Husten v. Schnell
| Decision Date | 13 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | A21-0348 |
| Citation | 969 N.W.2d 851 |
| Parties | Michael John HUSTEN, Appellant, v. Paul SCHNELL, Minnesota Commissioner of Corrections, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Bradford Colbert, Legal Assistance to Minnesota Prisoners, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Corinne Wright-MacLeod, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Gaïtas, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Reilly, Judge.
Appellant appeals the district court's dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims and his constitutional challenge to his indeterminate sentence. Because the district court did not err in determining that appellant's section 1983 claims are precluded by his failure to prevail on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and that his challenge to the administration of his sentence is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, we affirm.
In 2012, appellant Michael Husten was convicted of second-degree murder for an offense he committed in 1975. Based on his plea agreement, the district court imposed an indeterminate sentence of up to 20 years in prison. Minn. Stat. § 609.19 (1974) (). When the offense was committed, individuals who were sentenced to indeterminate sentences of less than life imprisonment were eligible for parole. Minn. Stat. § 609.12, subd. 1 (1974). Under this indeterminate sentencing scheme, a prisoner could be paroled at the discretion of the Minnesota corrections authority. Minn. Stat. § 243.05 (1974). For crimes committed on or after May 1, 1980, a determinate sentence applies under the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. Minn. Sent. Guidelines 2 (2020). But the commissioner of corrections still maintains authority to determine whether an offender whose offense was committed before May 1, 1980, is eligible for parole. Minn. Stat. § 244.08, subd. 1 (2020) (). Husten is currently incarcerated at the Minnesota Correctional Facility at Moose Lake with a parole hearing scheduled for February 2022.
On a self-represented basis in 2016, Husten petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in Washington County District Court, alleging in part that his indeterminate sentence violated the ex post facto provisions of the Minnesota and United States Constitutions. The district court denied Husten's habeas corpus petition, and this court affirmed. We held that Husten v. Roy , No. A17-0775, 2017 WL 5661583 (Minn. App. Nov. 27, 2017), rev. denied (Minn. Jan. 24, 2018).
In April 2020, after the World Health Organization declared the COVID-19 outbreak a global pandemic, the Minnesota Department of Corrections (the department) created a temporary process for inmates to apply for COVID-19 conditional medical release (COVID-19 CMR). The COVID-19 CMR program allows incarcerated individuals to apply for temporary release from custody, if they have existing medical conditions that put them at a higher risk of serious illness or death from COVID-19. The department screens COVID-19 CMR applicants and grants release at its discretion.1 The department later published an update on COVID-19 CMR, stating that inmates
Husten suffers from several serious medical conditions making him particularly susceptible to complications and death from COVID-19. Husten applied for COVID-19 CMR and the department granted his application. But five days later, the department withdrew its approval and notified Husten that, because he was serving an indeterminate sentence and subject to the parole process, he was not eligible for the COVID-19 CMR program.
Husten filed a complaint in district court against Paul Schnell, the Commissioner of Corrections (the commissioner), asserting two claims: (1) that the commissioner denied him equal protection of the laws by declaring him ineligible for COVID-19 CMR based on his indeterminate sentence, and (2) that the calculation of his sentence violated ex post facto provisions of the Minnesota and United States Constitutions. The district court dismissed the action with prejudice concluding: (1) that Husten's section 1983 claims were precluded because he had not prevailed in a habeas corpus action, and (2) that his ex post facto claim was also barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel because he raised the same issue in his 2016 habeas corpus action. Husten appeals from the resulting judgment.
1. Did the district court err in concluding that Husten's section 1983 claims are precluded by his failure to first bring and prevail in a habeas corpus action?
2. Did the district court err in concluding that Husten's constitutional challenge to his indeterminate sentence is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel?
The district court dismissed Husten's section 1983 claims with prejudice, concluding that Husten was barred from bringing these claims given the Supreme Court's holdings in Preiser and Heck . See Preiser v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) ; Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). We review de novo a district court's decision on a motion to dismiss and limit our review to whether the complaint sets forth legally sufficient claims for relief. Hebert v. City of Fifty Lakes , 744 N.W.2d 226, 229 (Minn. 2008). We accept the allegations in the complaint as true and "construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Id. (quotation omitted).
This case is about whether an incarcerated individual can bring claims under the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in state court to challenge the fact or duration of his incarceration if the individual has not yet succeeded in a habeas corpus action. Both the writ of habeas corpus and section 1983 provide access to a judicial forum to challenge alleged unconstitutional treatment by state officials. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 ; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; Minn. Stat. § 589.01 (2020). But a writ of habeas corpus and section 1983 claims differ in procedure and scope. We begin by comparing the nature of habeas corpus relief, under both state and federal law, with section 1983 claims.
Minnesota prisoners may petition for a writ of habeas corpus either under the Minnesota habeas corpus statute, Minnesota Statutes chapter 589, or under the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A prisoner may file a writ in Minnesota state court under chapter 589 to challenge unlawful imprisonment or restraint. Minn. Stat. § 589.01 ; Kelsey v. State , 283 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn. 1979) ( Kelsey II ).
Similarly, a federal writ of habeas corpus can be sought in federal court asserting that an individual is in "custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Under the federal statute, a prisoner must exhaust all state remedies unless there are no available or otherwise effective state corrective processes. Id. (b)(1)(A)-(B). This exhaustion requirement provides the state court with the first opportunity to correct constitutional errors through alternative remedies. Preiser , 411 U.S. at 492, 93 S.Ct. 1827. A writ of habeas corpus is narrow in scope and "not available when there is some other regular legal procedure to remedy the alleged wrong." State ex rel. Young v. Schnell , 956 N.W.2d 652, 674 (Minn. 2021).
Section 1983 provides a federal civil action to challenge deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Unlike the federal habeas corpus statute, section 1983 does not include an exhaustion-of-remedies requirement. And the broad language of section 1983 could be interpreted to allow an incarcerated individual to pursue claims challenging the fact or duration of his confinement without first obtaining a writ of habeas corpus. See Preiser , 411 U.S. at 489, 93 S.Ct. 1827 (). Relief under section 1983 includes monetary damages or injunctive relief but it does not necessarily mean a shorter duration of confinement. Id.
Because both section 1983 and writs of habeas corpus provide remedies for constitutional violations, the United States Supreme Court has analyzed whether the two causes are interchangeable. Thus, a review of United States Supreme Court cases guides our analysis.
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the interrelationship between section 1983 claims and the federal habeas corpus statute in Preiser v. Rodriguez , 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439. In that case, three state prisoners challenged the revocation of good-behavior-time-credits and sought injunctive relief to restore the credits. Id. at 477, 93 S.Ct. 1827. Rather than seeking relief under the habeas corpus statute, the prisoners sued under section 1983. Id. The Court addressed whether state prisoners could obtain equitable relief under section 1983 or whether they must proceed under the federal habeas corpus statute. Id. at 478, 93 S.Ct. 1827.
The Court analyzed the language of section 1983 and the common-law history of habeas corpus and held that "when a state...
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