Hutto v. Davis

• Decision Date: 11 January 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-23,81-23
• Citation: 102 S.Ct. 703,70 L.Ed.2d 556,454 U.S. 370
• Parties: Terrell Don HUTTO, Director, Virginia State Department of Corrections, et al. v. Roger Trenton DAVIS
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

454 U.S. 370

102 S.Ct. 703

70 L.Ed.2d 556

Terrell Don HUTTO, Director, Virginia State Department of Corrections, et al.

v Roger Trenton DAVIS.

No. 81-23.

Jan. 11, 1982.

Rehearing Denied March 22, 1982.

See 455 U.S. 1038, 102 S.Ct. 1742.

PER CURIAM.

On October 26, 1973, law enforcement officers raided respondent's home and seized approximately nine ounces of marihuana and assorted drug paraphernalia. Several days before the raid, officers had tape-recorded a transaction in which respondent had sold marihuana and other controlled substances to a police informant. With the aid of the seized evidence and the tape recording, respondent was convicted in Virginia state court of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of marihuana. The jury imposed a fine of $10,000 and a prison term of 20 years on each of the two counts, the prison terms to run consecutively. At the time of respondent's conviction, Virginia law authorized fines of up to $25,000 and prison terms of not less than 5 nor more than 40 years for each of respondent's offenses. Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226, 1229 (CA4 1978).

After exhausting direct appeal, respondent brought a habeas action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, asserting that a 40-year sentence was so grossly disproportionate to the crime of possessing less than nine ounces of marihuana that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment as proscribed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The District Court, relying primarily upon the four factors set forth in Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (CA4 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938, 94 S.Ct. 1454, 39 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974), agreed:

"After examining the nature of the offense, the legislative purpose behind the punishment, the punishment in the Commonwealth of Virginia for other offenses, and the punishment actually imposed for the same or similar offenses in Virginia, this court must necessarily conclude that a sentence of forty years and twenty thousand dollars in fines is so grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crimes as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution." Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F.Supp. 444, 453 (1977).

Accordingly, the District Court issued a writ of habeas corpus.

A panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed. Davis v. Davis, supra. The panel correctly noted that this Court "has never found a sentence for a term of years within the limits authorized by statute to be, by itself, a cruel and unusual punishment," 585 F.2d, at 1229, and held that respondent had failed to show that his sentence, in light of the factors known to the jury ¹ and the punishment authorized by Virginia, was sufficiently extraordinary to violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id., at 1233. The decision was short-lived. Sitting en banc, the Court of Appeals reheard the case and, "for reasons sufficiently stated by the district judge in his opinion," affirmed the award of habeas relief. Davis v. Davis, 601 F.2d 153, 154 (1979). We granted certiorari, vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of our decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980). Sub nom. Hutto v. Davis, 445 U.S. 947, 100 S.Ct. 1593, 63 L.Ed.2d 782 (1980). The Court of Appeals again affirmed the District Court, this time by an equally divided vote. Davis v. Davis, 646 F.2d 123 (1981). Because the Court of Appeals failed to heed our decision in Rummel, we now reverse.

The petitioner in Rummel was sentenced to life imprisonment under the Texas recidivist statute upon being convicted of his third felony: obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses. He had previously been convicted of passing a forged check in the amount of $28.36, and of fraudulently using a credit card to obtain $80 worth of goods or services. 445 U.S., at 265-266, 100 S.Ct., at 1135-1136. Like the respondent in this case, Rummel argued that the length of his imprisonment was so "grossly disproportionate" to the crime for which he was sentenced that it violated the ban on cruel and unusual punishment of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In rejecting that argument, we distinguished between punishments—such as the death penalty—which by their very nature differ from all other forms of conventionally accepted punishment, and punishments which differ from others only in duration. This distinction was based upon two factors. First, this "Court's Eighth Amendment judgments should neither be nor appear to be merely the subjective views of individual Justices." Id., at 275, 100 S.Ct., at 1140. And second, the excessiveness of one prison term as compared to another is invariably a subjective determination, there being no clear way to make "any constitutional distinction between one term of years and a shorter or longer term of years." Ibid. Thus, we concluded that "one could argue without fear of contradiction by any decision of this Court that for crimes concededly classified and classifiable as felonies, . . . the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative." Id., at 274, 100 S.Ct., at 1139. Accordingly, we held that Rummel's life sentence did not violate the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment.

As mentioned above, the District Court found respondent's sentence to be unconstitutional by applying the four-part test of Hart v. Coiner, supra. Hart also was relied upon by the lower-court dissenters in Rummel, and was implicitly disapproved by our rejection of the dissenters' view. Not only did we expressly recognize Hart as the primary opposing authority, 445 U.S., at 267, 269, 100 S.Ct., at 1135, 1136, but our opinion also disapproved each of its four "objective" factors.² Because the District Court's grant of habeas relief was clearly guided by these factors, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming.

In short, Rummel stands for the proposition that federal courts should be "reluctan[t] to review legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment," id. at 274, 100 S.Ct., at 1139, and that "successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences" should be "exceedingly rare," id. at 272, 100 S.Ct., at 1138.³ By affirming the District Court decision after our decision in Rummel, the Court of Appeals sanctioned an intrusion into the basic line-drawing process that is "properly within the province of legislatures, not courts." Id., at 275-276, 100 S.Ct., at 1139-1140. More importantly, however, the Court of Appeals could be viewed as having ig- nored, consciously or unconsciously, the hierarchy of the federal court system created by the Constitution and Congress. Admittedly, the Members of this Court decide cases "by virtue of their commissions, not their competence." And arguments may be made one way or the other whether the present case is distinguishable, except as to its facts, from Rummel. But unless we wish anarchy to prevail within the federal judicial system, a precedent of this Court must be followed by the lower federal courts no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may think it to be.

Accordingly, the petition for a writ of certiorari is granted, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss respondent's habeas petition.

It is so ordered.

Justice POWELL, concurring in the judgment.

The Court holds that the Eighth Amendment countenances a prison term of 40 years and a fine of $20,000 for respondent's possession and distribution of approximately nine ounces of marihuana said to have a street value of about $200. I view the sentence as unjust and disproportionate to the offense. Nevertheless, for the reasons stated below I reluctantly conclude that the Court's decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980), is controlling on the facts before us. Accordingly, I join the judgment only.

I

The respondent Davis met Eads in prison. During Eads' confinement, his wife had become a drug user. Concerned about this development and its effect on their 2-year-old child, Eads offered to cooperate with the police "to assist in the exposure and arrest of those supplying drugs to his wife and any illicit drug distributor in the area, including Davis who Eads identified as an active drug dealer in Wythe County." Davis v. Davis, 585 F.2d 1226, 1228 (CA4 1978).

On furlough from prison, Eads told Davis he wished to buy drugs for himself and some mutual friends currently in prison. Shortly thereafter, the two went to Davis' home where Davis sold Eads three ounces of marihuana for $74. Davis also gave Eads "drug pills which included L.S.D. and another illicit controlled drug." Ibid. A police raid on Davis' home later uncovered about six ounces of marihuana, two scales, and other drug paraphernalia.

Davis was found guilty of both distributing marihuana and of possessing marihuana with intent to distribute. On each count, he received a sentence of 20 years' imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. These sentences were imposed on a consecutive basis. The District Court granted his petition for a writ of habeas corpus because the sentences were "so grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crimes as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment . . . ." ¹ This judgment was reversed on appeal, Davis v. Davis, supra, but reinstated by the Court of Appeals on rehearing en banc.² We remanded for reconsideration in light of our decision in Rummel v. Estelle, supra.³ By an equally divided vote en banc, the Court of Appeals again affirmed.⁴

II

The sole authority upon which the Court today relies is its decision in Rummel v. Estelle. Rummel decided that the Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishments ⁵ was not transgressed by the imposition of life imprisonment for a recidivist's third felony,...