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Dorothy C. HUSKINSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Baum & Peterson, Pocatello, for appellant.
St. Clair, St. Clair, Hiller & Benjamin, Idaho Falls, for respondent.
Robert D. Huskinson and Dorothy Huskinson were married on August 20, 1953. Two children were born to them, a daughter and a son, ages 12 years and 4 years, respectively, at the time of the decree in this case.
On May 10, 1968, Robert D. Huskinson instituted this action for divorce, on the grounds of extreme cruelty, and Mrs. Huskinson answered the complaint and counterclaimed for separate maintenance. The district court conducted a trial of the issues, and findings of fact, conclusions of law and a divorce decree were entered in August of 1968. The husband was granted a divorce and custody of the two minor children was awarded to the wife. The husband was required to pay support money for the minor children and support money to the wife for a period of six months. The trial court also divided certain property.
The appellant wife has appealed from the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment. On this appeal she does not question the dissolution of the marriage, or any of the provisions of the decree concerning the custody of and support for the minor children, or any of the provisions therein concerning her support. Her assignments of error are directed solely to the valuation and distribution of certain items of property by the trial court.
In her first assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred in awarding what is referred to as the Teton Basin property to the respondent. The Teton Basin property was purchased in December 1967 by the respondent and his brother from a Mr. Peterson for $18,000. Respondent borrowed $9,000 from a local bank to pay his half of this purchase price. This loan was still unpaid at the time of trial. The property was stocked with about seventy head of cattle, owned one-half by respondent and the other one-half by his brother. These cattle were also purchased with money borrowed from the local bank, which note was also unpaid at the time of trial. Respondent, at the trial on August 5, 1968, testified that at that time he still owed the entire amount paid for the property and cattle.
The trial court in a memorandum opinion, stated that In the conclusions of law, it is stated: 'That the Teton Basin property interests and the cattle interests owned by the plaintiff and his brother, Ralph Huskinson, are awarded to the plaintiff subject to all encumbrances thereon.' The judgment awarded this property to respondent, subject to outstanding encumbrances.
The facts concerning the Teton Basin property are undisputed from the record. No objection was made to the admission of the respondent's testimony. Considering the short time that respondent owned the Teton Basin property, and under the state of the record, no error appears in the trial court's disposition of this property. I.C. § 32-712, Meredith v. Meredith, 91 Idaho 898, 434 P.2d 116 (1967); Loveland v. Loveland, 91 Idaho 400, 422 P.2d 67 (1967). In its judgment, the trial court provided:
In the trial court's memorandum it is stated:
However, there is no finding of fact in this regard.
At the time of the trial, appellant was unemployed. She had the prospect of being employed as a school teacher at a salary of approximately $5,000.00 per year. The trial court was apprehensive that attempting to maintain a home of this type would be beyond the financial capabilities of appellant. In order to alleviate this problem, the trial court left it optional with the parties to attempt to reach an agreement as to disposition of the property. Whether there was such an agreement, or any attempt to reach such agreement, would not and does not appear from this record, as such negotiations could only take place after entry of the decree, and the facts in this record are only those developed at the trial. This approach to the problem by the trial court does not appear to be unreasonable, nor does it reflect an abuse of discretion.
Appellant contends, however, that the court nonetheless erred in ordering an 'immediate' sale of the house. Citing Rose v. Rose, 82 Idaho 395, 353 P.2d 1089 (1960) appellant maintains that the trial court should have retained jurisdiction of the cause and provided for an appraisal and sale if the parties failed to reach an agreement between themselves. In Rose v. Rose, supra, this court noted that
'The court by its decree allowed the party (sic: parties) thirty days within which to arrive at an agreement as to a division or disposition of the property, retaining jurisdiction in the event of their inability to agree, and provided for appraisement and sale as authorized by I.C. § 32-713.' 82 Idaho at 400, 353 P.2d at 1092.
In the present case the trial court ordered an immediate sale of the home unless the parties could agree on some other disposition of the property. An immediate sale is not compatible with an attempt by the parties to reach an agreement, and these provisions are contradictory in effect. Better practice would have been for the trial court to have granted such time as it deemed reasonable for the parties to attempt to reach an agreement, retaining jurisdiction during this period to approve any such agreement of the parties, or if no agreement is reached by the parties during this period, to enter its order for sale at that time. Rose v. Rose, supra.
It is our conclusion, however, that no prejudicial error resulted from this provision of the decree. The decree was entered on August 23, 1968, and the notice of appeal was filed on October 14, 1968. The record is silent as to any request by appellant subsequent to the decree for additional time within which to arrive at another agreement. Under these circumstances no prejudicial error appears.
Appellant's third assignment of error relates to the court's order that the parties' furniture be sold and the proceeds divided equally. The decree provides:
'That the furniture and fixtures accumlated by the parties shall be sold unless the parties can agree upon an equitable division of same with the proceeds being divided equally between the parties; said furniture and fixtures were valued at $5,000.00, at the time of trial and either party wishing to purchase all of said fixtures may purchase them for the $5,000 figure, which purchase price would then be divided equally between the parties.'
This provision is identical to one of the conclusions of law.
The trial court in its memorandum opinion stated that the furniture and fixtures were
'probably too extensive for a smaller but adequate place for the children and defendant to live in so unless the parties can agree upon an equitable division thereof at the time the house is sold the furniture and fixtures will be sold and the proceeds divided between the parties.'
However, there is no actual finding of fact in that regard to sustain the trial court's conclusion of law as to the necessity of selling this personal property as opposed to dividing it in king. Neither is there any...
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Shepard v. Shepard, 10949
...equitable powers. See Davis v. Davis, supra; Nichols v. Nichols, 84 Idaho 379, 372 P.2d 758 (1962). I.C. 32-713. Huskinson v. Huskinson, 92 Idaho 920, 453 P.2d 569 (1969). No error was committed by the trial Appellant's next assignment alleges that the district court erred in limiting the t......
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Chugg v. Chugg
...of ordinary good judgment and an abuse of discretion by that court.' 68 Idaho at 279-280, 193 P.2d at 393. See also Huskinson v. Huskinson, 92 Idaho 920, 453 P.2d 569 (1969); Parks v. Parks, supra; Angleton v. Angleton, 84 Idaho 184, 370 P.2d 788 (1962). The trial court found in favor of th......
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Parker v. Parker
...although conflicting evidence; therefore it will not be disturbed on appeal. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Chugg v. Chugg, supra; Huskinson v. Huskinson, 92 Idaho 920, 453 P.2d 569 (1969). In an attempt to provide for the disposition of the parties' community interests in the real property the district c......