Huynh v. Ingersoll-Rand

• Decision Date: 17 June 1993
• Docket Number: No. B067825,INGERSOLL-RAN,D,B067825
• Citation: 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 296,16 Cal.App.4th 825
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: Jones T. HUYNH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v.efendant and Respondent.

Page 296

20 Cal.Rptr.2d 296

16 Cal.App.4th 825

Jones T. HUYNH, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. INGERSOLL-RAND, Defendant and Respondent.

No. B067825.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 7, California.

June 17, 1993.

[16 Cal.App.4th 828] Charles R. Weldon, Norwalk, for plaintiff and appellant.

McHale and Connor, and Bruce Janger, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent.

JOHNSON, Associate Justice.

In this case, a worker sued the manufacturer of a hand held power grinder which severely injured his eye. The trial court granted summary judgment on grounds the grinder was "misused" by attaching the wrong disc to the machine. We reverse because the defendant failed to sustain its burden of proving the "misuse" caused the injury or of demonstrating the manufacturer provided an adequate warning against this potential dangerous mismatch of components.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

In September 1987, appellant Jones T. Huynh applied for a position as a welder at Southwest Marine, Inc. This firm required all prospective welders to demonstrate their ability through a "welding test." On September 27, 1987, the third day of his test, Huynh was required to use a grinder. Some Southwest Marine employee handed Huynh an Ingersoll-Rand (Ingersoll) model DG220 pneumatic hand grinder with attached disc. The following language was inscribed in tiny letters on the "trigger" of the Ingersoll pneumatic grinder.

Warning

Operate with Equip

Rated at Tool R.P.M.

Model DG220

Rated 30000

Ser AHJ20154

(A photocopy of the imprint of this language was included in the record before the trial court and on this appeal.)

When given to Huynh, this grinder and disc had already been assembled either by that employee or another Southwest Marine employee. Shortly after Huynh started using the grinder the disc "exploded." Fragments of the disk struck Huynh's face, severely damaging his left eye.

On September 19, 1988, Huynh filed a complaint against several defendants including Ingersoll, the manufacturer of the pneumatic grinder. The complaint contains three causes of action: strict product liability, negligence, and breach of warranty. All three causes of action embody broad allegations the grinder was defective in design and manufacture, and lacked adequate warnings.

Ingersoll filed an answer presenting a general denial and, among other things, an affirmative defense based on Huynh's alleged "misuse" of its product, the grinder.

Ingersoll moved for summary judgment based on the "misuse" affirmative defense. The motion was supported by declarations the grinder was rated at 30,000 revolutions per minute (r.p.m.'s) while the disc Huynh used was rated at only 24,000 r.p.m.'s. In his opposition, Huynh contended the "misuse" was foreseeable and Ingersoll's warning against this mismatch danger was inadequate. As alternative grounds for resisting the "misuse" affirmative defense, Huynh argued the causation issue remained a jury issue and, in any event, the grinder was defectively designed in ways which promoted a mismatch of grinder and disc and/or independently contributed to Huynh's injuries.

While conceding it was a "close case," the trial court nevertheless entered summary judgment in favor of defendant on April 23, 1992. In doing so, the court upheld the affirmative defense of "misuse" of the product. It also found the "adequacy" of the warning was irrelevant because some Southwest Marine employees had read and comprehended that warning. It further found Huynh had not produced sufficient credible evidence of a design defect to support that basis of liability.

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON DEFENDANT'S ASSERTION OF AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.

The general principles governing review of any summary judgment require the closest scrutiny of the trial court's ruling when it reaches the appellate level. "The summary judgment procedure, inasmuch as it denies the right of the adverse party to a trial, is drastic and should be used with caution." (Citation omitted.) Summary judgment is properly granted only when the evidence in support of the moving party establishes that there is no issue of fact to be tried.... [p] " ' "The affidavits of the moving party are strictly construed and those of his opponent liberally construed, and doubts as to the propriety of summary judgment should be resolved against granting the motion." ' " Gomez v. Ticor (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 622, 626-627, 193 Cal.Rptr. 600.) "If any triable issue of fact exists, it is error for the trial court to grant a party's motion for summary judgment." (Robinson v. City and County of San Francisco (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 334, 337, 116 Cal.Rptr. 125.)

The burden on the moving party, when as is typical that party is a defendant, becomes even heavier when the summary judgment motion is based on an affirmative defense. Instead of merely supplying enough evidence to negate a single element of plaintiff's cause of action, the moving party must produce evidence which proves a "complete defense" (LaRosa v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 741, 744, 176 Cal.Rptr. 224, italics added.) "[T]here is no obligation on the opposing party (plaintiffs here) to establish anything by affidavit unless and until the moving party has by affidavit stated " ' "facts establishing every element [of the affirmative defense] necessary to sustain a judgment in his favor. (Citation omitted.)" ' " " (Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co. (1965) 237 Cal.App.2d 44, 50, 46 Cal.Rptr. 552.)

What this means, of course, is that if an affirmative defense has four elements, it does not suffice even if the defendant produces overwhelming evidence as to three of those elements. If the defendant fails to address the fourth element at all or to produce substantial evidence supporting that element, the trial court cannot properly grant summary judgment. Moreover, a summary judgment granted in those circumstances would have to be reversed, even if the plaintiff failed to introduce a scintilla of evidence challenging that element.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF TRIABLE ISSUES.

Ingersoll predicated its summary judgment motion on a single ground--the affirmative defense that Huynh "misused" its product, the grinder, by coupling it with a disc not rated to handle the higher speeds at which the grinder was capable of running. Several triable issues remain concerning this narrowly focused summary judgment motion.

A. A Triable Issue Remains Whether the Alleged "Misuse" of Ingersoll's Grinder was the Actual Cause of Huynh Injury.

"Misuse" is a defense only when that misuse is the actual cause of the plaintiff's injury, not when some other defect produces the harm. (Self v. General Motors Corp. (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 1, 9, 116 Cal.Rptr. 575.) This causation is one of the elements of the "misuse" affirmative defense and thus the burden falls on the defendant to prove it. At the summary judgment stage, it is not the responsibility of the responding party to produce evidence other factors may have caused the injury. Instead it is part of the moving party's obligation to complete its proof of the affirmative defense of "misuse" by demonstrating this "misuse"--rather than some other factor--was the proximate cause of the injury.

Ingersoll produced no evidence supporting a finding this disc exploded on this occasion solely because the plaintiff used a disc which was not rated for quite as many r.p.m.'s as the grinder. ¹ (Notably, the disc was only rated for speeds 20 percent less than the grinder, not the 600 percent less which appeared in McCurter v. Norton Co. (1968) 263 Cal.App.2d 402, 69 Cal.Rptr. 493, the case on which Ingersoll primarily relies.) ² While this is a possible cause, respondent failed to demonstrate it was the only possible cause or that it was the cause on this occasion. On the basis of respondent's motion and supporting documents, it is not possible to rule out other defects in the design or manufacture of the grinder as a cause of this particular injury.

Ingersoll could have discharged its obligation on the causation issue, for instance, by submitting the declaration of an expert who expressed an opinion it was more probable than not this disc exploded because the grinder was operating at a speed in excess of the maximum this type of disc can sustain. But Ingersoll failed to introduce such a declaration or any other evidence that what it presumed to be the cause in fact was the cause of appellant's injury.

At oral argument, Ingersoll's counsel claimed no evidence was required on the causation issue because "it speaks for itself." Sometimes cause and effect relationships are so simple and visible they indeed do "speak for themselves." For example, one man strikes another in the face with a fist, breaking the latter's jaw. But in other situations the cause and effect are not so obvious, often occurring at a microscopic level or involving a complex chain of events or a variety of possible causative factors. This is one of those situations. While spinning at a speed which made what actually happened invisible to the human eye this grinder disk simply blew apart. Something caused this grinder disk to disintegrate, but whether it was the fact it was affixed to a grinder rated to spin at a potential speed 20 percent higher than the disk was rated may or may not have been the cause. The purported cause and effect relationship simply does not "speak for itself" in this case.

It was up to Ingersoll as the moving party in this summary judgment motion to introduce persuasive evidence supporting this element of its affirmative defense. In fact, it produced no evidence on this issue. Ingersoll's failure to do so is all the more remarkable since appellant Huynh's opposition papers highlighted the causation issue and the fact it remained a jury question. Accordingly, there remains a triable issue regarding this essential element of the "misuse" defense, which was the...