Hyatt v. Johnston

• Decision Date: 20 October 1879
• Citation: 91 Pa. 196
• Parties: Hyatt <I>versus</I> Johnston.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

91 Pa. 196

Hyatt versus Johnston.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

October 7, 1879.

October 20, 1879.

October 7th 1879.

Before SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON, TRUNKEY and STERRETT, JJ. GREEN, J., absent

Error to the Court of Common Pleas, No. 1, of Allegheny county: Of October and November Term 1879, No. 211.

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John B. Herron, Jr., and George Shiras, Jr., for plaintiff in error.—The merchandise, for a balance of the price of which this suit was brought, was sold and delivered to Crawford, Chamberlin & Co., prior and up to January 11th 1873; and the draft in suit, dated February 18th 1873, was received by the plaintiff, credited on their account, and the account closed, on February 21st 1873.

The court erred in admitting the letters of March 1st, 22d, and April 1st. The two former relate to a transaction wholly independent of and subsequent to the one in suit, and were clearly irrelevant. The drawers of the draft in suit, or the intention of the parties thereto, are in no way disclosed by these letters. While the letter of April 1st does contain an allusion to the acceptances of February 18th, this letter, taken in connection with that of March 26th, to which it is a reply, was no evidence that these acceptances were those of the new firm, or that the plaintiff had received them in absolute payment. In his use of the word "settled," Hyatt simply meant that the goods had been included in an account stated, which had been agreed to, and closed in the manner indicated: Houser v. Irvine, 3 W. & S. 345; Bevan v. Cullen, 7 Barr 281; Scott v. Strawn, 4 Norris 471; Parsons on Part. 284; Collyer on Part., 4th Am. ed., sect. 373, note 1; Lindley on Part., 646.

H. & G. C. Burgwin, for defendant in error.—The plaintiff admitted that he knew at the time of the dissolution of the original firm, by the withdrawal of Johnston and entry of Brown, and that the new firm assumed all the liabilities of the old. The old firm name was adopted by the new, and on February 18th 1873 the draft was accepted by Crawford, Chamberlin & Co. But plaintiff, on the trial, raised the question as to whether this acceptance was not by the old firm in liquidation. To remove all doubt on this point, we introduced the plaintiff's letters of March 1st, March 22d and April 1st, addressed to Crawford, Chamberlin & Co., showing that business accounts were carried on between them at that time; that consequently these letters were addressed to the new firm, and that when in that of April 1st, plaintiff wrote to Crawford, Chamberlin & Co. that the stock to which they referred in theirs of 26th March, "was all settled for in your acceptances I now hold," one of which was that in suit, he showed beyond all controversy that it was the acceptance of his then correspondents, viz.: the new firm, and not that of the old firm in liquidation.

Mr. Justice STERRETT delivered the opinion of the court, October 20th 1879.

While it was conceded by the defendant that the first firm of Crawford, Chamberlin & Co., of which he was a member, was indebted to plaintiff for merchandise, in a larger sum than that claimed in this suit, it was contended that acceptances of the second firm were taken by the plaintiff, in absolute payment of that indebtedness, and the defendant was thus released therefrom. The plaintiff, therefore, had a clear prima facie case, and the burden was on the defendant of proving that the draft in suit was the acceptance of the second firm, and that it was received by the plaintiff in absolute payment of the original debt.

For the purpose of proving these facts, the letters referred to in the bills of exception, were offered and admitted. The plaintiff insisted that they were insufficient, and requested the court to instruct the jury, "That the burden of proving that the plaintiff took an acceptance of the new firm, as absolute payment, is on the defendant, and that the defendant has given no evidence from which the jury would be warranted in finding that the...