Hutter Northern Trust v. Door County Chamber of Com.
Decision Date | 20 September 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 71-1300.,71-1300. |
Citation | 467 F.2d 1075 |
Parties | HUTTER NORTHERN TRUST et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DOOR COUNTY CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
John A. Hutter, pro se.
Sven V. Kirkegaard, James R. Smith, Sturgeon Bay, Wis., for defendant-appellee.
Before SPRECHER, Circuit Judge, DURFEE, Senior Judge, United States Court of Claims,* and ESCHBACH, District Judge.**
Plaintiff Hutter, acting pro se, brought this action, based upon diversity of citizenship, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The essence of plaintiff's complaint is that he was illegally ousted from the Chamber of Commerce of Door County, Wisconsin, and as a consequence, has suffered considerable damage, including the loss of his business, the Chateau Hutter, a summer resort located in that county. The complaint, obviously drafted by a pro se plaintiff with little or no experience in pleading or practice, alleges causes of action for damages for breach of contract, interference with contract rights, deprivation of civil rights, and possibly for libel, slander, conspiracy and other wrongs. Issue was joined and a lengthy trial ensued, with over 1,200 pages of transcript of testimony. After plaintiff rested its case, defendant made a motion for a directed verdict, which was granted by the court. Plaintiff now appeals. The judgment of the District Court is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
In granting defendant's motion, the trial court concluded that This was a correct statement of the legal requirement for a directed verdict. Plaintiff's appeal asserts a plethora of challenges to this order, but does include the usual ground that there was sufficient evidence to warrant the submission of "the cause to the jury."
Plaintiff presented his case pro se. Although the trial judge stated that "Hutter is an experienced lawyer", plaintiff stated that he had never tried a lawsuit and never appeared before a jury. Our review of the record supports this conclusion that plaintiff lacked even the minimal amount of legal experience and ability to adequately represent himself pro se.
In attempting to present evidence to support his cause in over 1,210 pages of transcript, plaintiff was confronted with a constant fusillade of over 1,800 objections by defendant's counsel without any reason therefor being stated. These incessant objections were usually sustained by the trial judge without any statement of the basis for the ruling, despite plaintiff's many requests therefor because of his inexperience with the rules of evidence. Plaintiff was thus constantly thwarted in his attempts to present testimony in support of his case. Out of the 1,210 pages of the transcript, there are less than 100 pages of admitted testimony. This is not to imply that all of the questions propounded by plaintiff were unobjectionable. However, as the trial progressed, it is apparent that its usual sequence was for plaintiff to ask a question, for defense counsel to object, and for the court to sustain the objection, without stating any grounds for the ruling, as requested by plaintiff.
For instance, plaintiff on direct examination of Robert Metivir, a witness who had been a guest at Hutter's resort, did ask leading questions, which if properly presented, could have been relevant and material. When the court sustained defendant's objections, the following colloquy took place:
Consequently, no explanation was provided. The particular questions which had just been asked by plaintiff do appear to have been objectionable as leading. It cannot be assumed plaintiff would have been unable to rephrase the questions so as to make them not leading, if he had the benefit of the reasons for the court's ruling. However, in effect, this procedure was denied plaintiff. This was not merely an isolated incident, but rather characteristic of the entire trial. Thirty pages later plaintiff was questioning on direct examination another witness who had been a guest at the resort. Counsel for defendant was still objecting without specifying the grounds for doing so, and the trial judge, accordingly, was still sustaining the objections without any explanation as to the basis for his rulings:
Ten questions and ten objections later, all of the objections being sustained, the following exchange took place between plaintiff and the trial judge:
In the remaining ten pages of transcript containing the direct examination of this witness, this pattern continued, except that counsel for defendant would occasionally state the basis for his objection. Again, it is apparent that some of the objections made by counsel for defendant had a reasonable basis, although in most cases neither the court nor counsel were willing to say what this basis might be. Moreover, there were questions asked by plaintiff, which were excluded by the court, which were not obviously objectionable, if indeed they were objectionable at all. Here too, no explanation was given by the court, notwithstanding plaintiff's request. Later, during plaintiff's direct examination of his wife, the following exchange occurred:
Plaintiff later sought to elicit testimony on direct examination from the manager of the Door County Chamber of Commerce by way of leading questions. In response to plaintiff's claim that the witness was a hostile witness, the court responded that such had not been demonstrated. What plaintiff failed to do was to draw the distinction made in Rule 43(b) (Fed.R.Civ.P. 43(b)), between hostile or unwilling witnesses, and an adverse party or officer of an adverse party. Whereas the witness would clearly come within the latter category, and thus be subject to leading questions on direct examination, it is at least a colorable contention that he might not come within the former category. It seems somewhat incongruous that in the same proceeding in which the trial judge granted such considerable...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Cersosimo v. Cersosimo
...is bound by the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law. See Hutter Northern Trust v. Door County Chamber of Commerce, 467 F.2d 1075, 1079 (7th Cir. 1972); Murphy v. Citizens Bank of Clovis, 244 F.2d 511, 512 (10th Cir. 1957); Hampton v. Gilmore, 511 S.W.2d 4......
-
U.S. v. Young
...has broad discretion in deciding whether or not to allow narrative testimony. Fed.R.Evid. 611(a); Hutter Northern Trust v. Door County Chamber of Commerce, 467 F.2d 1075, 1078 (7th Cir.1972); see Goings v. United States, 377 F.2d 753, 762-63 (8th Cir.1967). We see no reason to apply a diffe......
-
Steege v. Johnsson (In re Johnsson)
...(trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying pro se 's request to testy in narrative form); Hutter N. Trust v. Door Cnty. Chamber of Commerce, 467 F.2d 1075, 1078 (7th Cir.1972) (same).Despite these accommodations, the Debtor's behavior repeatedly called into question the balancing ......
-
U.S. v. Burke
...will sustain a decision excluding evidence if any ground would have been sufficient support. See Hutter Northern Trust v. Door County Chamber of Commerce, 467 F.2d 1075, 1079-80 (7th Cir.1972); cf. United States v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394, 400 (7th Cir.1985). The district judge was within her ......
-
Coordinating the attack in trial
...improper. [ United States v. Carboni , 204 F3d 39, 45 (2nd Cir.2000) (leading); Hutter Northern Trust v. Door County Chamber of Commerce , 467 F2d 1075, 1078 (7th Cir. 1972) (narrative).] Despite these principles, courts retain wide latitude to permit them, as the court has discretion on th......