Hutto v. State

Decision Date12 August 1965
Docket Number1 Div. 134
PartiesSanford L. HUTTO v. STATE of Alabama.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Thos. M. Haas, Mobile, for appellant.

Richmond M. Flowers, Atty. Gen., and David W. Clark, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

COLEMAN, Justice.

From conviction for murder in the second degree defendant appeals.

On Thursday evening, September 20, 1962, three young men met a woman at a restaurant in Saraland. Defendant joined the group and left the restaurant with them some time later. Defendant was driving his automobile. The woman and one of the three young men were in the back seat. Defendant drove to a wooded area in or near Saraland and stopped. Later, the other two of the three young men followed in another car and came to the place where defendant's car had stopped. One or more of the three young men had sexual intercourse with the woman. The three young men drove off and left defendant and the woman together.

In the late afternoon of Friday, September 21, 1962, two boys found the body of the woman and police were notified. The toxicologist testified that a knotted handkerchief was tied tightly around the woman's neck, and that analysis of a sample of blood taken from the woman's body showed 'that there was a percentage of alcohol in the blood sufficient to render the person from whom the blood was taken intoxicated.'

The assistant coroner testified that he performed an autopsy on the body and that death was due to strangulation brought about by the handkerchief knotted about the neck. Defendant was convicted of murdering this woman.

Counsel for defendant argues the points which call for consideration.

Defendant argues that he should have been granted a continuance on account of an occurrence, which took place while the court was qualifying the venire, as follows:

'THE COURT: Gentlemen, do any of you know any members of the defendant's family?

'MR. TRAVIS WALKER: I think his sister works in the store up there where I am at.

'THE COURT: All right. Are there any other questions you wish me to put to this gentleman. Mr. Newbill is standing there. Yes, sir.

'MR. NEWBILL: I knew the deceased's family.

'THE COURT: Might I ask the extent of the knowledge? What was the acquaintance?

'MR. NEWBILL: I lived in the area in which she lived and I knew her ex-husband real well. And I knew her children while she was in the insane asylum--

'THE COURT: Well, all I want, Mr. Newbill, is your knowledge of the family, not any of the other.

'MR. HAAS: If the Court please, in view of the unfortunate statement from the juror, the defendant humbly asks for another panel of jurors to hear this case.

'THE COURT: Motion is denied.

'MR. HAAS: Exception.'

Under the rule expressed in Fisher v. State, 23 Ala.App. 544, 129 So. 303, it is error to permit the state to show, over defendant's objection, the number of children left by deceased, their ages, etc. Certainly, under that rule, the court would have erred to reversal if the court had permitted the state to show, over defendant's objection, that deceased left children. See Knight v. State, 273 Ala. 480, 142 So.2d 899. Such evidence has no probative value with respect to the issues before the jury and is prejudicial to defendant because the evidence tends to provoke, in the jury, sympathy for the children of deceased who have lost a parent and animosity against defendant who has allegedly caused the loss. Evidence that deceased had been in the insane asylum is likewise irrelevant and could tend to prejudice defendant.

The statement, however, was made by a juror and not by a witness. If the statement had been volunteered by a witness, defendant could and should have moved the court to instruct the jury to disregard the statement. We think, if defendant thought the statement damaging, he should have so moved the court with respect to the statement here. In view of the nature of the statement, i. e., merely that the speaker knew the children of deceased while she was in the insane asylum, we are of opinion that any prejudicial effect could have been removed by instructions from the court to the jury to disregard the statement. We are not to be understood as holding that the prejudice of a statement going into greater detail could be removed by such an instruction to the jury.

Further, this statement did not come from the witness stand, and the court, in its oral charge, said to the jury:

'Now, gentlemen, you are the sole judges of the facts in the case and you take the law as the Court has given it to you and the evidence as it has come to you from the witness stand and you put the two together and say whether or not this defendant is guilty or not guilty. Do not dwell upon surmise, conjecture or guesswork, or undertake to reconstruct in your own mind what the facts might have been, but take the facts as they come to you from the sworn testimony given in this Court. . . ..'

We hold that denial of continuance was not error.

Defendant argues that the court erred in admitting into evidence state's exhibit 1 over defendant's objection. Exhibit 1 is a photograph of the face, neck, hands, left shoulder, and left arm of deceased. The body is clothed.

The toxicologist testified that the exhibit fairly and accurately shows the way the handkerchief was around the neck of the deceased at the time the witness first observed the body at the scene.

On examining the picture, we are of opinion that the picture meets the test that it must have some tendency to prove or disprove some disputed or material issue, to illustrate some other material fact or evidence, or to corroborate or disprove some other evidence offered or to be offered. It must have some tendency to shed some light on some material inquiry. Rollings v. State, 160 Ala. 82, 49 So. 329; Nichols v. State, 267 Ala. 217, 100 So.2d 750. Overruling objection to the photograph was not error.

Defendant argues that the court erred in overruling defendant's objections and admitting into evidence two written confessions allegedly made by defendant.

To follow a chronological order, however, we note first the testimony of a patrolman of the Saraland Police Department. The patrolman testified that about 5:00 p. m., on Friday, September 21st, he arrived at the place where the body had been found that day; that he kept vehicles from entering the road; that he remained there until 10:00 p. m.; that, while there, he saw a number of people; and that defendant came there about 5:35 p. m.

The patrolman testified that defendant was not threatened or offered any inducement or hope of reward in order to get him to make a statement, and that no violence was applied to defendant. Over defendant's objection, the patrolman testified that defendant said: "I did it. Here I am. Lock me up or take me later."; that defendant remained where patrolman was for fifteen or twenty minutes; that the patrolman did not arrest defendant; and that the patrolman did not see defendant any more or thereafter participate in the investigation. Defendant does not argue that this oral confession was not voluntary or that evidence to prove it was not admissible.

On voir dire, when the jury was not present, the patrolman testified that he had been present 'down in General Sessions Court when a hearing was held in this case' and did not testify and that he did not testify before the grand jury.

After the jury returned to the box, on cross-examination, defendant asked the patrolman whether he had testified before the grand jury or at the preliminary hearing. The state objected to each question and the court sustained the objections. Defendant argues that the court erred in so ruling.

Defendant says the rulings were erroneous because the cross-examination was unduly limited and the jury was entitled to know all the circumstances surrounding the alleged confession.

Whether the patrolman did or did not testify at the preliminary hearing or before the grand jury sheds no light on the issue of defendant's guilt or on the credibility of the patrolman. The question whether he had testified earlier is not the same question as when did he first make known to his superiors the fact that defendant had made the alleged oral confession. It may be that the failure of the witness to come forward with his testimony at the earliest reasonable opportunity would reflect on his credibility. The defendant cross-examined the patrolman as to when he reported the confession to his superiors and the jury had the full benefit of the questions and of the patrolman's answers.

On the other hand, the failure of the patrolman to testify before the grand jury or on preliminary hearing may well have been because the solicitor decided that the patrolman's testimony was unnecessary on those occasions.

We are of opinion that the court did not err in sustaining the objections to the questions asking the patrolman whether he had testified earlier.

Two written confessions allegedly made and signed by defendant were admitted into evidence over defendant's objection, and defendant strenuously insists that the court erred in overruling his objections. In brief, defendant states the circumstances of the confession as follows:

'On the afternoon of September 22, 1962, two or three police officers went to the home of the Appellant in Saraland, Alabama, and took the Appellant to the police station at Saraland. The Appellant was questioned by the Sheriff of Mobile County, Alabama, and one of his deputys, the Chief of Police of the town of Saraland, and perhaps other officers, from about 2:00 P.M., September 22, 1962, until around midnight of the same day. The Appellant made no statement on that day. Around midnight, the Chief of Police of the town of Saraland placed a charge on the docket book of said town against the Appellant, apparently being a charge of vagrancy under some ordinance of the town of Saraland. The Appellant was kept in the town jail and was again...

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