Hussaini v. Gelita U.S. Inc.

• Decision Date: 04 November 2010
• Docket Number: No. C10–4083–MWB.,C10–4083–MWB.
• Citation: 749 F.Supp.2d 909
• Parties: Qudsia HUSSAINI, Plaintiffv.GELITA USA, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

749 F.Supp.2d 909

Qudsia HUSSAINI, Plaintiff

v.GELITA USA, INC., Defendant.

No. C10–4083–MWB.

United States District Court, N.D. Iowa, Western Division.

Nov. 4, 2010.

Paul D. Lundberg, Lundberg Law Firm, Sioux City, IA, for Plaintiff.

Abigail McKenzie Moland, Roger J. Miller, McGrath, North, Mullin & Kratz, PC, Omaha, NE, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANTGELITA USA, INC.'S MOTION TO DISMISS

MARK W. BENNETT, District Judge.

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                ¦TABLE OF CONTENTS¦
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND                                        911
                

 A. Procedural Background                                          911
                    B. Factual Background                                             912
                

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS                                                    914
                

 A. Standards For A Motion To Dismiss                              914
                    B. NLRA Preemption                                                916
                

 1.   Garmon framework                                          916
                         2.   Garmon analysis of Hussaini's causes of actions           918
                

 a. Discharge in violation of public policy claim         918
                             b. Promissory estoppel claim                             921
                             c. Fraudulent misrepresentation claim                    922
                

III. CONCLUSION                                                        923
                

Labor relations are the National Labor Relations Board's (“the NLRB”) sandbox.This case raises the question of whether plaintiff's Iowa common law claims against her former employer for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, promissory estoppel, and fraudulent misrepresentation fall within that sandbox and are, therefore, preempted by the National Labor Relations Act,29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.(“NLRA”).¹

I.INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

A.Procedural Background

On August 5, 2010, plaintiffQudsia Hussaini filed a petition in Iowa District Court for Woodbury County against her former employer, Gelita USA, Inc.(“Gelita”).In her petition, Hussaini alleges the following three causes of action against Gelita: (1) a common law claim of wrongful discharge in violation of Iowa public policy; (2) a common law claim for promissory estoppel; and (3) a common law claim for fraudulent misrepresentation.On August 30, 2010, Gelita removed the case to this court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332and1441, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.On this same date, Gelita filed a Motion to Dismiss.In its motion, Gelita seeks dismissal of the petition on the ground that Hussaini's claims are all preempted by the National Labor Relations Act,29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.Alternatively, Gelita seeks dismissal of Hussaini's wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim for failure to state a cause of action, arguing that the Iowa Supreme Court would not recognize such a wrongful discharge claim grounded on violations of the NLRA.Gelita also seeks dismissal of Hussaini's wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim on the ground that Hussaini has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Hussaini did not allege in her petition that she was an at-will employee.

On September 14, 2010, Hussaini filed a resistance to Gelita's Motion to Dismiss.In her resistance, Hussaini argues that her state law claims are not preempted by the NLRA because her claims are not identical to the claims presented to the NLRA.She further argues that her claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy should not be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action because the Iowa Supreme Court would recognize such a claim where the plaintiff was fired to cover up violations of the NLRA.Finally, Hussaini argues that she is not required to plead that she was an at-will employee in order to state a claim of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.Gelita did not filed a reply brief, but did file copies of filings in two cases, case no. 18–CA–19458andcase no. 18–CA–19478, currently pending before the National Labor Relations Board(“NLRB”).

On October 28, 2010, the court heard telephonic oral arguments on defendant Gelita's Motion to Dismiss.Plaintiff Hussaini was represented by Paul D. Lundberg of Lundberg Law Firm, P.L.C., Sioux City, Iowa.Defendant Gelita was represented by Roger J. Miller and Abigail M. Moland of McGrath North Mullin & Kratz, P.C. L.L.O., Omaha, Nebraska.Before discussing the standards for defendant Gelita's Motion to Dismiss, the court will first examine the factual background of this case.

B.Factual Background

On a motion to dismiss, the court must assume all facts alleged in Hussaini's petition are true, and must liberally construe those allegations.Conley v. Gibson,355 U.S. 41, 45–46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80(1957).Accordingly, the following factual background is drawn from Hussaini's petition in such a manner.

Qudsia Hussaini is a resident of Dakota County, Nebraska.Gelita is a Delaware Corporation authorized to do business in the State of Iowa.It has a facility in Sergeant Bluff, Iowa.Hussaini was employed as a laboratory technician at Gelita's Sergeant Bluff facility for over thirteen years.

In 2008, employees at Gelita's Sergeant Bluff facility were unionized and represented by United Food and Commercial Workers International Union Local # 1142 (“the Union”).Hussaini, however, had voted against certification of the Union as the laboratory employees' collective bargaining representative.In September 2009, Melissa Simon, Gelita's Sales Manager, gave Hussaini an envelope containing information on how to obtain a decertification petition from the District National Labor Relations Board office to decertify the Union as the laboratory employees' collective bargaining representative.After Simon gave Hussaini the decertification information, Simon promised Hussaini that, if she obtained the signatures necessary to hold a decertification election for laboratory employees, Hussaini's job would be protected, she would be protected from harassment by Union members, and she would be promoted.Simon made this promise as Gelita's authorized managerial representative.When Hussaini questioned Simon about Simon's promises to her, Simon reassured Hussaini that Simon's promises to her had been explicitly authorized by Jeff Tolsma, Gelita's Vice President of Human Resources.

After Hussaini was given the decertification materials by Simon, Gelita's management gave Hussaini assistance in preparing the necessary paperwork and obtaining signatures for the decertification election.Tolsma and Dean Wood, who was in charge of the Q.C. Laboratory, were among those Gelita management employees providing assistance to Hussaini in her decertification efforts.Hussaini was able to obtain the necessary signatures to hold the decertification election despite direct harassment from Union members.As a result of the decertification election, the Union was decertified as the laboratory employees' collective bargaining representative.

On June 11, 2010, Hussaini, and four other laboratory employees were summarily fired by Gelita.The other four employees fired at the same time as Hussaini were active Union supporters who supported the Union in the decertification election.Hussaini and the other four employees were told that they were being fired as part of a downsizing effort by Gelita.Gelita's reason for firing the five employees was a pretext for their firing, because Gelita was actively hiring new laboratory technicians the same week that the five were fired.Gelita fired Hussaini with the four other employees to mask Gelita's intent to discharge the other four for their pro-Union activities.

On June 16, 2010, Hussaini filed a charge of unfair labor practices against Gelita with the NLRB, case no. 18–CA–19458.On June 30, 2010, the Union also filed a charge of unfair labor practices against Gelita with the NLRB, case no. 18–CA–19478.Hussaini and the Union's cases before the NLRB have been consolidated and are currently pending adjudication.²

II.LEGAL ANALYSIS

Gelita seeks dismissal of all claims asserted against it for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).³After reviewing the standards for a motion to dismiss, the court will address the specific issues raised by Gelita's motion seriatim.⁴

A.Standards For A Motion To Dismiss

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for a motion to dismiss on the basis of “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.”⁵In its decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929(2007), the Supreme Court revisited the standards for determining whether factual allegations are sufficient to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,”Conley v. Gibson,355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80(1957).While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, ibid.;Sanjuan v. American Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology, Inc.,40 F.3d 247, 251(C.A.71994), a plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do, seePapasan v. Allain,478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209(1986)(on a motion to dismiss, courts“are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, see5 C. Wright & A. Miller,...