Hutsell v. Massanari

• Decision Date: 13 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. 00-3292,00-3292
• Citation: 259 F.3d 707
• Parties: (8th Cir. 2001) SHIRLEY HUTSELL, APPELLANT, v. LARRY G. MASSANARI, <A HREF="#fr1-1" name="fn1-1">1 APPELLEE. Submitted:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 707

259 F.3d 707 (8th Cir. 2001)

SHIRLEY HUTSELL, APPELLANT, v. LARRY G. MASSANARI,¹ APPELLEE.

No. 00-3292

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Submitted: April 13, 2001

Filed: August 1, 2001

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. [Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Wollman, Chief Judge, Magill, and Murphy, Circuit Judges.

Wollman, Chief Judge

Shirley Hutsell appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on her application for disability insurance benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(i) & § 423. We reverse and remand with instructions to remand to the Social Security Administration.

I.

Hutsell was born on June 24, 1944, and has a sixth-grade education. She has a long history of mental illness. She sought professional medical attention as early as 1974 and was hospitalized at least twice for psychotic episodes prior to 1990. In 1991, Hutsell was again hospitalized; according to the records of George W. Jackson Community Mental Health Center in Jonesboro, Arkansas, on October 15, 1991, Hutsell's husband admitted her, "rambling to the point of incoherence," to the hospital because she had been hearing and seeing things, locked herself in the bathroom, and urinated on the floor.

Hutsell has been diagnosed with various chronic schizophrenia-based disorders, including Schizoaffective Disorder, Bipolar Type.² Her intellectual functioning is borderline.³ She takes several different medications, including antipsychotic drugs, and frequently reports to her primary treating physician, Dr. Mark Baltz, for medication checks and adjustment. In 1992, neuro/clinical psychologist Dr. William Wilkins concluded that Hutsell's condition "could evolve into a reasonably short term frank psychosis" if confronted with stress but that with medication and a low-stress environment Hutsell would likely continue to do well. In 1993, Dr. Joseph Crupie observed that Hutsell's "prognosis for a recurrent Schizophrenic episode is good." No doctors have noted any evidence of malingering or exaggeration.

On a daily basis, with medication, Hutsell's symptoms include depression, memory loss, and confusion. Hutsell suffers from periods of depression and from shaky spells two or three times a week. Side effects from her medication include drowsiness and occasional loss of balance. Hutsell generally rises early and makes breakfast for herself and her daughter. During the day, Hutsell cooks, cleans, does laundry, and sometimes visits friends or socializes at the local senior citizen center. Her housework is occasionally unfinished because she forgets what she is doing. She watches a few hours of television, reads the newspaper, and listens to the radio for a few hours. Hutsell drives only in town and shops for groceries but she often must make several trips because of her memory problems. Her brother-in-law sometimes shops for her.

Several consulting doctors have addressed Hutsell's impairments in the context of her capacity for work-related activities. In 1994, Dr. W. Gerald Fowler, a psychiatrist, observed that Hutsell "could not understand and remember simple primarily oral instructions six hours per day five days per week" and "[o]nly a blood relative or close family friend... could tolerate [Hutsell's] episodes of confusion," concluding that "[r]epeat hospitalization would probably be precipitated by the stress of increased expectations of her such as she would experience with any full-time job." Also in 1994, consulting psychologist Dr. Stephen Harris diagnosed Hutsell's borderline intellectual functioning and concluded that Hutsell was "seriously limited, but not precluded" in the majority of work-related skills listed on his assessment form. He rated her ability to deal with work stresses and maintain concentration and attention as both fair and "poor to none," which means "[n]o useful ability to function in this area." In September of 1997, Dr. Paul Loop, a psychiatrist, concluded that Hutsell is markedly limited in many areas relating to adaptation, and concentration and persistence, and moderately limited in several areas of social interaction, and understanding and memory. Dr. Loop concluded that "[w]hile she has responded favorably to neuroleptic [antipsychotic drug] use, she is still significantly impaired and would have great difficulty obtaining and maintaining gainful employment."

Hutsell's past relevant work experience includes that of a cook and a cook's helper. Hutsell stated that when she worked full-time, her primary employer let her leave work and take time off when necessary. Hutsell's work history shows that her income declined in 1990 and 1991. She earned $2790.07 in 1991 and $1815.75 in 1990, which is about $6000 less than the year before. Since her 1991 discharge from the hospital, Hutsell has not engaged in full-time employment. Hutsell has, however, worked as a temporary part-time or fill-in employee, although the number of hours that she has worked are minimal. She had no reported income in 1992, 1994, or 1995, $427.52 in 1993, and $2572.00 in 1996, when she worked as a temporary "fill in" dishwasher.

On August 28, 1992, Hutsell filed an application for disability benefits, alleging an onset date of October 31, 1990. Hutsell asserts that she is unable to work because of a nervous breakdown and mental problems. The Social Security Administration denied Hutsell's application initially and again on reconsideration. Hutsell then requested and received a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ). The ALJ denied benefits in 1994, and Hutsell appealed the decision to the Appeals Council, which remanded the case. In 1996, an ALJ again denied Hutsell benefits, and again the Appeals Council remanded.

After a third hearing, an ALJ issued an opinion on May 28, 1998, again denying benefits. The ALJ evaluated Hustell's claim according to the five-step sequential analysis prescribed by the social security regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)- (f); see also Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987) (describing analysis). At the first three steps of the analysis, the ALJ found that Hutsell had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her onset date; that she suffered from chronic schizophrenia disorder, controlled with medication; possible bipolar disorder, controlled with medication; and borderline intellectual functioning; and that she had severe impairments that did not meet or equal a listed impairment.

Although the ALJ completed a Psychiatric Review Technique Form (PRTF), the determination of Hutsell's residual functional capacity was based not on the updated medical evidence but on the 1996 ALJ decision, which found Hutsell to be only slightly impaired because "the longitudinal record establishes that the claimant has function[ed] well despite many types of stresses related to family illness, family death, death of friends, 2 adjudication hearings in this matter, illness of an adult child, and adolescent [sic] of a dependent child...." At the fourth step of analysis, the ALJ determined that Hutsell has the capacity for work other than that which involves highly complex tasks requiring abstract thinking or close interpersonal contact. The ALJ subsequently concluded that Hutsell could return to her past work as a cook or cook's helper and denied her claim for benefits.

Hutsell again appealed. This time, the Appeals Council denied her request for further review. Accordingly, the ALJ's judgment became the final decision of the Commissioner. Hutsell then sought review in the district court, which granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner. Hutsell now appeals, arguing that the ALJ's functional capacity determination is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. She also contends that the ALJ erred in determining that she could return to her past relevant work. At oral argument, Hutsell's counsel added that the case should be remanded pursuant to our recently issued opinion in Lauer v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2001).

II.

Our role is to determine whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Prosch v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1012 (8th Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but is enough that a reasonable mind would find it adequate to support the Commissioner's conclusion. Id. In determining whether existing evidence is substantial, we consider evidence that detracts from the Commissioner's decision as well as evidence that supports it. Craig v. Apfel, 212 F.3d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 2000). As long as there is substantial evidence on the record as a whole to support the Commissioner's decision, we may not reverse it because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, id., or because we would have decided the case differently, Browning v. Sullivan, 958 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 1992).

With regard to mental disorders, the Commissioner's decision "must take into account evidence indicating that the claimant's true functional ability may be substantially less than the claimant asserts or wishes." Parsons v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1334, 1341 (8th Cir. 1984). Given the unpredictable course of mental illness, "[s]ymptom-free intervals and brief remissions are generally of uncertain duration and marked by the impending possibility of relapse." Andler v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1389, 1393 (8th Cir. 1996). Moreover, "[i]ndividuals with chronic psychotic disorders commonly have their lives structured in such a way as to minimize stress and reduce their signs and symptoms." 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1, § 12.00(E) (1999). "Such individuals may be much more impaired for work than their signs and symptoms would indicate." Id.

Although the ALJ bears the primary responsibility for...