Hutchison v. Newark Police Dep't

• Decision Date: 07 October 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:15-cv-3057
• Parties: Randall Tyler Hutchison, Plaintiff, v. Newark Police Department, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

Randall Tyler Hutchison, Plaintiff,
v.
Newark Police Department, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:15-cv-3057

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

October 7, 2016

CHIEF JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

Magistrate Judge Kemp

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Randall Tyler Hutchison, who is currently a pretrial detainee at the Licking County, Ohio jail awaiting trial on various felony charges, filed this action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging that his rights were violated by several members of the Newark, Ohio police department. The case is before the court to consider Defendants' motion to dismiss. Mr. Hutchison has filed a memorandum in opposition. For the following reasons, it will be recommended that the motion be granted in part and denied in part.

I. The Factual Background

Some of the claims in this case arise from an incident which took place November 5, 2014. According to the complaint, one of the events which took place that day was the shooting of a police officer. Another was Mr. Hutchison's being struck by a police car driven by police detective Doug Bline, one of the defendants. Mr. Hutchinson asserts that Detective Bline has since told several different versions of that event, all of which include the claim that Mr. Hutchison posed a threat to public safety because he was pointing a firearm at Detective Blaine or at others. However, Mr. Hutchison's complaint cites to video evidence that he did not point a firearm at the officer, and to physical evidence showing that at the time he was struck, Mr. Hutchison was on one side of a fence, perhaps on his knees, and

Page 2

the gun was on the other side. A fair inference to be drawn from Mr. Hutchison's complaint is that he had thrown his gun away and was trying to surrender when Detective Bline struck him with his vehicle. Mr. Hutchinson also complains that evidence relating to this event (a shell casing) was lost or destroyed by the police.

A second incident is also described in the complaint, and allegedly took place about a month before the first. According to Mr. Hutchison, on that date, two of the other defendants, Newark Police Officers Arndt and Purtee, came to his house after his girlfriend assaulted him. They allegedly belittled Mr. Hutchison and used a racial slur during the conversation, also suggesting that he commit suicide and threatening to tell other police officers that he intended to shoot an officer. The prayer for relief does not address this incident directly, asking that Mr. Hutchison be awarded damages, that Detective Bline be fired, and that the police department publicly apologize for running him over and putting him in a coma.

II. The Motion to Dismiss

In their motion to dismiss, Defendants make the following arguments:

(1) To the extent that Mr. Hutchison is suing the defendants in their official capacities, such a suit is, under Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985), the equivalent to a suit against the City of Newark itself, but the complaint does not allege any facts which would support municipal liability here;

(2) The Newark Police Department is not a suable entity; and

(3) The individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on any damage claims asserted against them in their individual capacities because, even taking as true the facts set forth in the complaint, Detective Bline was justified in using deadly force to apprehend Mr. Hutchison, and the other officers did not commit any constitutional violations at all.

Page 3

Mr. Hutchison's response makes two points which the Court will discuss more fully below. He argues that the complaint alleges that he was struck by Detective Bline's vehicle while he was in the process of giving himself up, and that his reputation was damaged when Officers Arndt and Purtee circulated a false memorandum to the Newark police force to the effect that Mr. Hutchison intended to commit "suicide by cop." The Court will address each of Defendants' arguments in turn.

III. Standard of Review

A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6) should not be granted if the complaint contains "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). All well-pleaded factual allegations must be taken as true and be construed most favorably toward the non-movant. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009). Rule 8(a) admonishes the Court to look only for a "short and plain statement of the claim," however, rather than requiring the pleading of specific facts. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007), quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2).

On the other hand, more than bare assertions of legal conclusions is required to satisfy the notice pleading standard. Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988). "In practice, a complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Id. (emphasis in original, quotes omitted).

"[w]e are not holding the pleader to an impossibly high standard; we recognize the policies behind rule 8 and the concept of notice pleading. A plaintiff will not be thrown out of court for failing to plead facts in support of every arcane element of his claim. But when a complaint omits facts that, if they existed, would clearly dominate the case, it seems fair to assume that those facts do not exist."

Page 4

Id. Finally, the Court notes that, even after the decisions in Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), pro se complaints are still to be construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Denkins v. Mohr, 2014 WL 806370 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2014), adopted and affirmed 2014 WL 4272823 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 29, 2014). It is with these standards in mind that the motion to dismiss will be decided.

IV. Discussion A. Official Capacity Claims

Defendants are correct that any claims made against any of the defendants in their official capacities are deemed to be claims against their employer, which, in this case, is the City of Newark. They are also correct that municipalities cannot be held liable simply because they employed persons who committed constitutional violations. Rather, a municipality, in order to be held liable under 42 U.S.C. §1983, must have itself committed some act which makes clear that not just the individual employee, but the City itself, was acting in an unconstitutional manner.

There are numerous fairly well-established ways in which a municipality like a city can commit a constitutional violation. For example, it can deliberately fail to train its employees to conduct themselves properly in situations where, without adequate training, it is obvious that citizens' constitutional rights will be violated. See, e.g., City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)(" the inadequacy of police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability ... where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact"). Or it can adopt a policy or custom - either through a legislative body such as a city council, or through the act of a final decision-maker - which directly causes constitutional injury. See, e.g., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 479 U.S. 469 (1986). Alternatively, it may, after the fact,

Page 5

adopt or ratify an unconstitutional action of one of its employees as its own. See, e.g., Leach v. Shelby County Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241 (6th Cir. 1989). However, in order to withstand a motion to dismiss a claim against a municipality under §1983, the complaint must plead facts which support at least one of these theories. See Bickerstaff v. Lucarelli, 830 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2016).

Here, the complaint does not plead any facts suggesting that the City of Newark is responsible for any unconstitutional actions of any of the individual defendants. Mr. Hutchison has not alleged any failure to train, any City policy, or any after-the-fact ratification by the...