Hyde v. Warden
Decision Date | 21 April 2016 |
Docket Number | CASE NO. 2:14-CV-02725 |
Parties | TAD HYDE, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, PICKAWAY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner, a state prisoner, brings the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the Court on the Petition, Respondent's Return of Writ, Petitioner's Reply, and the exhibits of the parties. For the reasons that follow, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. This action is DISMISSED.
The Ohio Second District Court of Appeals summarized the facts and procedural history of this case as follows:
State v. Hyde, No. 2013 CA 41, 2014 WL 1338790, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. March 28, 2014). On March 28, 2014, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but remanded the case to the trial court for the limited purpose of correcting the judgment entry to reflect that Hyde entered a plea of no contest, rather than a plea of guilty. Id. On April 18, 2014, Petitioner filed an Application for Reconsideration Pursuant to Appellate Rule 26(A). (ECF No. 7-1, PageID# 200.) He asserted that his appellate attorney should have argued that "he was not provided a preliminary hearing within the time periods specified in Crim. R. 5(B) and R.C.2945.71 . . . the two robbery offenses should have been raised in a single indictment because evidence from one robbery provided probable cause for the other robbery; . . .[he] was not being held on previously imposed sentences, and thus he was being held only on 'pending charges' for speedy trial purposes; and . . . the one-month delay in his competency hearing should have been charged against the State, and the triple-count provision should have applied after the two robbery cases were consolidated." (ECF No. 7-1, PageID# 229-30.) The appellate court considered Petitioner's application for reconsideration which the Court construed as an application under Ohio Appellate Rule 26(B),1 and on June 30, 2014, denied the application. (PageID# 228.) Petitioner filed a timely appeal. (PageID# 234.) He asserted as follows:
(PageID# 240.) On January 28, 2015, the Ohio Supreme Court declined to accept jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to S. Ct. Prac. R. 7.08(B) (4). State v. Hyde, 141 Ohio St.3d 1454 (Ohio 2015).
Thereafter, Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He asserts that he was convicted in violation of his right to due process and right to a speedy trial because the State failed to comply with the mandatory statutory requirements set forth in O.R.C. § 2945.73 and failed to dismiss both indictments against him (claim one); denied him a hearing under Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975),2 and a timely preliminary hearing (claim two); denied him a speedy trial under O.R.C. 2945.71(E), Ohio's "triple count" provision (claim three); and denied him a speedy trial under Ohio law because it failed to timely consolidate the charges against him (claim four). See Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioner's 'Writ of Habeas Corpus,' Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. & 2254 (ECF No. 2.) It is the position of the Respondent that Petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted, fail to present issues cognizable for federal habeas corpus relief, and are without merit.
Before addressing the merits of any claims, the Court disposes of Petitioner's claims that are either procedurally defaulted or not cognizable in habeas. The Court turns first to claim two and then to claims three and four.
In recognition of the equal obligation of the state courts to protect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants, and in order to prevent needless friction between the state and federal courts, a state criminal defendant with federal constitutional claims is required to present those claims to the highest court of the state for consideration. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). If the petitioner fails to do so, but the state still provides a remedy to pursue, his or her petition is subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies. Id.; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Deitz v. Money, 391 F.3d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 2004). If, because of a procedural default, the petitioner can no longer present the relevant claims to a state court, the petitioner also waives the claims for purposes of federal habeas review unless he or she can demonstrate cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional error. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 724; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986).
In the Sixth Circuit, a court must undertake a four-part analysis to determine whether procedural default is a bar to a habeas petitioner's claims. Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Scuba v. Brigano, 259 F. App'x. 713, 718 (6th Cir. 2007) ( ). Specifically, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit requires the district courts to engage in the following inquiry:
First, the court must determine that there is a state procedural rule that is applicable to the petitioner's claim and that the petitioner failed to comply with the rule. . . . Second, the court must decide whether the state courts actually enforced the state procedural sanction. . . . Third, the court must decide whether the state procedural forfeiture is an adequate and independent state ground on which the state can rely to foreclose review of a federal constitutional claim.
Maupin, 785 F.2d at 138 (internal quotations omitted). Finally, if "the court determines that a state procedural rule was not complied with and that the rule [has] an adequate and independent state ground, then the petitioner" may still obtain review of his or her claims on the merits if the petitioner establishes: (1) a substantial reason to excuse the default and (2) that he or she was actually prejudiced by the alleged constitutional error. Id. "Cause" under this test "must be something external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to him[;] . . . some factor external to the defense [that] impeded [ ] efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. This "cause and prejudice" analysis also applies to failure to raise or preserve issues for review at the appellate level or failure to appeal at all. Id. at 750.
Nevertheless, "'[i]n appropriate cases' the principles of comity and finality that inform the concepts of cause and prejudice 'must...
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