Hutchins v. St. Paul, M. &. M. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 27 June 1890
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: HUTCHINS v ST. PAUL, M. &. M. RY. CO.

44 Minn. 5

46 N.W. 79

HUTCHINSvST. PAUL, M. &. M. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 27, 1890.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. The probate court has jurisdiction to direct administration for the purpose of enforcing a cause of action arising under the statutes of this state for the death of a person caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, although the deceased was not an inhabitant of this state, and left no property therein.

2. In such actions, the damages are purely compensatory for pecuniary loss. No compensation can be given for wounded feelings, or for the loss of the comfort or companionship of a relative, or for the pain and suffering of the deceased. The basis on which the damages are to be estimated is the probable pecuniary loss of the widow or next of kin by reason of the death of the deceased, in view of all the facts and circumstances in evidence, and, if the verdict is greatly in excess of the sum thus arrived at, the court should set it aside or reduce it.

3. While the court has no right to substitute its own estimate of the damages for that of the jury, yet it has the right to determine the amount beyond which there is no evidence, upon any reasonable view of the case, to support the verdict, and to order a new trial, unless the plaintiff will consent to reduce the verdict to such amount.

4. Actions under the statute, for injuries causing death, where the damages are wholly compensatory for pecuniary loss, distinguished from those for willful torts or for personal injuries, in which punitive damages, or damages for injuries not pecuniary in their nature, such as injury to the feelings, or for mental and physical pain and suffering, are allowed.

Appeal from district court, Hennepin county; SMITH, Judge.

Benton & Roberts, for appellant.

Welch, Botkin & Welch, and R. G. Siebecker, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

This was an action under the statute to recover damages for the death of plaintiff's intestate, caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant. Gen. St. 1878, c. 77, § 2. Plaintiff's letters of administration were issued by the probate court of Hennepin county, in which the deceased received the injuries of which he there died. The gist of defendant's first and second assignments of error is that the probate court had no jurisdiction to direct administration, because the deceased was not an inhabitant of this state, and left no assets therein. See Gen. St. 1878, c. 49, § 2. Without now considering whether letters of administration can be assailed collaterally on any such ground, we are of opinion that a cause of action under the statute first cited is to be deemed assets of the deceased, within the meaning of the statute last cited, so as to give the probate court jurisdiction to direct administration for the purpose of enforcing it, and distributing the proceeds. It is true that, strictly speaking, the cause of action did not belong to the deceased in his life-time, but only accrued at his death; also that, when realized on, the proceeds form no part of his general estate, but belong to his next of kin. But the narrow and literal construction contended for by the appellant would often prevent the enforcement of the cause of action at all, because of the impossibility of securing a personal representative of the deceased to maintain it. Administration is a proceeding in rem, the res being the estate of the deceased; and we apprehend that, whether the deceased was a resident or a non-resident, the existence of assets is essential to administration, for it is the estate, and not the expired breath, of the deceased upon which administration operates. Hence it would seem to follow, from appellant's logic, that if the deceased left no assets, strictly so called, no administration could ever be had, and consequently the statutory right of action for the benefit of the next of kin could never be enforced. This right of action is given in case of the death of any person, whether a resident of the state, or only temporarily sojourning in it, at the time of his receiving the injuries causing his death. The law will not allow it to be defeated for want of a party to maintain it. The fact that the statute gives such a right of action to the personal representative, and to him alone, implies the right to appoint, if necessary, an administrator to enforce it, and administer the proceeds in accordance with the statute. See Railway Co. v. Andrews, 36 Conn. 213.

The next error assigned is the refusal of the court to dismiss the action on the ground that the evidence conclusively showed that the deceased was guilty of contributory negligence. Ordinarily, in case of an affirmance, a discussion of the evidence upon a question of this kind subserves no useful purpose, and we see nothing in the facts of the present case that takes it out of this general rule. Hence we content ourselves with saying that, in our judgment, the question of the negligence of the deceased was, upon the evidence, for the jury.

The only remaining question requiring consideration is whether the damages awarded ($3,500) were excessive. The only evidence bearing upon this question was the testimony of the mother of the deceased, who was evidently an unusually candid and honest witness, although, as was natural, her maternal affection may have inclined her to look with some partiality upon the character and conduct of her son. It appears that the deceased was nearly 39 years of age at the time of his death, and that he had always been an able-bodied and healthy man. He commenced railroading when a mere boy, and continued in that business up to the time of his death, with the exception of six or eight months immediately preceding the close of the late civil war, during which he was in the army. At the end of the war, he resumed railroading, and very soon afterwards married, when only about 17 years old. Shortly after his marriage, he went to California, where he remained a year or two, leaving his wife at his mother's. What he did in California does not distinctly appear. His wife and he never lived together again, she having, for some cause, obtained a divorce. He remained single ever afterwards, so that for the last 20 years, at least, he had no family to support. He seems to have followed a...