Huston v. Smith
Decision Date | 11 January 2016 |
Docket Number | No. C 13-4063-MWB,C 13-4063-MWB |
Parties | PAUL MICHAEL HUSTON, a/k/a PAUL MICHAEL BLAISE, Petitioner, v. JASON SMITH, Superintendent of Cherokee Mental Health Institution, BRAD WITTROCK, Deputy/Acting Superintendent of Cherokee Mental Health Institution, and CHARLES PALMER, Director of the Iowa Department of Human Services, Respondents. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Is Paul Michael Huston (a/k/a Paul Michael Blaise), an inmate of the Civil Commitment Unit for Sexual Offenders (CCUSO) in Cherokee, Iowa, entitled to habeas relief from his civil commitment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254? Huston's habeas counsel contends that Huston's civil commitment counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to secure a bifurcated trial and in failing to preserve Huston's right to a speedy trial. Huston asserts additional claims pro se, including a "Padilla claim"1 that his trial counselin his underlying state criminal case failed to inform him that a collateral consequence of his guilty plea to a harassment charge might be his civil commitment as a sexually violent predator. The respondents deny that Huston has a clearly established federal right to effective assistance of counsel in civil commitment proceedings, but if he does, that his claims are without merit.
Huston's legal odyssey involves a predicate criminal conviction and two civil commitment trials, post-conviction relief proceedings on his criminal conviction, and appeals of his civil commitment. I will lay out the milestones in that journey, as described by the Iowa appellate courts.
In its decision on Huston's direct appeal of his civil commitment, the Iowa Supreme Court described the circumstances leading to Huston's predicate criminal conviction as follows:
As S.E. walked through River View Park in Fort Madison in October 2005, Paul Blaise [a/k/a Huston], who was collecting cans in the park, approached her and began asking her questions. He asked her if she was married, if she was sexually active, and if she would engage in anal sex. He wondered if she had ever been the victim of a violent crime, if she would use lubrication to have anal sex, if she would take her clothes off or have sex if someone asked her or threatened to hurt her. Although S.E. grew increasingly uncomfortable and quickened her pace, Blaise kept up with her while continuing to ask "hypothetical" questions. S.E. tried repeatedly to change the conversation and eventually ran away from Blaise and asked another pedestrian to walk her to her car. After warning another female pedestrian that "therewas someone in the park talking about rape and guns and all kinds of sexual stuff," S.E. called the police. Officers located Blaise in the park and discovered he was carrying a gun. Blaise ultimately pled guilty to first-degree harassment and received a two-year sentence.
In re Det. of Blaise, 830 N.W.2d 310, 313 (Iowa 2013). There does not appear to be any dispute that Huston's criminal counsel never advised him that a possible consequence of his conviction or guilty plea to the harassment charge was civil commitment as a sexually violent predator pursuant to IOWA CODE CH. 229A. See, e.g., Blaise v. State, 801 N.W.2d 627, 2011 WL 2078091, *1 (table op.) ( ).
On December 6, 2005, Huston was convicted on his guilty plea and sentenced to two years of imprisonment. State Court Documents, Sealed Exhibit 31 (Judgment Entry of Iowa District Court For Lee County At Fort Madison). Huston's criminal conviction was final prior to his application for state post-conviction relief in May 2007.
The next step on Huston's legal odyssey was his first civil commitment trial. As the Iowa Supreme Court explained, "While Blaise was incarcerated for the harassment offense, the State sought to have him committed as a sexually violent predator (SVP) under Iowa Code chapter 229A." In re Det. of Blaise, 830 N.W.2d at 313. There does not appear to be any dispute that, prior to Huston's first civil commitment trial, his civil commitment counsel, appointed pursuant to IOWA CODE CH. 229A, moved the trial court to bifurcate the trial. His civil commitment counsel argued that Huston's entire background, including details about all of his past criminal acts and other matters, would be superfluous and, in fact, prejudicial to the jury's ability to decide the first question before them, that is, whether his harassment conviction was for a sexually violent offense,as defined in IOWA CODE CH. 229A, but the motion to bifurcate was denied. In re Det. of Blaise, 770 N.W.2d 852, 2009 WL 1066767, *1 (Iowa Ct. App. April 22, 2009) (table op.) ( ). As the Iowa Supreme Court also explained, In re Det. of Blaise, 830 N.W.2d at 313.
In re Det. of Blaise, 830 N.W.2d at 313-14 (footnote omitted).
Before Huston's second civil commitment trial, his civil commitment counsel, again, moved to bifurcate his trial, this time "basing his argument on potential 'jury confusion,'" but that motion was, again, denied. In re Det. of Blaise, 830 N.W.2d at 314. The Iowa Supreme Court detailed the evidence presented at the second trial, as follows:
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