Hutchison by Hutchison v. Luddy
| Decision Date | 15 November 1996 |
| Citation | 683 A.2d 1254,453 Pa.Super. 420 |
| Parties | Michael S. HUTCHISON, Jr., by Mary J. HUTCHISON, Parent and Natural Guardian v. Father Francis LUDDY, St. Therese's Catholic Church, Bishop James Hogan and Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown. Appeal of ST. THERESE'S CATHOLIC CHURCH, Bishop James Hogan and Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Superior Court |
Carl A. Eck, Pittsburgh, for appellants.
Richard M. Serbin, Altoona, for Michael S. Hutchinson, Jr., for appellee.
Before TAMILIA, FORD ELLIOTT and BROSKY, JJ.
This appeal is from the judgment entered on a verdict following a jury trial. A verdict was entered in favor of appellee, Michael S. Hutchison, Jr. (Michael), and against all appellants. The jury awarded the amount of $519,000.00 in compensatory damages, the sum of $311,564.11 as delay damages, and punitive damages in the amount of $50,000.00 against Fr. Francis Luddy (Luddy) and $1,000,000.00 against St. Therese's Catholic Church (St. Therese), Bishop James Hogan (Bishop Hogan) and the Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown (the Diocese). 1 Following the denial of post-trial Motions, judgment was entered on the verdict, and this appeal timely followed. 2 Appellants raise a number of issues, to-wit:
(1) Whether the trial court erred in allowing Michael to proceed under the theory set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 317 for negligent hiring, supervision and retention of Luddy by appellants.
(2) Whether the trial court erred in allowing Michael to proceed on a theory of a pattern, practice or custom of appellants to ignore or to fail to investigate and remedy allegations of molestation.
(3) Whether St. Therese knew of Luddy's pedophilic disposition and failed to warn potential victims.
(4) The admissibility of the failure of appellants to report molestation incidents to the authorities.
(5) Whether the trial court erred in allowing evidence of sexual molestation committed by other members of the clergy against other victims, by Luddy against other victims and by Luddy against Michael.
(6) The propriety of the injection of the defense of comparative negligence against Michael.
(7) Whether the jury instruction and jury interrogatory on causation were sufficient to enable the jury to decide if Michael consented to the acts in question in order to obtain money.
(8) Whether the verdict form was erroneous because it requested the jury to itemize elements of Michael's damages.
(9) & (10) Whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant the imposition of punitive damages against all appellants.
We vacate the judgment entered on the damage awards against St. Therese, Bishop Hogan and the Diocese and discharge them from liability.
This unfortunate situation had its genesis in a series of sexual molestations of Michael which began when he was ten or eleven years old and which lasted until he was seventeen years of age by Luddy when the latter served as a parish priest. 3 St. Therese was located within the jurisdiction of the Diocese, and Bishop Hogan served as the Bishop of the Diocese at the time of the incidents in question. However, at the time of the two incidents which survive the bar of the statute of limitations, Luddy was serving at St. Mary's Church in Windber, Pennsylvania. 4
Appellants first assert that the trial court should not have permitted Michael to proceed under the theory set forth in Restatement (Second) Torts § 317 for the negligent hiring, supervision and retention of Luddy by appellants. Section 317 states:
Duty of Master to Control Conduct of Servant
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if
(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which the servant is privileged to enter only as his servant, or
(ii) is using a chattel of the master, and
(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his servant, and
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.
(Underlined emphasis supplied). However, the theory set forth under Section 317 is inapplicable to the facts at hand. At no time within the applicable limitations period 5 did Luddy commit, upon any premises in the possession of St. Therese, Bishop Hogan or the Diocese, the acts of which Michael now complains. Instead, these encounters occurred at the Townhouse Motel in Altoona. We feel confident in saying that the Townhouse Motel is not a premise which was in the possession of St. Therese, Bishop Hogan or the Diocese. Motels and hotels are not establishments which would be typically possessed by these appellants to fulfill religious or priestly functions or to further the purposes of the Roman Catholic Church.
Section 317 does impose liability upon the Master for acts of the servant committed outside the scope of the servant's employment. No doubt exists that Luddy, while engaging in these acts of sexual molestation, was acting outside the scope of his priestly duties. The activity of which Michael now complains is wholly inconsistent with the role of one who is received into the Holy Orders as an ordained priest of the Roman Catholic Church. Michael testified that he ran away from his home in Ohio. When he returned to Altoona, where he had previously lived with his family, he sought out Luddy, who was his Godfather, because he needed money, which he received, at least on one occasion, in exchange for sexual favors to Luddy. That such nefarious conduct falls outside the scope of Luddy's employment as an ordained servant of the Roman Catholic Church is a conclusion which may be readily derived from a mere application of common sense. 6
However, while Section 317 does apply to impose liability upon the master for acts of the servant committed outside the scope of the latter's employment, the occurrence of such acts here fails to meet the initial threshold of Section 317(a)(i).
Judgment against St. Therese, Bishop Hogan and the Diocese vacated. St. Therese, Bishop Hogan and the Diocese are discharged from liability. 7 Jurisdiction relinquished.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to grant judgment n.o.v. on the basis that Section 317 is inapplicable to the facts at hand. Following my review of the record, I believe that appellee has set forth a valid cause of action under § 317. In their first issue, appellants ask:
1. Whether the court erred in allowing the plaintiff to proceed through discovery and trial under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 317 (1965), for the negligent hiring, retaining and supervision of Father Luddy when the record showed that the molestations occurred in a motel off the premises of the Diocese and there was no proof that Father Luddy was privileged to enter the motel solely because he was employed as a priest and when allowing any such action to go forward would result in excessive entanglement of the courts in the religious affairs of the Diocesan Parties? 1
Appellants' brief at 2 (emphasis added). As the majority indicates, Section 317 of the Restatement provides:
§ 317. Duty of Master to Control Conduct of Servant
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his servant while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if
(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which the servant is privileged to enter only as his servant, or
(ii) is using a chattel of the master, and
(i) knows or has reasons to know that he has the ability to control his servant, and
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercising such control.
Restatement (Second) Torts § 317 (1965) (emphasis added). At trial, appellee proceeded on the theory that with regard to the 1982 and 1984 incidents at the TownHouse Motel, Father Luddy was privileged to enter appellee's room because of his status as a priest and his role as appellee's spiritual advisor. See § 317(a)(i). The majority does not address this issue. Instead, it highlights those words in § 317 that require the incident to occur on the master's premises, without noting the "or" that follows. (Majority opinion at 421-424.) After a painstaking review of the record, I conclude that a jury could have found that appellee met with Father Luddy at the TownHouse Motel because Father Luddy was his spiritual advisor.
The majority observes that Father Luddy was clearly acting outside the scope of his priestly employment when he molested Michael, because such conduct plainly falls outside the parameters of priestly behavior. (Majority opinion at 423-424.) Obviously, the majority is correct. Father Luddy's behavior was not that of a priest, rather Father Luddy was a pedophile in priestly clothing. However, the issue is not whether Father Luddy was acting within the scope of his employment; if he were, § 317 would not apply at all. Rather, the issue is whether appellee perceived of Father Luddy in his role or identity as a priest when appellee called Father Luddy in 1982 and 1984, and whether Father Luddy took advantage of appellee's perception, and the trust and confidence it inspired in this boy, to lure him into a sexual relationship. From the evidence adduced at trial, the jury could have so concluded. As a result, I would not hold, as does the majority, that the findings of the jury do not support the trial court's legal conclusion that appellee established his claim under the...
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