Hutcheson v. Bibb

• Decision Date: 17 January 1905
• Parties: HUTCHESON v. BIBB ET AL. BIBB ET AL. v. HUTCHESON.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

38 So. 754

142 Ala. 586

HUTCHESON v. BIBB ET AL.

BIBB ET AL. v. HUTCHESON.

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 17, 1905

Appeal from City Court of Montgomery; A. D. Sayre, Judge.

Suit by Sallie E. Hutcheson against Martha D. Bibb and others. From a decree for complainant for a portion of the relief sought defendants appeal, and plaintiff prosecutes a cross-appeal. Affirmed.

Marks &amp Sayre and J. M. Chilton, for appellants.

Gunter & Gunter, for appellee.

DOWDELL J.

The bill in this case was filed by Mrs. Sallie E. Hutcheson for the purpose of setting aside and annulling the last will and testament of Miss Louisa S. Bibb, deceased, and also certain deeds of gift executed by said Louisa S. Bibb during her lifetime to Mrs. Martha D. Bibb. The ground alleged in the bill for avoiding the said will and deeds is undue influence exercised by the said Martha D. Bibb, the grantee in the deeds and the principal beneficiary under the will, over the said Louisa in the making and execution of the same. Mrs Martha D. Bibb, in her answer, denies all the material allegations of the bill in regard to the charges of undue influence. The cause was submitted for final decree upon the pleading and evidence, and a decree was rendered granting the relief sought as to the deed executed by the said Louisa to the said Martha D. on the 16th day of January, 1902 annulling and avoiding the same, and denying relief as to the said last will and testament and as to the other deeds--one executed on the 27th day of May, 1887, and the other on the 20th day of November, 1889. From this decree the direct and cross appeals are prosecuted.

In respect to the question of undue influence arising from confidential relations as affecting the validity of deeds and wills, the courts have made a distinction between transactions inter vivos and transactions of a testamentary character. In transactions inter vivos, where confidential relations exist between the parties, the law raises up the presumption of undue influence, and puts upon the donee, when the dominant party in the transaction, the burden of repelling such presumption by competent and satisfactory evidence; and this is usually done by showing that the grantor had the benefit of competent and independent advice of some disinterested third party. In transactions testamentary in character, the mere existence of confidential relations between the testator and the beneficiary under the will are not, in and of themselves alone, sufficient to raise the presumption of undue influence in the making of the will that would avoid the will in the absence of rebutting evidence. This subject was gone over with at length in Bancroft v. Otis, 91 Ala. 279, 8 So. 286, 24 Am. St Rep. 904, where many cases bearing on the question are cited and reviewed. There must be something more to avoid the will, such as fraud or coercion. As was said in Bancroft v. Otis, supra: "The undue influence which will avoid a will must amount to fraud or coercion--ideas which involve actual intent to control the testator against his will. The law never presumes fraud or the evil intent and unlawful acts essential to the coercion here contemplated. There must be some proof of these things. They cannot be considered to have been done merely because the proponent had the power to coerce. Undue influence with respect to gifts and conveyances inter vivos is a...