Hussaini v. G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc.

• Decision Date: 08 May 2019
• Docket Number: Case No. 17 C 8887
• Citation: 379 F.Supp.3d 679
• Parties: Mohammed Z. HUSSAINI, Plaintiff, v. G4S SECURE SOLUTIONS (USA) INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

379 F.Supp.3d 679

Mohammed Z. HUSSAINI, Plaintiff,

v.G4S SECURE SOLUTIONS (USA) INC., Defendant.

Case No. 17 C 8887

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed May 8, 2019

Phillip J. Robertson, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Hayley Lauren Geiler, Dinsmore & Shohl, Cincinnati, OH, Krysta Kaye Gumbiner, Stephanie L. Crigler, Thomas James Hayes, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, Daniel Kenneth Cetina, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, Chicago, IL, Kelly Elisabeth Eisenlohr-Moul, Pro Hac Vice, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, Atlanta, GA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

MATTHEW F. KENNELLY, District Judge:

Mohammed Hussaini, a Muslim man born in India, sued his former employer, G4S Secure Solutions (USA) Inc., alleging that G4S discriminated against him because of his religion, race, and national origin. G4S has moved for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants summary judgment for G4S on Hussaini's retaliation claim but denies the motion for summary judgment on his other claims.

Background

G4S is a company that contracts with other businesses to provide security services. In 2000, G4S hired Hussaini to work as a security guard at a warehouse in Carol Stream, Illinois. He was eventually promoted to the position of shift supervisor. As a supervisor, he worked the morning shift, which generally lasted from 5:30 a.m. to 2 p.m. Monday through Friday.

Hussaini, a practicing Muslim, attends Jummah prayers at a mosque in Bolingbrook, Illinois every Friday afternoon. Beginning in 2010, Hussaini would leave work early at about 10:30 a.m. so that he could go home, change his clothes, shower, and arrive at the mosque in the early afternoon when prayers began. He testified that changing his clothes and showering were part of his religious practice before Jummah prayers. He also testified that he had his supervisor's permission to leave early and that he never received complaints about or objections to the modified schedule.

In October 2015, Hussaini's supervisor was fired and replaced by Richard Griggs. In November, Hussaini wrote Griggs a letter in which he asked to leave at 10:30 a.m. on Fridays in order to attend prayers. The letter referred to previous conversations between Hussaini and Griggs about early departures on Fridays. Although at least one of Hussaini's work schedules indicates that he was required to be at work from 5:30 a.m. to 2 p.m. on Fridays, both Griggs and Hussaini testified that every time Hussaini asked to leave early to attend prayer, Griggs allowed him to go. It is undisputed that Hussaini never missed Jummah prayers because of work.

Griggs conducted a performance review of Hussaini in December 2015. Griggs summarized his conclusions in a memo to his supervisor, Sadik Patel. In the memo, Griggs listed eleven reasons why he believed that Hussaini should be removed from the position as shift supervisor, including a failure to work the required forty hours per week, difficulty managing other employees, and difficulty understanding or implementing G4S's procedures.

Hussaini testified that on December 13, 2015, Griggs told him that he had been fired and instructed him to turn over his badge. He also testified that when he asked why he had been fired, Griggs responded that he needed someone who could work on Fridays.

G4S disputes these allegations. In Griggs' version of events, he told Hussaini that he was being demoted as a shift supervisor, not terminated. He also told Hussaini that he could continue working at the warehouse as a security guard but that Hussaini declined the offer. G4S contends that the decision to demote Hussaini was based on the results of his performance review and had no connection to his religious practice, nationality, or race.

After the conversation with Griggs, Hussaini contacted Patel to discuss reassignment. Patel referred Hussaini to G4S's recruiting office, which offered him several security guard positions at nearby locations. Hussaini testified that he declined those offers because he wanted to continue working as a supervisor and did not want to accept the pay and hours that accompanied a lower-level position.

In January 2016, G4S sent Hussaini a letter stating that it was accepting his voluntary resignation for failure to accept another position within the company. Hussaini filed a discrimination charge with the Illinois Department of Human Rights in May 2016, which issued him a notice of right to sue on September 25, 2017. He timely filed this suit alleging that his termination violated Title VII and the Illinois Human Rights Act (IHRA). G4S has moved for summary judgment.

Discussion

"Summary judgment should be granted ‘if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ " Martinsville Corral, Inc. v. Soc'y Ins. , 910 F.3d 996, 998 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ). The Court views the evidence and draws all inferences in favor of Hussaini. See Cervantes v. Ardagh Grp. , 914 F.3d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 2019). Hussaini must identify "specific, admissible evidence showing that there is a genuine dispute of material fact for trial." Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ. , 870 F.3d 562, 568 (7th Cir. 2017). "If the nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, one on which he would bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted to the moving party." Cervantes , 914 F.3d at 564.

A. Retaliation claim

In count 2 of the complaint, Hussaini alleges that he was fired in retaliation for requesting a religious accommodation. Under Illinois law, to prevail on this claim Hussaini must prove that "(1) the employer discharged the employee, (2) in retaliation for the employee's activities, and (3) that the discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy." Walker v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co. , 915 F.3d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 2019).

G4S argues that this claim is preempted under the IHRA. The IHRA sets out an administrative procedure for certain civil rights claims and specifies that "no court of this state shall have jurisdiction over the subject of an alleged civil rights violation other than as set forth in this Act." 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/8-111(D). The Illinois Supreme Court has held that whether this statute preempts a claim turns on whether the claim is "inextricably linked" to right created by the IHRA such that there is "no independent basis for imposing liability apart from the Act itself." Maksimovic v. Tsogalis , 177 Ill. 2d 511, 513, 227 Ill.Dec. 98, 687 N.E.2d 21, 22 (1997).

The Court concludes that Hussaini's claim is preempted. To satisfy the third element of a claim for retaliatory discharge, Hussaini must point to the specific source of the clearly mandated public policy. See Turner v. Mem'l Med. Ctr. , 233 Ill. 2d 494, 505, 331 Ill.Dec. 548, 911 N.E.2d 369, 377 (2009). The only public policy that Hussaini identifies, however, is the IHRA itself. See Hussaini's Resp. to Mot. for Summ. J., dkt. no. 38, at 14. If the IHRA is the sole public policy basis for the retaliatory discharge claim, the claim is preempted. See Nelson v. Realty Consulting Servs., Inc. , 431 F. App'x 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2011) ; Shamim v. Siemens Indus., Inc. , 854 F.Supp.2d 496, 510-11 (N.D. Ill. 2012) (holding that a religious discrimination claim was preempted by the IHRA because the "the public policy against ethnic and religious discrimination ... is expressly contained in the IHRA").

Hussaini argues that the Illinois Supreme Court limited the scope of IHRA preemption in Blount v. Stroud , 232 Ill. 2d 302, 328 Ill.Dec. 239, 904 N.E.2d 1 (2009). In Blount , the court held that the IHRA did not preempt the plaintiff's claim that she was discharged in retaliation for refusing to commit perjury. Id. at 314, 328 Ill.Dec. 239, 904 N.E.2d at 9. The court emphasized that the plaintiff's claim was based on the Illinois whistleblower statute rather than the IHRA itself, explaining that the "plaintiff here established a basis for imposing liability on defendants independent of the Act, i.e., without reference to the legal duties created by the Act," id. , and that the "plaintiff need not and does not rely upon the public policy embodied in this Act to satisfy the elements of her common law tort claim," id. at 315, 328 Ill.Dec. 239, 904 N.E.2d at 10. Unlike the plaintiff in Blount , however, Hussaini expressly relies on the public policy embodied in the IHRA to satisfy the third element of his claim. Hussaini's claim is preempted because it is inextricably linked to the rights established under the IHRA.

Because Hussaini's retaliation claim is preempted, G4S is entitled to summary judgment on count 2.

B. Failure to accommodate

In count 1, Hussaini alleges that G4S failed to accommodate his religious practices as required by Title VII. To withstand summary judgment on this claim, Hussaini must point to evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that "(1) the observance or practice conflicting with an employment requirement is religious in nature; (2) the employee called the religious observance or practice to [the] employer's attention; and (3) the religious observance or practice was the basis for [the employee's] discharge or other discriminatory treatment." Adeyeye v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC , 721 F.3d 444, 448 (7th Cir. 2013) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). "If the employee shows these elements, the burden then shifts to the employer to show that it could not accommodate the employee's religious belief or practice without causing the employer undue hardship." Id.

First, G4S argues that it provided the requested accommodation.¹ Both Hussaini and Griggs testified that every time Hussaini asked Griggs to leave early to attend Friday prayers, Griggs allowed him to do so. It is undisputed that neither Griggs nor any other supervisors ever caused Hussaini to miss prayer. Hussaini's time records also...