Huzinec v. Six Flags Great Adventure, LLC
| Decision Date | 15 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:16-cv-02754-FLW-DEA |
| Parties | EVAN HUZINEC, Plaintiff, v. SIX FLAGS GREAT ADVENTURE, LLC, et al., Defendants. SIX FLAGS GREAT ADVENTURE, LLC, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. FOR FUN TOURS, CELEBRATION TOURS AND TRAVEL, INC., WILKER GOMES, JULIANO MIRANDA, and MARIANA VOLGADO, Third-Party Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*
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Plaintiff Evan Huzinec sues Defendants Six Flags Great Adventures ("SFGA"), Six Flags Entertainment Corporation ("SFEC"), Six Flag Theme Park ("SFTP"), and various fictitious entities (collectively, "Defendants") for injuries he suffered while riding a roller coaster. According to Huzinec, Defendants negligently operated the ride, causing him permanent eye injuries. Defendants now move to exclude Huzinec's expert as unqualified and unreliable, and for summary judgment on the grounds that Huzinec has not established the applicable standard of care or breach. For the following reasons, Defendants' motions are GRANTED.
SFGA operates Six Flags, an amusement park in New Jersey. See Def. Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("SUMF"), ¶ 3. SFEC is a holding company for park assets. Id. ¶ 6. SFTP is the sole member of SFGA. Id. ¶ 11. On July 5, 2014, Mariana Volgado, a fourteen year old park patron, dropped her cellphone while riding a roller coaster called El Toro. Id. ¶¶ 17-19. Volgado was visiting the park with a Brazilian group called "For Fun Tours," which brings teenagers to the United States as part of an English language immersion program. Id. ¶ 20. Volgado's "flying" phone "struck" Huzinec "in the head, face, and right eye." Id. ¶¶ 14-16, 18-19. As a result, Huzinec is blind in that eye. Id.; Compl., ¶ 4. Following the accident, SFGA ejected Volgado and one of her chaperones, Juliano Miranda, from the park for violating SFGA's "loose objects" policy, which prohibits unsecured phones on rides like El Toro. Id. ¶¶ 19, 21; Ex. H. SFGA "clearly posts and announces" the policy throughout the park and enforces it with "zero tolerance." Id. ¶ 15; Ex. D.
Huzinec underwent "extensive" medical treatment and "several surgeries," see Pl. Br., at 32-34, after which he filed suit against SFGA and SFEC on May 16, 2016. See ECF No. 1. His original Complaint alleged negligent "operation, possession, control, inspection, design, management, and maintenance" in Count I, see Compl., at 2-3, breach of implied and express warranty in Count II, id. at 4, fraudulent concealment in Count III, id. at 5-6, and gross negligence in Count IV for willful and wanton conduct. Id. at 7. Huzinec also sought punitive damages in Counts III and IV. Id. On June 7, 2016, SFGA moved for dismissal on Counts I and II in full, andon Huzinec's claim for punitive damages in Count IV, which I granted on January 3, 2017. See ECF Nos. 10-11.
On January 20, 2017, SFGA and SFEC filed Answers. See ECF Nos. 12-13. They then filed a Third-Party Complaint against For Fun Tours, Celebration Tours and Travel, Inc., Wilker Gomes, Juliano Miranda, and Mariana Volgado. See ECF Nos. 16, 19. Celebration Tours and Travel subsequently moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, see ECF No. 30, which I granted on April 24, 2018. See ECF Nos. 50-51. In July 2018, Magistrate Judge Douglas E. Arpert ordered the parties to mediate, see ECF No. 53, but they could not reach a settlement, and Judge Arpert reinstated this matter in November 2018. See ECF No. 54.
On April 26, 2019, Huzinec moved to amend his Complaint to add SFTP. See ECF No. 56, Judge Arpert granted Huzinec's motion on September 27, 2019. See ECF No. 60. Huzinec filed an Amended Complaint on October 15, 2019, against all Defendants. See ECF no. 62. As pled, the Amended Complaint asserted essentially the same claims as the original Complaint, including willful and wanton conduct, and demanded the same relief, including punitive damages. Id. SFGA immediately moved to dismiss Count II on the grounds that I have "already ruled [that] claim deficient in an Order dated January 7, 2017." See ECF No. 63, at 4. Around the same time, SFGA moved for default judgment against Wilker Gomes and For Fun Tours. See ECF Nos. 72-73. I denied SFGA's default motions for failing to "address any of the discretionary factors." See ECF No. 77, at 3. I granted its dismissal motion on Count II and struck all references to punitive damages. See ECF No. 79, at 4 & n.2.
Although not a model of clarity, the crux of the operative Amended Complaint is ordinary negligence, failure to train, and premises liability.1 As to ordinary negligence, Huzinec asserts thatSFGA unreasonably enforced the loose objects policy by failing to instruct Volgado to secure her phone while she queued for El Toro, supervise her for compliance before/during the ride, and stop the ride once she unsecured her phone. To demonstrate breach, Huzinec submits an expert report from Daniel Doyle. Huzinec also asserts that SFGA unreasonably maintained its loose objects policy despite a foreseeable risk that patrons such as Volgado might unsecure their phones. To demonstrate breach here, Huzinec submits a 2013 incident report documenting a similar injury to another patron and ten YouTube videos purporting to show patrons filming themselves on El Toro. Huzinec further asserts that SFGA failed to train ride operators to safely run El Toro, and maintained dangerous conditions on park premises.
On September 25, 2020, SFGA filed the instant summary judgment motion along with a motion to exclude Huzinec's expert. See ECF No. 86. SFGA argues that Doyle is unqualified to opine on the question whether it negligently developed or enforced its loose objects policy because he is (at most) an expert in ride maintenance, not park operations. See Def. Br., ¶¶ 26-29. SFGA further argues that Doyle is unreliable to the extent that his conclusions do not follow from any evidence in the record, but instead are based on speculation and "personal belief." See id. ¶¶ 46, 57-58; Ex. E, at 12. SFGA then moves for summary judgment on the grounds that Huzinec has not established the applicable standard of care or adduced any evidence that it breached its duty.
Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits if any, . . . demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact" and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986) (quotations omitted); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is "genuine" when "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A fact is "material" when it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. The court construes all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, see Boyle v. Cty. of Allegheny Pa., 139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998), whose evidence "is to be believed," and makes "all justifiable inferences . . . in [its] favor.'" Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004); see also Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007).
The moving party "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. That party may discharge its burden by "showing — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case when the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of proof," as here. Singletary v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 192 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001) (quotations and citations omitted). The nonmoving party must then identify, by affidavits or otherwise, specific facts showing that there is a triable issue. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. To do so, the nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the . . . pleading[s]." Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001) (quotations omitted). Instead, "[it] must make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element essential to [its] case, and on which [it] will bear the burden of proof at trial." Cooper v. Sniezek, 418 Fed. App'x. 56, 58 (3d Cir. 2011) (quotations and citations omitted). "While the evidence that the non-moving party presents may be either direct or circumstantial, and need not be as great as a preponderance, [it] must be more than a scintilla," Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005), and conclusory declarations, even if made in sworn statements, will not suffice. See Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).
SFGA first moves to exclude Plaintiff's expert, Daniel Doyle, based on his qualifications. See Def. Rep. Br., at 2. Trial courts are "gatekeepers" with a responsibility to exclude improper expert testimony. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). To this end, Fed. R. Evid. 702 imposes a "trilogy of restrictions on expert testimony: qualification, reliability and fit." Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 350 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2003). A district court must first qualify an expert witness to testify as such. To be qualified, the witness must "possess specialized expertise." Schneider v. Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 404 (3d Cir. 2003). The Third Circuit has "interpreted this requirement liberally" to include "a broad range of knowledge, skills, and training." In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 80 F.3d 777, 782 (3d Cir. 1996) (...
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