Hyde v. Connecticut Co.

• Decision Date: 01 December 1936
• Citation: 188 A. 266,122 Conn. 236
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: HYDE v. CONNECTICUT CO.

188 A. 266

122 Conn. 236

HYDE v. CONNECTICUT CO.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

December 1, 1936

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; Edward J. Quinlan Judge.

Action by Libby G. Hyde against the Connecticut Company, to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been caused by the defendant's negligence, which was tried to the jury. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appeals.

Error and new trial ordered.

Charles V. James, of Norwich (Arthur M. Brown, of Norwich, on the brief), for appellant.

Foster K. Sistare and George C. Morgan, both of New London, for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J., and HINMAN, BANKS, AVERY, and BROWN, JJ.

AVERY Judge.

The plaintiff brought this action claiming that she was a passenger in one of defendant's busses and that she was injured by stepping into a gutter when alighting from the bus. She claimed that the driver was negligent in stopping for her to alight in an unsafe place upon the highway, a considerable distance from the curb, causing her to alight into a gutter laid with rough and uneven stones and depressions and dangerous to walk upon, whereby she was caused to fall and was injured. The case was tried to the jury and resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendant has appealed assigning error in the charge of the court in three particulars.

From the finding, it appears that the plaintiff offered evidence to prove, and claimed to have proved, the following facts: The defendant, a common carrier of passengers, operated a motorbus on Montauk avenue to the Parade and then over State and Broad streets in the city of New London. On September 9, 1935, in the evening, the plaintiff entered as a passenger defendant's bus on Montauk avenue and was carried to the Parade, where she transferred to another running thence in a northwesterly direction over Broad street. She requested the operator to let her out at the stop nearest to Dow court. Her son lived there. The gutter along Broad street opposite the intersection of Dow court was in a sunken, eroded, and uneven condition with deep holes between the cobblestones. At Ledyard street, the nearest authorized stop to Dow court, the gutter was level and smooth with the road surface up to the curb line. Instead of stopping there, the driver decided to let the plaintiff off opposite the intersection of Dow court and stopped the bus on the edge of the macadam shoulder so that the plaintiff in alighting was forced to step down into the gutter. She placed her right foot on the ground and fell and was injured. At the time, it was dusk or dark, and raining, and the plaintiff was not familiar with the surface of the gutter. The bus driver traveled this route many times each day and knew of the condition of the gutter at this point and its rough and uneven surface.

The defendant claimed to have proved, among other things, these facts: At the place in question, Broad street was paved with concrete. On the northerly edge of the concrete was a macadam shoulder four or five feet in width. Between the macadam shoulder and the curbing on the northerly side of the street was a cobblestone gutter. The operator of the bus did not know the condition of the surface of the gutter at that point and did not drive into it and up to the curb because, as it was full of leaves, he feared that if he drove into it, its condition might be such that he would be unable to drive the bus out again. Also, he observed the limbs of a tree and believed he could not drive under them without their striking the top of the bus or the windshield; accordingly, he stopped so that the right side of the bus was twelve to fourteen inches southerly of the northerly edge of the concrete pavement.

In instructing the jury, the court called their attention to the rule of the public utilities commission relating to motorbusses which provides: " For taking on and discharging passengers a motorbus shall be stopped at the extreme right of the available roadway." The court informed the jury that if they found that the operator did not stop at the extreme right of the available roadway they would be justified in finding that there was negligence in such conduct. The defendant asserts that the court erred in so instructing the jury, and claims that the rule in the matter does not have the force of a rule of law, but was merely a regulation of the commission for the violation of which the defendant was answerable to it and liable to the penalty provided. General Statutes, Cum.Supp. 1935, § 1409c. With this contention we cannot agree. The commission is given express authority to make regulations as to the operation of motorbusses, including such as concern the convenience and safety of passengers and the public. General Statutes, § 3850. The...