Hussain v. Ascension Sacred Heart -- St. Mary's Hosp.
Decision Date | 21 October 2019 |
Docket Number | 18-cv-529-wmc |
Parties | MOHAMMED A. HUSSAIN, Plaintiff, v. ASCENSION SACRED HEART -- ST. MARY'S HOSPITAL, Inc., Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin |
Plaintiff Mohammed A. Hussain asserts defamation and negligence claims against defendant Ascension Sacred Heart -- St. Mary's Hospital, Inc. ("the Hospital"), over a negative performance evaluation letter. The Hospital counterclaimed, alleging that Hussain had entered into a contract when he applied to work at the Hospital and breached this contract when he brought this lawsuit and refused to execute a release of claims. Presently before the court are parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.1 (Dkts. ##35, 42.) For the reasons discussed below, the court concludes that plaintiff has failed to produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find in his favor on his defamation and negligence claims. The court further concludes that defendant has demonstrated that no reasonable jury could find against its counterclaims for breach of contract. Accordingly, the court will deny plaintiff's motion and grant summary judgment in favor of defendant.The only issue that remains is what relief, if any, is warranted for plaintiff's breach of contract, which the court will consider in further proceedings as set forth in the order below.
Plaintiff Mohammed A. Hussain is a radiation oncologist and medical doctor. Defendant Ascension Sacred Heart -- St. Mary's Hospital, Inc., hired Hussain to work as a "locum tenens" radiation oncologist for three short periods in 2011 and 2013. Locum tenens are physicians hired on a temporary, as-needed basis. Prior to providing services at the Hospital, Hussain signed a Statement of Application ("the Application"), which provided in relevant part:
(Hussain Dep., Ex. 2 (dkt. #39-2).)
The Application also expressly incorporated the terms of the Medical Staff Bylaws ("the Bylaws") as follows:
(Hussain Dep., Ex. 2 (dkt. #39-2).)
Finally, the Bylaws included a section titled "Immunity from Liability," which provided in relevant part:
. . .
(5) medical care evaluations;
. . .
(Banas Decl., Ex. 1 (dkt. #40-1) 34-35.)
Hussain did not read the Bylaws prior to signing the Application, and he does not recall reading the Application itself prior to signing it. Hussain further testified that there was a "rush" to complete the Application. (Hussain Dep. (dkt. #39) 46.) He did not ask any questions about the Application or Bylaws, nor ask if he could modify them. When Hussain signed the Application in 2011, he had other options for locum tenens placements available to him.
Hussain was assigned to the Hospital for a total of twelve days, working three, four-day stints in June 2011, July 2011, and March 2013. During each of the periods thatHussain worked at the Hospital, Kimberly Hetland was the manager of the Radiation Oncology Department, functioning as a dosimetrist -- a medical professional, though not a physician, who works with radiation oncologists to come up with treatment plans for patients. During and after Hussain's assignments, other members of the radiation oncology team raised a number of concerns with Hetland in her capacity as manager about Hussain and his work. After Hussain's third assignment in 2013, therefore, Hetland requested that Hussain's next scheduled assignment with the Hospital be cancelled.
In January 2015, Hetland completed a form -- which the parties refer to as a "forever letter" -- that included a "professional/peer evaluation" of Hussain. (Pl.'s Resp. to DPFOF, Ex. 2 (dkt. #53-2).) The forever letter included a "check-the-box" portion where Hetland mostly ranked Hussain as "below average" on skills such as medical knowledge, patient care outcomes and professional demeanor. The letter also included a narrative portion where Hetland wrote in part that she "would not have [Hussain] come back even if we were in dire need." (Id. (emphasis in original).) This letter was provided to at least two medical doctors who worked outside of the Hospital.3
On July 11, 2018, Hussain sued the Hospital over this forever letter, claiming that its issuance constitutes actionable defamation and negligence. On September 14, 2018,the Hospital requested that Hussain execute a release of claims against the Hospital. When Hussain did not do so within ten days, the Hospital filed two breach of contract counterclaims against him, claiming that he breached the terms of his Application and incorporated Bylaws in both filing suit and refusing to execute the release agreement.
OPINIONNow before the court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. Defendant has moved for summary judgment on plaintiff's defamation and negligence claims, as well as on its own breach of contract counterclaims. Plaintiff seeks summary judgment only on defendant's counterclaims.
Because the court's subject-matter jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship,4 Wisconsin substantive law applies. See Piltch v. Ford Motor Co., 778 F.3d 628, 631 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)) ("[A] federal court sitting in diversity must apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits . . . ."). However, the court's procedures remain governed by federal law. See Windy City Metal Fabricators & Supply, Inc. v. CIT Tech. Fin. Servs., Inc., 536 F.3d 663, 670 (7th Cir. 2008).
Summary judgment shall be granted if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A party requesting summary judgment on claims for which the opposing party bears the burden of proof may either produce evidence that negates the opposing party's claims or show that there is an absence of evidence to support the opposing party's case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). An even higher burden rests with a party seeking summary judgment on claims for which it has the ultimate burden at trial. See Hotel 71 Mezz Lender LLC v. Nat'l Ret. Fund, 778 F.3d 593, 601 (7th Cir. 2015). To prevail, the party with the ultimate burden "must lay out the elements of the claim[s], cite the facts which it believes satisfies these elements, and demonstrate why the record is so one-sided as to...
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