Hutchens v. Capital One Servs.
| Decision Date | 08 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:19cv637,Civil Action No. 3:19cv546 |
| Parties | NANNETTE HUTCHENS, Plaintiff, v. CAPITAL ONE SERVICES, LLC, et al., Defendant. VIRGINIA STIRNWEIS, Plaintiff, v. CAPITAL ONE SERVICES, LLC, et al., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
These matters come before the Court on Defendants Capital One Services, LLC, Capital One Financial Corporation, and Capital One, National Association's (collectively, "Capital One") and Plaintiffs Nannette Hutchens and Virginia Stirnweis's (collectively, "Plaintiffs") Cross-Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).1 (Hutchens ECF Nos. 18, 20; Stirnweis ECF Nos. 21, 23.)2 Capital One and Plaintiffsresponded. (ECF Nos. 22, 23.) The matter is ripe for disposition. The Court dispenses with oral argument because the materials before it adequately present the facts and legal contentions, and argument would not aid the decisional process. The Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.3 For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant Capital One's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, and deny Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.
These matters arise from Plaintiffs' employment with and subsequent termination by Capital One. Hutchens, a former "Project Manager /Program Manager/ IT Delivery Lead" for Capital One, asserts that Capital One failed to comply with the statutory requirements of the Older Workers Benefits Protection Act ("OWBPA")4 when Capital One terminated her employment, and that Capital One discriminated against her because of her age in violation ofthe Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA").5 (Hutchens Compl. ¶¶ 74, 77, ECF No. 1.) Stirnweis, a former "Corporate Insurance Specialist" at Capital One, brings claims for "unpaid overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act."6 (Stirnweis Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1.) When Capital One terminated their employment, both Plaintiffs had executed severance agreements, (the "Severance Agreements"), which contained identical language purporting to waive their right to bring a collective or class action (the "Collective Action Waiver").7
Although Plaintiffs bring their Complaints on an individual basis, each seeks a declaratory judgment that they may proceed in a collective action against Capital One.8 Capital One asserts that the Collective Action Waiver binds Plaintiffs and forecloses a class claim; Plaintiffs contend that the Collective Action Waiver is invalid under federal law, and that theplain language of the Collective Action Waiver does not apply to the claims in their respective Complaints. On December 18, 2019, the Court ordered the Parties to file cross-briefs concerning the validity of the Collective Action Waiver under the FLSA and the ADEA.9 (Hutchens Dec. 18, 2019 Order; Stirnweis Dec. 18, 2019 Order.)
The Court will provide a description of Plaintiffs' Complaints before turning to the language of the Severance Agreements.
In 2007, Capital One hired Hutchens "as a contractor" before converting her to "an associate in 2010." (Hutchens Compl. ¶ 12.) During the time frame pertinent to her suit, Hutchens "worked as a Project Manager /Program Manager/ IT Delivery Lead for Capital One." (Id. ¶ 14.)
Capital One "has five categories for its performance evaluation ratings scale: Exceptional, Very Strong, Strong, Inconsistent, Action Required." (Id. ¶ 15.) Hutchens assertsthat during her employment at Capital One "she consistently received performance evaluations in the Strong, Very Strong, or Exceptional [categories]." (Id. ¶ 17.) In October 2017, however, Capital One instituted a policy "forcing managers to rank [twelve percent] of its employees as not meeting expectations in the next round of performance evaluations." (Id. ¶ 18.) Pursuant to that policy, Capital One placed twelve percent of employees on a "coaching plan" or "performance improvement plan" and Capital One required "a sub-section of [that group] . . . to be involuntarily terminated." (Id. ¶¶ 21, 22.)
Hutchens states that Capital One ultimately sought to re-classify "objectively well-performing employees" as "poor performers" through the policy, thereby allowing Capital One to terminate those employees and increase "'involuntary attrition' rates." (Id. ¶¶ 49-50.) By involuntarily terminating the employment of older employees in particular, Capital One could "make room for . . . new recruits in their early to mid-20's" who had recently graduated from college. (Id. ¶ 47.)
In March 2018, despite previously strong performance reviews, "Hutchens was informed, out of the blue, that she was no longer meeting expectations and was placed on a 'coaching plan.'" (Id. ¶ 54.) Hutchens asserts that "[t]he coaching plan [indicating] . . . that Hutchens was a poor performer was pretextual and false, and was issued in order to meet Capital One's forced requirement that [twelve percent] of employees be placed on coaching plans or PIPs." (Id. ¶ 56.) Specifically, Hutchens notes that her "supervisor issued coaching plans to the two oldest employees in her group." (Id. ¶ 83.) Hutchens asserts that "[b]ut for [her] age, she would not have been placed on a 'coaching plan,' nor selected for [a performance improvement plan] or termination." (Id. ¶ 84.) Overall, "Capital One's facially neutral policy . . . has a disparate impact on employees over age 40." (Id. ¶ 62.)
On August 6, 2018, six months after placing Hutchens on a performance improvement plan, Capital One terminated her employment. (See Hutchens Severance Agr. 1.) Around that time, Capital One "provided, and Hutchens signed, a Letter of Agreement . . . which provided her severance pay in exchange for waiving certain claims against Defendants." (Hutchens Compl. ¶ 64.) Upon Hutchens's termination, Capital One "failed to comply with the OWBPA requirement that affected employees be given 45 days to consider the release, and that ages and job titles of associates be provided." (Id. ¶ 65.)
Hutchens's Complaint brings three counts. In Count I, Hutchens asserts that Capital One violated the statutory requirements of the OWBPA because her Severance Agreement did not provide her with the requisite "[forty-five] days to consider the waiver of any rights or claims under the ADEA" nor "the job titles and ages of all individuals selected or not selected for termination." (Id. ¶¶ 72-73.) In Count II, Hutchens claims that Capital One violated the ADEA because it discriminated against her on the basis of her age. (Id. ¶¶ 76-91.) In Count III, the claim at issue here, Hutchens asserts that the "purported collective/class action waiver issued by Capital One in its [Letter of] Agreement is not permitted by law." (Id. ¶ 100.) To that end, Hutchens "seeks declaratory relief from this Court to determine whether the specific purported class/collective waiver language in the [Letter of] Agreement is valid and/or enforceable, or void and/or unenforceable. (Id. ¶ 116.)
In 2009, Capital One hired Stirnweis. (Stirnweis Compl. ¶ 12.) During the time frame pertinent to her suit, "Stirnweis worked as a Corporate Insurance Specialist for Capital One" (Id. ¶ 13.) In this role, Stirnweis served "as the support person for and main point of contactbetween Capital One and its workers' compensation insurance and property insurance vendors." (Id. ¶ 16.)
Because Corporate Insurance Specialists worked all hours, Capital One "issued Stirnweis and other Corporate Insurance Specialists iPhones and take-home laptops so that each could perform work for Capital One's benefit remotely." (Id. ¶ 15.) Risk specialists, such as Stirnweis, "are not required to exercise discretion or independent judgment involving matters of significance in carrying out their duties," (id. ¶ 22), nor do they "perform as a primary duty managerial tasks over other employees," (id. ¶ 23). Based on the nature of a risk specialist's job responsibilities, Stirnweis asserts that "there is no FLSA exemption that applies to preclude her or other risk specialists from being paid one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of [forty hours] per week." (Id. ¶ 27.)
Despite the lack of any FLSA exception for risk specialists, Capital One "paid Stirnweis on a salary basis, and classified her and other risk specialists as exempt from receiving overtime under the FLSA." (Id. ¶ 28.) Stirnweis states that, instead, she should have earned overtime during her roughly decade long employment at Capital One. Stirnweis "regularly worked in excess of [forty] hours a week," (id ¶ 29), and Capital One did not require her "to keep precise track of her hours worked," (id. ¶ 30). Nonetheless, Capital One "knew or should have known that Stirnweis was working overtime hours without being paid" and that Capital One received the "benefit of the work performed by Stirnweis." (Id. ¶¶ 34, 35.) Despite Capital One's knowledge that Stirnweis routinely worked in excess of forty hours a week, Capital One failed to "pay Stirnweis an overtime premium for all hours she worked over [forty hours] per week." (Id. ¶ 33.)
On or about January 5, 2019, Capital One terminated Stirnweis's employment. (Id. ¶ 60.) On January 6, 2019, Capital One "provided and Stirnweis signed, a Letter of Agreement . . .which provided her severance pay in exchange for waiving certain claims against" Capital One. (Id. ¶ 61; see also Stirnweis Severance Agr.) Stirnweis asserts that "similarly situated risk specialists have signed a severance [Letter of] Agreement similar to the one signed by [Stirnweis]." (Stirnweis Compl. ¶ 62.)
Stirnweis's Complaint brings two counts. In Count I, Stirnweis asserts that Capital One...
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