Hyatt v. Big Horn School Dist. No. 4

• Decision Date: 23 November 1981
• Docket Number: No. 4,A,No. 5508,4,5508
• Parties: 1 Ed. Law Rep. 700 Jerry HYATT, Claude Craft, Dave Vigil and Jack Neilsen, on behalf of themselves and all other residents and property owners in Big Horn County, Wyoming, similarly situated, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. BIG HORN SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 4, State of Wyoming, and L. J. Fabricius, Shauna Gibbs, Melvin Winterholler, Keith McClain, individually and as members of the Board of Trustees of Big Horn School Districtppellees (Defendants).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 525

636 P.2d 525

1 Ed. Law Rep. 700

Jerry HYATT, Claude Craft, Dave Vigil and Jack Neilsen, on behalf of themselves and all other residents and property owners in Big Horn County, Wyoming, similarly situated, Appellants (Plaintiffs), v. BIG HORN SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 4, State of Wyoming, and L. J. Fabricius, Shauna Gibbs, Melvin Winterholler, Keith McClain, individually and as members of the Board of Trustees of Big Horn School District No. 4, Appellees (Defendants).

No. 5508.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Nov. 23, 1981.

Joseph E. Darrah, Powell, signed the brief and appeared in oral argument on behalf of appellants.

Ross D. Copenhaver, Powell, signed the brief and appeared in oral argument on behalf of appellees.

Before ROSE, C. J., and RAPER, THOMAS, ROONEY and BROWN, JJ.

ROONEY, Justice.

Appellants-plaintiffs appeal from a summary judgment in favor of appellees-defendants in an action wherein appellants requested (1) an injunction against "further proceedings, acts, dealings or construction whatever under the 1980 bond issue," (2) a declaration that such bond issue be null and void, (3) damages alleged to be suffered "as the result of the misconduct and act of" appellees, and (4) to "compel (the individual appellees) to operate the school facilities, educational processes and generally within the dictates set out by § 21-3-110(x)." ¹

After answering with a general denial and an affirmative defense of the 10-day statute of limitations in a contest of a bond election, ² appellees moved for a summary judgment, supported by affidavits with attached exhibits. Affidavits were also filed by appellants.

Appellants acknowledge that prior to the granting of the summary judgment, they "explained to the Court that there was no intended allegation that the election had not been properly conducted or that there was an election contest of such, or that this suit represented to do the same, and which particular claim for relief the Appellants-plaintiffs had abandoned." The relief requested in the first two items set forth, supra, was therefore abandoned.

Appellants state that:

" * * * the gist of the complaint being that the Appellees had by common plan and scheme, acting individually and in concert, were guilty at various times of promoting only the interest of the 'Basin schools', at the expense of the school systems located in Manderson and Hyattville. * * * "

But they word the issues on appeal as follows:

1. "Whether or not the Court erred in granting summary judgment in that there were genuine issues of material fact presented by the pleadings and affidavits rendering summary judgment under Rule 56 improper?"

2. "Whether or not the Court's findings and conclusions stated in the order of summary judgment erroneously state the law concerning the fiduciary duties of school board trustees."

3. "Whether or not the court erred in entering the finding that Appellants were guilty of laches in that no such issue was raised by either party prior to the motion for summary judgment, or within the summary judgment motion, and Appellants were thereby not afforded an opportunity to defend against same."

We affirm.

EXISTENCE OF GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS

The grounds for granting a motion for a summary judgment are set forth in Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P. "* * * the (summary) judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. * * * " (Emphasis added.)

In reviewing the district court's grant of summary judgment, we are governed by the same rules as was the district court. Centrella v. Morris, Wyo., 597 P.2d 958, 962 (1979); and Seay v. Vialpando, Wyo., 567 P.2d 285, 287 (1977). The moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that he is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law; and we look at the record from a viewpoint most favorable to the opposing party, giving to him all favorable inferences to be drawn from the facts contained in the affidavits and exhibits. Bancroft v. Jagusch, Wyo., 611 P.2d 819, 820 (1980); Miller v. Reiman-Weurth Company, Wyo., 598 P.2d 20, 24 (1979); Bluejacket v. Carney, Wyo., 550 P.2d 494, 497 (1976); Hunter v. Farmers Insurance Group, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1239, 1243 (1976). However, if the movant has adequately supported the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must come forward with competent evidence admissible at trial showing that there are genuine issues of material fact. Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P.; Harris v. Grizzle, Wyo., 625 P.2d 747, 749-750 (1981); Wood v. Trenchard, Wyo., 550 P.2d 490, 492 (1976); 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2739.

In support of their contention, appellants direct us to seven instances alleged to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material facts. However, five of the instances have to do with the validity of the bond election. ³ Such were probably subject to the 10-day statute of limitations; but in any event, they fall within appellants' disclaimer that the action is not a contest of the election, and they were therefore abandoned. They are also subject to the same analysis as are the other two instances.

The other two instances are: (1) a statement by the principal of the Manderson schools that the facilities at Basin had been expanded while those at Manderson had not been; and (2) statements that the upkeep, maintenance, repairs and equipment of the Manderson and Hyattville schools were inferior to that of the Basin schools.

It is inconsequential whether or not there is a dispute as to the truth of these items, i. e., whether or not there is a genuine issue as to them (and perhaps there is not, in this case), since they do not concern material facts as mandated by Rule 56(c), W.R.C.P., supra.

" * * * For purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing one of the essential elements of the cause of action asserted. (Citation.) Whether or not a fact is material depends upon the principle of law to be applied. Timmons v. Reed, Wyo.1977, 569 P.2d 112. * * * " Laird v. Laird, 597 P.2d 463, 466 (1979).

Inasmuch as the challenge of the validity of the bond election has been abandoned by appellants, the remaining prayers in their complaint (as already noted) have to do with only (1) damages to be suffered "as a result of misconduct and act" of appellees, and (2) compelling the individual appellees "to operate the school facilities, educational processes and generally within the dictates of § 21-3-110(x)." ⁴ The two instances alleged by appellants to establish issues of fact (Basin's school facilities have been expanded while those of Manderson-Hyattville were not, and the upkeep, repairs and maintenance of the Manderson-Hyattville schools have not been at the same level as that of the Basin schools), are not material to causes of action engendering such prayers. Furthermore, such instances concern discretionary matters for which error will lie only if the discretion is abused. Assuming that the Basin school facilities were expanded and those at Manderson-Hyattville were not, and assuming that the maintenance, etc., of the two was not at the same level, such does not establish misconduct by the board or failure on its part to operate the school district within the dictates of § 21-3-110(a)(x), W.S.1977. There may be a number of legitimate reasons for the alleged differences, and for the exercise of discretion by the board in this respect. In other words, the differences, in themselves, do not indicate an abuse of discretion on the part of the board.

The board is the governing body of the school district, § 21-3-105, W.S.1977. It has wide discretion in the management of the district's affairs. See §§ 21-3-105, 21-3-110, and 21-3-111, W.S.1977. They shall "(c)ontrol and disburse all moneys received from any source to maintain the schools within the district." Section 21-3-110(a)(vii), W.S.1977. "From any source" includes proceeds from issued bonds. Although we will interfere with actions of the board if such are shown to be arbitrary, capricious or fraudulent, Board of Trustees of School District No. 3 v. District Boundary Board, Wyo., 489 P.2d 413, 417 (1971), supplemented 489 P.2d 1393 (1971); Monahan v. Board of Trustees, County of Fremont, Wyo., 486 P.2d 235, 237 (1971); Bixby v. Cross, Wyo., 384 P.2d 710, 714 (1963), we will not otherwise substitute our judgment for that of the school board, Board of Trustees of School District No. 4 v. Colwell, Wyo., 611 P.2d 427, 428 (1980); Powell v. Board of Trustees, Crook County School District No. 1, Wyo., 550 P.2d 1112, 1113 (1976); Shenefield v. Sheridan County School District No. 1, Wyo., 544 P.2d 870, 874 (1976). Absent abuse thereof, we will not interfere with an honest exercise of discretion by public boards or officers. Bunten v. Rock Springs Grazing Association, 29 Wyo. 461, 215 P. 244, 248 (1923); Safferstone v. Tucker, 235 Ark. 70, 357 S.W.2d 3 (1962).

The facts presented by appellees in support of their motion for summary judgment reflect extensive inquiry and consideration by the board concerning the proper application of the bond proceeds. A committee of residents was established to advise on the matter. Recommendations were received from three independent educators. The bonding issue was discussed at twenty-one public meetings held throughout the district. The contemplated use of the money was publicized before the bond election. ⁵ Insurers were refusing to insure Manderson Elementary building. There were a number of fire code deficiencies.

Appellants' position with reference to the board's decisions is summarized in the argument made by them to the district court in opposition to...