Husten v. United States, 10900.

• Decision Date: 24 February 1938
• Docket Number: No. 10900.,10900.
• Citation: 95 F.2d 168
• Parties: HUSTEN v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

95 F.2d 168 (1938)

HUSTEN v. UNITED STATES.

No. 10900.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

February 24, 1938.

Thomas W. McMeekin, of St. Paul, Minn. (McMeekin & Quinn, of St. Paul, Minn., George F. Callaghan and Myer H. Gladstone, both of Chicago, Ill., on the brief), for appellant.

Victor E. Anderson, U. S. Atty., of St. Paul, Minn. (George A. Heisey, Asst. U. S. Atty., of St. Paul, Minn., on the brief), for appellee.

Before STONE, WOODROUGH, and VAN VALKENBURGH, Circuit Judges.

VAN VALKENBURGH, Circuit Judge.

An indictment returned in the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota charged that appellant, on the 9th day of September, 1936, "knowingly and unlawfully did transport in interstate commerce, to-wit: from the City of Freeport, or the vicinity thereof, in the state of Illinois, to the city of Minneapolis in the county of Hennepin in the state and district of Minnesota, and within the jurisdiction of this court, certain stolen goods, to-wit: jewelry, consisting of rings of the value of $5,000 or more, which jewelry theretofore on the date aforesaid shortly prior to the commencement of the unlawful interstate transportation aforesaid, at a point near said city of Freeport, Illinois, had been stolen from one John Kraus, President of the House of Kraus, ring manufacturers, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, defendant at the time and during the course of said unlawful interstate transportation then and there well knowing the goods aforesaid to have been so stolen."

This indictment was based upon the provisions of the National Stolen Property Act, §§ 1-7, 48 Stat. 794, 18 U.S.C.A. § 413 et seq. Section 415, 18 U.S.C.A., provides:

"Whoever shall transport or cause to be transported in interstate or foreign commerce any goods, wares, or merchandise, securities, or money, of the value of $5,000 or more theretofore stolen or taken feloniously by fraud or with intent to steal or purloin, knowing the same to have been so stolen or taken, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or by imprisonment for not more than ten years, or both."

It is shown without dispute that, September 9, 1936, John Kraus, partner in, and salesman for, a manufacturing house of jewelry located at Pittsburgh, Pa., was robbed of approximately 500 articles of jewelry, to wit, rings with diamond, cameo, and other settings. This jewelry was carried by Kraus principally as samples in calling upon the retail trade in the line of his business. The robbery took place near Freeport in the state of Illinois, and the robbers left with the jewelry at 1:30 in the afternoon of the above date. The distance from Freeport, Ill., to Minneapolis, Minn., is approximately 325 miles. At 10:52 p. m. of the same day appellant registered at the Radisson Hotel in Minneapolis, Minn., under the name and address of "G. L. Brooks, Duluth," and was assigned to room 1010 of that hotel. He had but one piece of baggage, a bag of medium size. At about 11 o'clock p. m. the roomservice department of the hotel received a telephone call from room 1010 for one sandwich and one malted milk. Five minutes later came a second call to repeat the order. This double order was served about 11:30 p. m. on the usual service table. The waiter found appellant and another man in the room. No outgoing telephone calls were registered from the room that night.

At 1:30 a. m., September 10, 1936, a group of men composed of three special agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Field Service for the District of Minnesota, two Minneapolis police detectives, and the Radisson Hotel house detective, together visited appellant's room. This group was headed by the Special Agent in charge. The house detective rapped and requested admission. The rap was repeated and then appellant asked who was there. The house detective replied and demanded admittance. Appellant then asked for the manager of the hotel, and was told that the manager was present. At least two and one-half or three minutes elapsed before the door was opened, and during this interval officers testify that they heard a "thud" within the room which sounded "like two things coming together, like the dropping of the screen or the pulling down of a window." An examination made of the window and screen disclosed marks of recent disturbance, and the hands of the examining officer were covered with a dark dust similar to that appearing upon the hands of appellant, who claimed that this had resulted from his removal of the service table from his room to the hall. However, no dirt appeared upon this table nor upon the cloth with which it was covered. There was no dirt upon the bed clothes nor upon appellant's pajamas, although he said he had been reading in bed after the removal of the table. Contemporaneously, one of the officers found the stolen jewelry in the alley beneath the window of room 1010. It was contained in two packages, one of which had burst open, apparently in the fall, and the rings therefrom were scattered over the alley within a radius of 8 or 10 feet. The jewelry was positively identified as that stolen from Kraus September 9, 1936, near Freeport, Ill. It must necessarily have reached Minneapolis by interstate transportation. A search of the room resulted in finding a Ford ignition key, which appellant told the officers fitted a car belonging to a gambler friend in Chicago, where appellant said he also lived. Appellant also told the officers that on the night of September 9th he had arrived from Chicago on the Burlington Zephyr, and came directly to the hotel. The Zephyr, however, did not arrive in Minneapolis until 10:59 p. m. He also said that a woman, not a man, as seen by the waiter, had been in his room that night, but he declined to reveal her name. He said he had come "to visit his folks in St. Paul," and had assumed the name of Brooks because he feared his divorced wife might locate him and cause him embarrassment. He thought she was somewhere in the Twin Cities. Special Agent Stein asked him "why, if his folks lived in St. Paul, why did he register in a Minneapolis hotel." He said: "I have nothing to say about that." "I asked him whether he came to Minneapolis with someone on the night of September 9, 1936; he stated he came alone." The appellant did not testify in his own behalf, and the trial resulted in conviction.

Two points are urged by appellant in this appeal: (1) There was no evidence to prove that the defendant transported the jewelry in interstate commerce or that he knew that it had been stolen. (2) The value of the property alleged to have been stolen and transported in interstate commerce was less than $5,000, within the intent and meaning of the National Stolen Property Act.

1. That the property was stolen near Freeport in the state of Illinois stands without dispute, and that it was found in Minneapolis, Minn., establishes that it was transported across interstate borders. The theft was completed and the jewelry left the scene of the robbery at 1:30 p. m., September 9, 1936. Appellant registered at the Radisson Hotel in Minneapolis at 10:52 p. m. of the same day. Nine hours and twenty-two minutes had elapsed. The distance between Freeport and Minneapolis is 325 miles — a distance easily traversed by automobile within that time. We deem it unnecessary to make further analysis of the testimony adduced to establish appellant's possession in Minneapolis. It speaks for itself. The rule limiting the application of presumptions in criminal cases cannot be invoked to destroy the force of legitimate and obvious inferences.

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