Huston v. FLS Language Centres
| Decision Date | 21 February 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 13–13158–FDS. |
| Citation | 18 F.Supp.3d 17 |
| Parties | Peter HUSTON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. FLS LANGUAGE CENTRES d/b/a FLS International, Dal Swain, and Ricardo Silva, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
Adam J. Shafran, Rudolph Friedmann LLP, Boston, MA, for Plaintiff.
Jessica Schauer Lieberman, Richard L. Alfred, Seyfarth Shaw, LLP, Boston, MA, for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND
This is a claim for overtime and minimum wages under state law. Plaintiff Peter Huston has brought suit against defendants FLS Language Centres d/b/a/ FLS International, Dal Swain, and Ricardo Silva for failure to pay wages in violation of Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, § 18, and violations of the Massachusetts Minimum Wage Statute, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151, § 1.
Plaintiff originally brought this action in Suffolk Superior Court. On December 13, 2013, defendants removed the case to this Court. Plaintiff filed a motion to remand the case to state court on December 18, 2013, contending that the case does not satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement. On January 3, 2013, defendants filed a motion to dismiss.
For the following reasons, plaintiff's motion to remand will be granted, and plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees will be denied. Defendants' motion to dismiss will remain pending after remand to the Superior Court.
Peter Huston is a resident of Arlington, Massachusetts. (Compl. ¶ 3). He was employed as a teacher by defendant FLS Language Centres d/b/a FLS International, from April to October 2013. FLS is a California corporation with a principal place of business in Pasadena, California.
(Id. ¶¶ 3–4). Dal Swain and Ricardo Silva are the president and treasurer of FLS, respectively. (Id. ¶ 5–6). The parties appear to agree that Swain and Silva are not citizens of Massachusetts.
FLS operates a facility in Boston, providing English language programs and curricula. (Id. ¶ 11–12). At least thirty to fifty teachers have been employed by FLS in Boston in the last three years. (Id. ¶ 15). FLS pays its teachers on an hourly basis. (Id. ¶ 16).
FLS allegedly does not pay its teachers for class-preparation time or time spent preparing student-progress reports and grades. (Id. ¶¶ 18–20). FLS teachers spend approximately three to six hours a week preparing to teach their class and performing grading tasks. (Id. ¶ 21). They also spend approximately four hours a month preparing student-progress reports. (Id. ¶ 24).
The complaint does not indicate either the number of hours worked by, or the amount of wages paid to, Huston. According to submissions by the parties, which do not appear to be disputed, FLS paid Huston an hourly wage of $22. (Pl. Mem., Ex. 1). Over his seven-month period of employment, Huston worked 676 hours and was paid $14,789 in wages. (Def. Mem., Ex. 1).
Plaintiff filed this case on November 12, 2013, in Suffolk County Superior Court. Defendants removed it to this Court on December 13, 2013, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. On December 18, plaintiff filed a motion to remand to state court, contending that the case did not satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction. That motion also requested an award of attorney's fees incurred by the remand, contending that defendants had no good-faith basis for the removal.
On January 3, 2014, defendants filed a motion to dismiss. On January 10, 2014, the Court stayed the deadline for plaintiff's response to the motion to dismiss pending the resolution of the motion to remand.
“The party invoking federal jurisdiction has the burden of establishing that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over the case.” Amoche v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 556 F.3d 41, 48 (1st Cir.2009). Defendants, therefore, “bear the burden of showing that removal was proper.” Fayard v. Northeast Vehicle Services, LLC, 533 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir.2008). “The removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, permits removal only where the district court could have exercised original jurisdiction over an action.” Id. at 45.
Defendants contend that the Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which grants federal district courts original jurisdiction over civil actions between citizens of different states where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Plaintiff does not dispute that the parties are diverse. Instead, he contends that the case does not meet the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement.
The First Circuit has not yet decided how heavy a burden the removing party must bear when proving the amount-in-controversy requirement. Milford–Bennington R. Co. Inc. v. Pan Am Railways, Inc., 695 F.3d 175, 178–79 (1st Cir.2012). However, it has held that a defendant removing a case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, must show a “reasonable probability” that the amount in controversy will exceed the jurisdictional threshold. Amoche, 556 F.3d at 48–49.1
There is no obvious reason why the burden of showing that the jurisdictional amount has been met should be different for removal under diversity of citizenship than under CAFA. See Youtsey v. Avibank Mfg., Inc., 734 F.Supp.2d 230, 236 (D.Mass.2010) (); Providence Piers, LLC v. SMM New England, Inc., 2013 WL 178183, at *3 (D.R.I. Jan. 16, 2013) (). Accordingly, the Court will apply the “reasonable probability” standard of Amoche to this matter.
The question is thus whether defendants have shown a reasonable probability that the amount of controversy in this case exceeds $75,000. See, e.g., Reynolds v. World Courier Ground, Inc., 272 F.R.D. 284, 286 (D.Mass.2011). The following appears to be the appropriate analytic framework for considering that question:
First, if the jurisdictional amount is not facially apparent from the complaint, then a court need look to the notice of removal and any other materials submitted by the removing defendant. However, whether a defendant has shown a reasonable probability that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional minimum may well require analysis of what both parties have shown. Second, as part of the analysis of whether a removing defendant has met the standard of “reasonable probability,” a court may consider which party has better access to the relevant information. Third, a court's analysis of the amount in controversy focuses on whether a removing defendant has shown a reasonable probability that more than the jurisdictional minimum is in controversy at the time of removal. Fourth, any doubts in the evidence should be construed in favor of remand because the court has a responsibility to police the border of federal jurisdiction. Fifth, this preliminary determination concerning whether a defendant has met its burden should be done quickly, without an extensive fact-finding inquiry. Finally, a plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits is largely irrelevant to the court's jurisdiction because the pertinent question is what is in controversy in the case, not how much the plaintiffs are ultimately likely to recover.
Id. at 286 (internal quotations and alterations omitted) (collecting First Circuit cases).
The Court first looks to plaintiff's specific damage allegations to determine the amount in controversy. See Coventry Sewage Associates v. Dworkin Realty Co., 71 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1995). Although there are no damage allegations in the complaint, plaintiff's state-court civil cover sheet claims damages of “$250k+.” (Notice of Removal, Ex. 2). Defendants contend that this ends the inquiry, as that means plaintiff has alleged damages of more than $75,000. Plaintiff contends the amount was “[q]uite obviously ... meant to encompass the estimated value of the [p]laintiff's and the putative class's claims, and not just the [p]laintiff's claim individually.” (Pl. Mem. at *4 n. 1). As plaintiff notes, a claim of $250,000 in individual damages arising out of only seven months of work would lead to absurd results. At $22 per hour, a person would have to work 11,364 unpaid hours to achieve $250,000 in damages; there are only 8,760 hours in a normal (non-leap) year.
The trial court in Polion v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 2004 WL 3120092 (Mass.Super. Dec. 6, 2004), handled a similar question concerning the jurisdictional limitation between Superior and District Courts of Massachusetts. The defendant in that case contended that the $25,000 claimed damages on the cover sheet meant that the plaintiffs in the class action were alleging damages of $25,000 each. Polion, 2004 WL 3120092, at *7. The court noted that “[t]he statement of anticipated damages [on the cover sheet] merely enables the Clerk of the Court to determine, on the face of the cover sheet, whether the Superior Court has the $25,000 minimum required jurisdiction over the case, or whether it should be transferred to a District Court.” Id. It found “no authority, by law or in practice,” for the defendant's contention that the damages on the cover sheet represented an amount claimed by each named plaintiff rather than the entire amount of the lawsuit. Id.
Here, there is only one named plaintiff. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to conclude that the claimed damages of more than $250,000 on the cover sheet represented the amount in controversy plaintiff expected the entire class to recover. That amount is not sufficient to establish federal jurisdiction.
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Huston v. Centres
...18 F.Supp.3d 17Peter HUSTON, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,v.FLS LANGUAGE CENTRES d/b/a FLS International, Dal Swain, and Ricardo Silva, Defendants.Civil No. 13–13158–FDS.United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.Signed Feb. 21, Motion granted i......