Hutton v. States Accident Ins. Co.

• Citation: 108 N.E. 296,267 Ill. 267
• Decision Date: 07 April 1915
• Docket Number: No. 9782.,9782.
• Parties: HUTTON v. STATES ACCIDENT INS. CO.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

267 Ill. 267

108 N.E. 296

HUTTON

v.STATES ACCIDENT INS. CO.

No. 9782.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 17, 1915.

Rehearing Denied April 7, 1915.

Appeal from Appellate Court, Fourth District, on Appeal from Circuit Court, Jasper County; A. M. Rose, Judge.

Action by John W. Hutton against the States Accident Insurance Company. From a judgment of the Appellate Court (186 Ill. App. 499), affirming a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals on certificate of importance. Reversed and remanded.

Farmer, J., dissenting.Fithian & Kasserman, of Newton (McKenzie Cleland, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Wm. B. Wright, of Effingham, for appellee.

COOKE, J.

The appellee, John W. Hutton, obtained a judgment in the circuit court of Jasper county against the appellant, the States Accident Insurance Company, for $500, which was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the Fourth District. 186 Ill. App. 499. A certificate of importance having been granted, this appeal has been perfected from the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The suit was brought upon a policy of accident insurance issued by appellant, which insured the appellee against ‘injuries effected exclusively by external, violent, and accidental means.’ The record discloses that at the close of appellee's case, and again at the close of all the evidence, a peremptory instruction was offered to find the issues for the appellant, which was refused in each instance. In the Appellate Court this action of the court was assigned for error, and the errors there assigned have been reassigned here. While in the argument of appellant this action of the court is not specifically referred to, the effect of the argument made is that there was no evidence tending to support appellee's claim or to disclose a cause of action, and this is the only question of law presented upon this appeal. Counsel for appellee in his brief states:

‘If this case has any standing in the Supreme Court, it is upon the theory that there is no evidence in the record on behalf of plaintiff which, standing alone and undisputed, would support the verdict of the jury; in other words, if it is rightfully here, it is because the court refused, at the close of plaintiff's evidence and at the close of all the evidence, to instruct the jury to find the issues for the defendant.’

And his argument, in effect, is directed to upholding the action of the court in refusing the peremptory instructions. We shall therefore consider the case as though this action of the court was specifically mentioned by appellant as the ground relied upon for reversal.

There was practically no conflict in the testimony of the various witnesses as to the facts. According to the testimony of appellee, in which the facts are presented in as favorable light as by any other witness, there had been some little difficulty between him and one John Huddlestun prior to November 9, 1911. On that evening he and Huddlestun had a conversation in the city of Newton in reference to their difficulty, after which appellee went to his office. Having finished his work there, he went to a restaurant in that city to get his supper. As he entered the restaurant from the west, he saw Huddlestun sitting on a stool on the south side of the room, at a lunch counter. Without saying a word to Huddlestun, appellee walked up behind him and struck him a blow with his fist on the side of the face or head, intending, as he states, to hit him so hard that ‘he wouldn't get up and begin it all over.’ The blow did not have the desired effect. Huddlestun immediately arose from his seat, whereupon the appellee struck at him again. Huddlestun then pushed or knocked appellee down, breaking his leg. It is uncertain from the testimony of appellee whether his leg was broken in the fall, or whether it was twisted and broken before he fell; but in any event it was broken, according to the undisputed testimony, while he was engaged in the fight with Huddlestun.

Appellant contends that, where an accident policy insures against an injury effected exclusively by accidental means, there can be no recovery where such injury is the result of the voluntary act of the insured, although such result may be entirely unexpected and undesigned, and insists that the evidence does not even tend to prove that the injury was caused by accidental means, inasmuch as appellee had voluntarily engaged in a fight, of which the injury received was but the natural and probable consequence. The contention of appellee is based upon the proposition that his act in assaulting Huddlestun was attended with an unexpected and unusual result-that is, the breaking of his leg-and one which could not have been reasonably anticipated and which he did not intend to produce. We are of the opinion that the position of appellee is not tenable. Where one voluntarily and deliberately engages in a fight or brawl, and places another in a position where he, too, must fight to defend himself, it is a natural result, and one known to all sensible men as likely to follow, that one or both of the combatants will receive...