Hutchins v. Shatz

• Decision Date: 28 February 2013
• Docket Number: C.A. No. 12–cv–30111–MAP.
• Citation: 494 B.R. 108
• Parties: Donald C. HUTCHINS, Plaintiff v. SHATZ, SCHWARTZ AND FENTIN, P.C., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

494 B.R. 108

Donald C. HUTCHINS, Plaintiff

v.SHATZ, SCHWARTZ AND FENTIN, P.C., Defendants.

C.A. No. 12–cv–30111–MAP.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Feb. 28, 2013.

Donald C. Hutchins, Springfield, MA, pro se.

John G. Bagley, Jeffrey K. O'Connor, Morrison Mahoney LLP, Springfield, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION WITH REGARD TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (Dkt. Nos. 9 & 23)

PONSOR, District Judge.

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a complaint alleging negligence and malpractice during his bankruptcy proceedings. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Dkt. No. 9. This motion was referred to Magistrate Judge Kenneth P. Neiman for a Report and Recommendation.

On December 14, 2012, Judge Neiman issued his Report and Recommendation, carefully reviewing Defendant's and Plaintiff's arguments. In the end, Judge Neiman found Defendant's arguments to be meritorious and recommended that the motion be allowed.

Plaintiff filed an objection to the Report and Recommendation on December 21, 2012. This two-page objection, however, failed to address any of Judge Neiman's substantive reasoning. Instead, Plaintiff objected to the referral of the motion to Judge Neiman and sought relief under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(1) and (b)(6). The referral was proper, and neither of the provisions of the Civil Rules noted by Plaintiff has any applicability to this dispute.

Based on the failure of Plaintiff to offer any substantive opposition to Judge Neiman's Report and Recommendation, and upon the clear merits of Judge Neiman's analysis, this court, upon de novo review, hereby ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 23). Based upon this, the court hereby ALLOWS Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 9). This case may now be closed.

It is So Ordered.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (Document No. 9)

NEIMAN, United States Magistrate Judge.

Presently before the court is an action by Donald C. Hutchins (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, against Shatz, Schwartz and Fentin, P.C. (“Defendant”), a law firm. Plaintiff's complaint sets forth two counts, negligence and malpractice, which arise out of Plaintiff's bankruptcy proceedings. Defendant has moved to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The motion has been referred to this court for a report and recommendation. See28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). For the following reasons, the court will recommend that Defendant's motion be allowed.

I. Background

The following facts come mainly from Plaintiff's complaint (“Compl.”). However, the court has also considered certain documents related to Plaintiff's underlying bankruptcy case, In re Donald C. Hutchins, Case No. 07–41459–HJB (“Bankr. Case”), because Plaintiff's complaint explicitly refers to some of these documents and because they constitute official public records. See Trans–Spec Truck Service, Inc. v. Caterpillar Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 321 (1st Cir.2008) (“When ... a complaint's factual allegations are expressly linked to—and admittedly dependent upon—a document (the authenticity of which is not challenged) that document effectively merges into the pleadings and the trial court can review it in deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” (quoting Beddall v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 16–17 (1st Cir.1998))); Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1993) (courts may also consider “official public records” at the motion to dismiss stage). The facts and all reasonable inferences are stated in a light most favorable to Plaintiff as the party opposing dismissal. Young v. Lepone, 305 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2002).

On April 23, 2007, Plaintiff filed a petition under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. (Compl.¶ 6.) At the time of Plaintiff's filing, he also had three patent cases pending in the United States District Court in which, as plaintiff, he sought over five million dollars in damages; one of the cases was scheduled to go to trial. ( Id. at ¶¶ 14, 15, 16.) The BankruptcyCourt initially appointed Joseph Collins as trustee of the bankruptcy estate, but Collins declined the appointment due to a conflict of interest stemming from an earlier consultation with Plaintiff in his role as President of Hutchins Tool and Engineering Company, Inc. ( Id. at ¶¶ 7–8.) The Bankruptcy Court accepted Collins' withdrawal and on May 1, 2007, appointed Steven Weiss, a partner in Defendant law firm, as trustee of Plaintiff's bankruptcy estate. ( Id. at ¶ 8.) At such time, Plaintiff asserts, he thought there was a potential conflict of interest with Weiss, as Plaintiff had personal and adversarial relationships with many of the partners of Defendant law firm. ( Id. at ¶¶ 9, 10, 12.) One specific instance of professional conflict of interest, Plaintiff maintains, concerned Mark Bluver, who, beginning in 1979, had an adversarial relationship with Plaintiff related to an eight-year environmental dispute also involving Hutchins Tool and Engineering Company, Inc. ( Id. at ¶ 12.)

On May 31, 2007, Weiss filed an application with the Bankruptcy Court to employ Defendant law firm as his counsel in his role as trustee. (Bankr. Case Docket No. 15.) The Bankruptcy Court granted Weiss's application on June 14, 2007, noting, among other things, that there were no objections. (Bankr. Case Docket No. 17.) Shortly thereafter, Weiss scheduled a meeting with Plaintiff at Defendant's offices to discuss the patent cases. (Compl. ¶ 17.) Both Plaintiff and Weiss believed that the cases constituted a major asset of the estate. ( Id.) At Plaintiff's suggestion, Bluver participated in the meeting so that Plaintiff could guide Bluver through the patent case that was scheduled to go trial. ( Id. at ¶ 18, 19.) At the meeting, Bluver acknowledged the conflict arising out of the prior environmental dispute but did not disqualify himself or indicate that he was unfamiliar with patent litigation. ( Id. at ¶ 19.) At the close of the meeting, Bluver told Plaintiff that he would need an extensive amount of time to review the documents of one of the patent cases. ( Id. at ¶ 20.) Weiss, as well, told Plaintiff about previous amounts that he had received for bankruptcy creditors through settlement rather than having the cases go to trial. ( Id.)

Bluver filed notices of appearance in all three patent cases as counsel for Weiss in his role as trustee. ( Id. at ¶ 121.) In that capacity, Bluver assisted Weiss in reaching settlement agreements with the opposing parties. ( Id. at ¶ 21–22.) In accordance with the settlement agreements, Weiss filed in the Bankruptcy Court motions to compromise Plaintiff's claims against the defendants in the three patent cases. (Bankr. Case Docket Nos. 53, 69, 126.) Plaintiff objected to two of Weiss's motions to compromise. ( Id., Docket Nos. 64, 130, 156.) However, in connection with an agreement with Weiss, Plaintiff withdrew his objection to one of Weiss's motions and agreed not to object to Weiss's second motion to compromise. ( Id., Docket No. 108.) As to Plaintiff's objections to Weiss's third motion to compromise, the Bankruptcy Court overruled them because Plaintiff did not appear at the hearing to prosecute his objections. ( Id., Docket No. 172.)

The Bankruptcy Court granted Weiss's motions to compromise on October 17, 2007, October 19, 2007, and March 14, 2008, respectively. ( Id., Docket Nos. 98, 101, 172.) Weiss settled the three patent cases for a total of $46,033. (Compl. at ¶ 22.) On December 1, 2011, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order discharging Plaintiff and on March 22, 2012, the Bankruptcy Court closed his bankruptcy case. (Bankr. Case Docket Nos. 231, 235.)

Plaintiff filed the instant complaint on June 20, 2012, in which he alleges negligence(Count I) and legal malpractice (Count II) against Defendant. The crux of Plaintiff's claims is that the patent cases were settled for too low an amount, thereby reducing the funds available to the estate, which additional funds would have been distributed to creditors and to Plaintiff. Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) rests on several alternative grounds.

II. Standard of Review

When faced with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept the allegations in the complaint as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994); Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 443 (1st Cir.1992). Although “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,’ ” SepulvedaVillarini v. Dep't of Educ. of P.R., 628 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir.2010), the Supreme Court made clear that, under Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief, on its face, will survive a motion to dismiss. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1940, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). The Court explained that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 1949. Still, a pro se plaintiff is “entitled to liberal construction of his allegations, no matter how inartfully pled.” Stern v. Haddad Dealerships of the Berkshires, Inc., 477 F.Supp.2d 318, 321 (D.Mass.2007).

III. Discussion

As an initial matter, although Plaintiff named their law firm as the defendant, his complaint, read broadly, appears to assert claims for the actions of both Weiss, in his role...