Hyde v. Lawson
| Decision Date | 28 July 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 10833,10833 |
| Citation | 94 Idaho 886,499 P.2d 1242 |
| Parties | Eleanor Mae HYDE, a widow, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Lloyd T. LAWSON and Vera C. Lawson, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Herbert S. Sanderson, Coeur d'Alene, D. J. LaPorte, Tacoma, Wash., for defendants-appellants.
E. L. Miller, Coeur d'Alene, for respondent.
In 1942 Fred and Emma Harshaw purchased the NW 1/4 of tract 98, Avondale Irrigation Tracts in Kootenai County, Idaho. In 1950 the Harshaws conveyed the east 1/2 of the NW 1/4 to William and Hazel Baack. Later in 1950 the Baacks decided to build a home on their newly acquired land, however, uncertainties arose regarding the true boundary line separating the Baack property from the remainder belonging to the grantors. Harshaw and Baack met and agreed to a boundary line and drove stakes toe stablish the boundary line between the two adjoining properties. After establishing the boundary line Baack constructed a home on his property. In the course of constructing that home, Baack employed Harshaw (the grantor) to perform certain labor.
In 1954 Baack sold the west 1/2 of the east 1/2 of the NW 1/4 of tract 98 to the plaintiff-respondent, Eleanor May Hyde and her husband. At the time of this sale the stakes driven in the ground in 1950 by Baack and Harshaw were pointed out to the Hydes as representing the west boundary of their property. The trial court found that the plaintiff maintained a lawn, hedges, trees and gardens, and that these improvements ran to the west boundary line as established by the stakes driven by Baack and Harshaw in 1950.
In 1955 defendants purchased the west 1/2 of the NW 1/4 of tract 98 from the Harshaws. From 1955 to 1967 there was no dispute between the Hydes and the defendants regarding the line dividing their respective properties. In 1967 the defendants had the property surveyed by a licensed surveyor. This survey revealed that the boundary line, as established by the stakes drive-by Baack and Harshaw in 1950, was approximately eight to ten feet west of the true boundary. Shortly thereafter the defendants are alleged to have removed vegetation, trees, cut limbs from trees and built a fence along the surveyed line which cut off access to the west side of the plaintiff's house.
The plaintiff brought action to have title to the disputed area quieted in her favor by reason of adverse possession. The trial court found that the plaintiff and her predecessor had at all times since 1950 been in actual and notorious possession of the disputed strip of land; had paid all taxes levied upon the land according to the description contained in the deeds and entered judgment quieting title in the disputed strip of land.
The defendants appealed to this Court arguing that the trial court erred in admitting testimony of Baack regarding the circumstances surrounding the boundary line agreement with the deceased Harshaw. The defendants also assign as error that the evidence does not support the following findings of fact: that in April of 1950 Baack and Harshaw met and agreed upon a boundary line dividing their property by placing stakes in the ground along said line; that the stakes recovered by witnesses and identified at trial were those originally placed in 1950; that at the time of the sale to the plaintiff the stakes placed in 1950 were pointed out by Baack as marking the western boundary of plaintiff's property; that the plaintiff openly and notoriously occupied the property and planted additional hedges, trees and garden to the western boundary of the property as fixed by Baack and Harshaw in 1950; that at the time the defendants purchased their property the use, possession and occupation of the plaintiff was clearly open, visible and apparent to the defendants; that following a survey by a licensed surveyor the defendant claimed ownership of the disputed strip and erected a wooden fence which cut off access of the plaintiff to the west side of her home and that the defendants destroyed vegetation, trees and removed tree limbs.
Finally, defendants assign as error that the trial court's finding of fact XI, that the plaintiff and her predecessor had paid all taxes levied and assessed on their property, does not support its conclusions of law and fails to support the judgment of adverse possession.
Referring to the defendants' claim that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Baack regarding the agreement between himself and Harshaw establishing a boundary line dividing their property, we are of the opinion that this testimony was admissible. Baack was a party to the boundary agreement and testified to the circumstances surrounding the agreement with Harshaw. In Eagan v. Colwell, 1 this Court permitted testimony as to the reputed owner of disputed property and said:
2
The witness Baack was a party to the agreement made in 1950 and, other than the deceased Harshaw, was the only person available who could testify to the boundary agreement. Therefore, it was not error to admit this testimony because of necessity and because it was the best evidence available to show the circumstances surrounding the boundary agreement.
Before proceeding further we must determine whether an agreement, such as the one in the case at bar, fixing a boundary line is valid in light of the statute of frauds. 3 In Idaho Land Company v. Parsons, 4 this Court first permitted an oral boundary agreement and approved the doctrine that when coterminous owners of land, in good faith, agree upon and establish a boundary line between their respective tracts of land, the line so established is binding upon the parties and those holding under them.
In Downing v. Boehringer, 5 the Court considered the agreed boundary issue in light of the statute of frauds. In Downing, supra, the Court said:
6
In order for an oral boundary agreement to be valid the true boundary line must be unknown to the parties and is uncertain or in dispute. If the parties agree to a boundary under these circumstances, and thereafter take possession, pursuant to the agreement, they are bound. Such a boundary agreement is not a conveyance of land, and thus invalid under the statute of frauds for lack of a writing, but is merely locating and establishing the common boundary.
We now deal with the defendants' allegations on appeal that the evidence does not support the trial court's findings of fact. There is substantial and competent evidence in the record to the effect that the boundary line was agreed upon by Baack and Harshaw in 1950; that the stakes recovered by witnesses and identified at trial were those originally placed in the ground pursuant to the 1950 agreement; that at the time of the sale to the plaintiff the stakes placed in 1950 were pointed out as marking the western boundary of plaintiff's property; that after purchasing the property the plaintiff openly and notoriously occupied the property and planted additional hedges, trees and garden to the western boundary as disclosed at the time she purchased the property; that at the time the defendants purchased their property (1955) the use, possession and occupation of the plaintiff to the line, as established by Baack and Harshaw in 1950, was clear and apparent to the defendants; that following a survey by a licensed surveyor the defendants claimed ownership of the disputed strip of land, built a wooden fence that cut off access of the plaintiff to the west side of her house; that the defendants destroyed vegetation, trees and removed tree limbs in the disputed strip of land.
It has been a rule of long standing in this jurisdiction that findings of the trial court supported by substantial and competent evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. 7 The record in the case at bar clearly supports the trial court's findings of fact and therefore will not be disturbed by this Court.
Defendants' final assignment of error alleges that the trial court's finding that the plaintiff and her predecessor had paid all taxes levied and assessed on their property does not support its conclusions of law and fails to support a judgment of adverse possession. Defendants claim that because taxes were assessed and levied only on the land described on plaintiff's deed 8 that plaintiff has not satisfied the statutory requirement 9 of payment of taxes necessary to perfect title to the disputed strip by adverse possession.
Prior to dealing with the payment of tax element of adverse possession a discussion of the other statutory requirements is in order. I.C. § 5-210 requires that in order...
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