Hutton v. Autoridad Sobre Hogares De La Capital

• Decision Date: 23 July 1948
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 5086.
• Citation: 78 F. Supp. 988
• Parties: HUTTON v. AUTORIDAD SOBRE HOGARES DE LA CAPITAL.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

78 F. Supp. 988

HUTTON v. AUTORIDAD SOBRE HOGARES DE LA CAPITAL.

Civ. No. 5086.

District Court, Puerto Rico.

July 23, 1948.

Celestino Iriarte, F. Fernandez Cuyar and H. Gonzalez Blanes, all of San Juan, P. R., for plaintiff.

James R. Beverley, of San Juan, P. R., for defendant.

CHAVEZ, District Judge.

Plaintiff's amended complaint filed April 28, 1948, against the Autoridad sobre Hogares de la Capital, hereinafter referred to as the Housing Authority, alleges that on and before the year 1940, plaintiff was the owner in fee simple of the land described in the amended complaint; and in 1940, the defendant filed suit against the plaintiff for condemnation of said lands; and on January 14, 1941 the District Court of San Juan rendered final judgment of condemnation of said properties in favor of defendant and awarded plaintiff the sum of $68,965.74 as full compensation for all damages caused plaintiff by said condemnation. Defendant entered into possession of said properties.

Plaintiff further alleges that the lands were expropriated by defendant for the express and avowed purpose of "developing its program of low cost home construction, and specifically for the construction of "Project P.R.-2-3", and that it needed said lands in order "to provide low-cost sanitary and decent homes for persons of moderate income in the Capital of Puerto Rico, that is, San Juan, and in order to eliminate slums within the Capital of Puerto Rico".

Plaintiff then alleges that over seven years have elapsed since the final judgment of condemnation in favor of defendant, but nevertheless, defendant has not utilized the lands condemned for the purpose for which they were expropriated from plaintiff, or for any other purpose, and specifically defendant has not constructed or developed on said lands "Project P.R.-2-3", nor any other low-cost housing project, nor has plaintiff provided in said lands condemned low-cost sanitary and decent houses for persons of moderate income in the Capital of Puerto Rico, that is, San Juan; nor has plaintiff eliminated slums in said lands.

Plaintiff further alleges that the lands condemned by defendant were voluntarily leased by said defendant to a third party for purposes wholly foreign and different from those for which said lands were expropriated, and alleges further that plaintiff has deposited with the Clerk of the Court the sum of $68,965.74, which sum is offered and tendered to defendant as being the amount received from said defendant by virtue of the judgment of condemnation.

The defendant Housing Authority on May 5, 1948, filed a motion to dismiss the amended bill of complaint on three grounds, to wit:

1. The Amended Bill of Complaint alleges in paragraph 5 thereof that the lands involved in this suit are leased by defendant to a third party. Such third party, in accordance with the laws of Puerto Rico, is an indispensable party to this proceeding and has not been made a defendant herein and there is, therefore, a lack of parties defendant.

2. In accordance with the Act of Congress of September 1st, 1937 (50 Stat. 888 42 U.S.C.A. § 1401 et seq.) the United States Housing Authority is an indispensable party in this proceeding and has not been sued herein.

3. The defendant herein is an agency and instrumentality of the Government of Puerto Rico and the article of the statute under which plaintiff brings this present suit, to wit, Section 7 of the law regulating expropriation proceedings approved March 12, 1903, as amended, is not applicable to the Government of Puerto Rico, its agents and instrumentalities, consequently the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against defendant.

On May 14, 1948, the defendant filed a Supplementary Motion to Dismiss Amended Bill of Complaint, in which motion defendant repeats and re-affirms the grounds for dismissal set forth in its motion dated May 5, 1948, and on the further ground that the section of the statute under which plaintiff has brought suit, to wit: sec. 7 of the Expropriation Law of Puerto Rico, has been repealed by virtue of Act 105 of the Legislature of Puerto Rico, approved by the Governor of Puerto Rico on May 11, 1948, which statute took effect upon the date of its signature in accordance with the terms thereof.

The defendant contends that the right of the plaintiff to bring suit under Sec. 7 of the Expropriation Act, was purely a statutory right and that when the Statute (Sec. 7) was repealed, such right ceased to exist and the right of action is terminated.

The plaintiff concedes the rule to be as cited by Sec. 2042, 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3d, Ed., p. 522-523, as follows: "Sec. 2042. Effect of repeal, etc. The effect of the repeal of a statute where neither a saving clause nor a general saving statute exists to prescribe the governing rule for the effect of the repeal, is to destroy the effectiveness of the repealed act in futuro and to divest the right to proceed under the statute, which, except as to proceedings past and closed, is considered as if it had never existed."

However, plaintiff contends that the above principle does not govern where a saving clause exists, either in the statute itself or in a general saving statute. Plaintiff relies on Sec. 386 of the Political Code of Puerto Rico as a saving clause and claims further that the effect of a general saving statute is to preserve the action as it existed and is in harmony with Sec. 3 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, Ed., 1930.

The statutes pertinent to this case are as follows:

Sec. 282, Civil Code of P. R., Ed. 1930 provides as follows: "No person shall be deprived of his ownership, except it be by a competent authority and for a justified purpose of public utility, and after having been properly indemnified."

Sec. 7 of the Expropriation Act of Puerto Rico, approved March 12, 1903, as amended by the Act approved March 12, 1908, which provides as follows: "Sec. 7 (As amended by act of Mar. 12, 1908, p. 94). In all cases of condemnation, sale, transfer or voluntary encumbrance of property for the performance of a work of public utility, whenever such work is not completed within the time fixed by the concession or franchise, or, in case no time is so fixed, within the term of six months, counting from the date on which the final decision ordering the condemnation was rendered, the party dispossessed or who voluntarily sold, transferred or encumbered his right of ownership shall have a right of action to recover the property condemned, returning the amount received."

Act No. 105, Laws of Puerto Rico approved May 11, 1948, reads as follows: Sec. 3. "Sec. 7 of the Act to Provide for the Condemnation of Private Property for the purposes and under the conditions therein named, approved March 12, 1903 as subsequently amended, is hereby repealed."

Sec. 386 of the Political Code of Puerto Rico, provides as follows: "The repeal of any statute by the Legislative Assembly shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing act shall so expressly provide and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture or liability."

Sec. 3 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, Ed. 1930, provides as follows: "Sec. 3.— Laws shall not have a retroactive effect unless they expressly so decree. In no case shall the retroactive effect of a law operate to the prejudice of rights acquired under previous legislative action."

The defendant in his brief relies principally upon the matters raised in its supplementary motion to dismiss, that is, that Sec. 7 of the Expropriation Act of Puerto Rico was repealed by Act No. 105, approved May 11, 1948.

Points 1 and 2 are ruled against the defendant. Point 3 is ruled against the defendant. (Autoridad sobre Hogares de Puerto Rico v. Corte de Distrito de Arecibo, Hon. R. Agrait Aldea, Juez, No. 1718, decided by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico on January 23, 1948.)

We come now to consider the matters raised by the Supplementary Motion to Dismiss.

Sec. 386 of the Political Code of Puerto Rico is identical with the Federal Statute. See Title 1 U.S.C.A. § 29, and Sec. 109, same title.

This section was derived from the Act of February 25, 1871, and was incorporated in U. S. Revised Statutes as Sec. 13.

This section has been construed by the courts not as an attempt to limit the power of Congress or the Legislature, but merely prescribes a rule of construction, binding upon the courts, as a substitute for the common-law rule with respect to the effect of a repealing statute, as a release from penalties and prosecutions for offenses committed under the statute repealed, and under it the repeal of a penal statute extinguishes no penalties previously incurred thereunder in the absence of an expressed extinguishing clause in the repealing act. (see cases cited 1 U.S.C.A. § 29)

The Federal courts have construed the words "penalty", "forfeiture" and "liability", as being synonymous with "punishment", in connection with crimes of every grade, and the section was intended to apply to all offenses. United States v. Ulrici, Fed. Cas. No. 16, 594; United States v. Van Vliet, D.C., 23 F. 35, reversing D.C., 22 F. 641.

It should be noted that all of the above cases referred to, covered a period approximately from 1870 to 1910. In that year Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 30 S.Ct. 621, 54 L.Ed. 1001, was decided. This case held that the section (R.S. § 13), was not alone applicable to penalties and forfeitures under penal statutes but extends as well to "liabilities", and a liability or obligation to pay a tax imposed under a repealed statute is not only within the letter, but the spirit and purpose of the provision.

The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico applied the principles outlined in Hertz v. Woodman, supra, in P....