Hutchinson v. State
Decision Date | 27 April 2012 |
Docket Number | CR–10–0595. |
Citation | 111 So.3d 754 |
Parties | Joseph W. HUTCHINSON III v. STATE of Alabama. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Joseph W. Hutchinson III, pro se.
Richard J. Riley, Birmingham, for appellant.
Troy King and Luther Strange, attys. gen., and Kristi O. Wilkerson, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
1
Joseph W. Hutchinson III appeals from two orders of the Choctaw Circuit Court approving only part of the attorney-fee declarations Hutchinson submitted for his representation of Medell Banks, Jr. We remand with instructions.
Hutchinson originally filed a notice of appeal to this Court. In an unpublished order dated December 4, 2009, this Court transferred Hutchinson's appeal to the Alabama Supreme Court.2 The Supreme Court, however, has transferred the appeal back to this Court. Hutchinson v. State, 66 So.3d 220 (Ala.2010). In its opinion transferring the appeal, the Supreme Court stated the following facts, which are also relevant here:
On appeal, Hutchinson presents two issues. First, he argues that the trial court exceeded its discretion in failing to approve the full amount of his fee declarations because, he says, the undisputed evidence indicated that his work was reasonable and necessary to Banks's defense and that it prevented a grave miscarriage of justice. Alternatively, Hutchinson contends that the trial court exceeded its discretion by failing to articulate its reasons for reducing the amount of the fees Hutchinson claimed. We agree with Hutchinson's alternative argument, and we remand this cause to the trial court for it to explain why it reduced the fee amounts Hutchinson submitted on his fee declarations.
As noted above, Hutchinson submitted two fee declarations to the trial court: The first was for work Hutchinson performed in the trial court before the appeal to this Court, and the second was for work completed after Banks filed his appeal. Each fee declaration included detailed itemizations of the amounts Hutchinson claimed.
Hutchinson's first fee declaration sought the following amounts:
— $1,635 in in-court expenses, representing 27.25 hours at $60 an hour; — $18,557.60 in out-of-court expenses, representing 463.94 hours at $40 an hour;
— $3,803.95 in extraordinary expenses approved in advance by the trial court; and
— $17,191.65 in overhead expenses, representing 491.19 hours at $35 an hour.
The second fee declaration sought the following amounts:
— $2,610 in in-court expenses, representing 43.50 hours at $60 an hour;
— $28,046 in out-of-court expenses, representing 701.15 hours at $40 an hour; extraordinary expenses approved in advance by the court of $5,143.15; and overhead expenses of $26,062.75, representing 744.65 hours at $35 an hour.
Because the judge who had presided over Banks's criminal proceedings had retired, the fee declarations were assigned to a new judge. An evidentiary hearing was held on March 9, 2009. Hutchinson testified at the hearing, as did attorney Jim Evans, who served as appointed cocounsel with Hutchinson during Banks's proceedings, and attorney Spencer Walker, who had served as appointed counsel for Banks's wife Victoria.
On September 2, 2009, the trial court entered separate orders on the fee declarations. On each fee declaration, the trial court approved Hutchinson's litigation expenses and the amounts Hutchinson sought for in-court time. On both fee declarations, however, the trial court reduced the amounts Hutchinson sought for out-of-court time and for office overhead expenses.
In the first fee declaration, Hutchinson sought $18,557.60 for out-of-court work (463.94 hours at the rate of $40 per hour) and overhead expenses of $17,191.65 (491.19 hours at the rate of $35 per hour). The trial court reduced the fee for out-of-court work to $11,597.46 and the overhead expenses to $8,595.82. The trial court gave no explanation for the reductions, other than a handwritten note on the fee declaration stating that the reduced amounts represented “39.75% of out of ct. hours.” The trial court did not explain, however, why it selected 39.75 as a percentage to reduce the out-of-court hourly fee and the overhead expenses. Moreover, it does not appear that the trial court actually reduced either of those expenses by 39.75 percent.
In the second fee declaration, Hutchinson sought $28,046 for out-of-court hourly work (701.15 hours at the rate of $40 per hour) and $26,062.75 in overhead expenses (744.65 hours at the rate of $35 per hour). The trial court reduced the fee for out-of-court work to $17,578.54 and the overhead expenses to $13,031.37. Again, the trial court gave no reason for the reductions other than a handwritten note on the fee declaration stating that the reduced amounts represented “60.25% of out of ct. hours.” As with the first fee declaration, the trial court did not explain why it selected 60.25 percent, nor does it appear that the trial court actually used 60.25 percent in reducing the amounts claimed by Hutchinson.
Hutchinson was appointed to represent Banks under § 15–12–21(a), Ala.Code 1975.3 At the times relevant to this appeal,§ 15–12–21(d), Ala.Code 1975, provided, in relevant part: 4
“(1) In cases where the original charge is a capital offense or a charge which carries a possible sentence of life without parole, there shall be no limit on the total fee.”
See also§ 15–12–6, Ala.Code 1975 (); Wright v. Childree, 972 So.2d 771, 781 (Ala.2006) ().
As § 15–12–21(d) indicates, Hutchinson was entitled to receive “forty dollars ($40) per hour for time reasonably expended out of court in the preparation of [Banks's] case” (emphasis added), and, because Banks was charged with a capital offense, there was no limit on the total number of hours Hutchinson could charge for his out-of-court time so long as, in the trial court's view, that time was “reasonably expended” preparing the case.
This Court has not established criteria for a trial court to consider in determining whether, under § 15–12–21(d), time was “reasonably expended out of court in the preparation of the case.” In evaluating the reasonableness of an attorney fee generally, however, the Supreme Court has stated:
“ ‘The determination of whether an attorney fee is reasonable is within the sound discretion of the trial court and its determination on such an issue will not be disturbed on appeal unless in awarding the fee the trial court exceeded that discretion. State Bd. of Educ. v. Waldrop, 840 So.2d 893, 896 (Ala.2002); City of Birmingham v. Horn, 810 So.2d 667, 681–82 (Ala.2001); Ex parte Edwards, 601 So.2d 82, 85 (Ala.1992), citing Varner v. Century Fin. Co., 738 F.2d 1143 (11th Cir.198...
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