Hyde v. Warden

• Decision Date: 21 April 2016
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 2:14-CV-02725
• Parties: TAD HYDE, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, PICKAWAY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

TAD HYDE, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, PICKAWAY CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, Respondent.

CASE NO. 2:14-CV-02725

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

April 21, 2016

JUDGE GREGORY L. FROST

Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers

OPINION AND ORDER

Petitioner, a state prisoner, brings the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the Court on the Petition, Respondent's Return of Writ, Petitioner's Reply, and the exhibits of the parties. For the reasons that follow, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED. This action is DISMISSED.

I.

The Ohio Second District Court of Appeals summarized the facts and procedural history of this case as follows:

Hyde's charges stem from the robberies of two different Rite Aid stores on June 11 and 14, 2012, respectively, in Springfield, Ohio. On June 14, 2012, Hyde was arrested and charged with the robbery committed that day. After further investigation by the police, Hyde was charged on June 20 with the June 11 robbery.

On June 25, 2012, Hyde was indicted on the June 14 robbery; he was served with the indictment on the following day. Case No. 12-CR-443. At his arraignment, the court set bond at $25,000; he remained in jail in lieu of bond. On July 2, 2012, Hyde was indicted for the robbery committed on June 11, 2012. Case No. 12-CR-455. Hyde was arraigned on July 5, 2012, and bond was set at $35,000. Hyde was not released on bond.

On October 11, 2012, Hyde moved to dismiss both actions on the ground that his speedy trial rights were violated. On October 16, 2012, the State moved to consolidate the two cases, pursuant to Crim. R. 13. After a hearing on October 17, the motion to dismiss was denied, and the motion to consolidate was granted.

On October 22, 2012, Hyde entered pleas of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity, and he requested an evaluation of his mental condition both at the present time and at the time of the charged offenses. On November 6, 2012, the trial court sustained the motion for a competency evaluation and ordered an evaluation. A competency review hearing was scheduled for December 13, 2012. On the day of the hearing, Hyde requested a continuance so that he could call witnesses. The matter was continued until February 25, 2013, at which time a hearing was held. On March 4, 2013, Hyde moved for a second evaluation of his mental condition at the time of the alleged offense. Hyde withdrew that motion on March 7, 2013.

On April 9, 2013, the day of Hyde's scheduled trial, Hyde again moved to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. He also moved for relief from the consolidation of the two actions and for his counsel to withdraw. The trial court overruled Hyde's motions and also filed an entry finding him competent to stand trial. Later that day, Hyde withdrew his former plea and pled no contest to robbery in Case No. 12-CR-443. Pursuant to the plea, the robbery charge in Case No. 12-CR-455 was dismissed. Hyde was sentenced accordingly.

Hyde appeals from his conviction in Case No. 12-CR-443. His sole assignment of error states that "trial court committed plain error by not dismissing both indictments against Mr. Hyde, due to violation of his speedy trial rights."

State v. Hyde, No. 2013 CA 41, 2014 WL 1338790, at *1-2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2d Dist. March 28, 2014). On March 28, 2014, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, but remanded the case to the trial court for the limited purpose of correcting the judgment entry to reflect that Hyde entered a plea of no contest, rather than a plea of guilty. Id. On April 18, 2014, Petitioner filed an Application for Reconsideration Pursuant to Appellate Rule 26(A). (ECF No. 7-1, PageID# 200.) He asserted that his appellate attorney should have argued that "he was not provided a preliminary hearing within the time periods specified in Crim. R. 5(B) and R.C.2945.71 . . . the two robbery offenses should have been raised in a single indictment because evidence from one robbery provided probable cause for the other robbery; . . .[he] was not being held on previously imposed sentences, and thus he was being held only on 'pending charges' for speedy trial purposes; and . . . the one-month delay in his competency hearing should have been charged against the State, and the triple-count provision should have applied after the two robbery cases were consolidated." (ECF No. 7-1, PageID# 229-30.) The appellate court considered Petitioner's application for reconsideration which the Court construed as an application under Ohio Appellate Rule 26(B),¹ and on June 30, 2014, denied the application. (PageID# 228.) Petitioner filed a timely appeal. (PageID# 234.) He asserted as follows:

1. The trial court committed plain error by not dismissing both indictments maintained against Mr. Hyde as violative of his speedy trial rights. Mr. Hyde was prejudiced by unnecessary prosecutorial and judicial delays which denied Mr. Hyde protection of speedy trial. R.C. 2945.71(E).

2. A defendant charged with multiple related offenses in the same jurisdiction is entitled to the protection of the triple-count provision of R.C. 2945.71(E). Argument: A defendant being held on more than one pending charge is el[igible] for the triple count provision.

3. A defendant charged with multiple related offenses in the same jurisdiction is entitled to timely consolidation of separate indictments under a single case to preserve the g[u]arantee of a speedy trial for each crime.

(PageID# 240.) On January 28, 2015, the Ohio Supreme Court declined to accept jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to S. Ct. Prac. R. 7.08(B) (4). State v. Hyde, 141 Ohio St.3d 1454 (Ohio 2015).

Thereafter, Petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He asserts that he was convicted in violation of his right to due process and right to a speedy trial because the State failed to comply with the mandatory statutory requirements set forth in O.R.C. § 2945.73 and failed to dismiss both indictments against him (claim one); denied him a hearing under Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975),² and a timely preliminary hearing (claim two); denied him a speedy trial under O.R.C. 2945.71(E), Ohio's "triple count" provision (claim three); and denied him a speedy trial under Ohio law because it failed to timely consolidate the charges against him (claim four). See Memorandum of Law in Support of Petitioner's 'Writ of Habeas Corpus,' Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. & 2254 (ECF No. 2.) It is the position of the Respondent that Petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted, fail to present issues cognizable for federal habeas corpus relief, and are without merit.

II.

Before addressing the merits of any claims, the Court disposes of Petitioner's claims that are either procedurally defaulted or not cognizable in habeas. The Court turns first to claim two and then to claims three and four.

A. Procedural Default

In recognition of the equal obligation of the state courts to protect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants, and in order to prevent needless friction between the state and federal courts, a state criminal defendant with federal constitutional claims is required to present those claims to the highest court of the state for consideration. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c). If the petitioner fails to do so, but the state still provides a remedy to pursue, his or her petition is subject to dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies. Id.; Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991); Deitz v. Money, 391 F.3d 804, 808 (6th Cir. 2004). If, because of a procedural default, the petitioner can no longer present the relevant claims to a state court, the petitioner also waives the claims for purposes of federal habeas review unless he or she can demonstrate cause for the procedural default and actual prejudice resulting from the alleged constitutional error. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 724; Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485 (1986).

In the Sixth Circuit, a court must undertake a four-part analysis to determine whether procedural default is a bar to a habeas petitioner's claims. Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Scuba v. Brigano, 259 F. App'x. 713, 718 (6th Cir. 2007) (following the four-part analysis of Maupin). Specifically, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit requires the district courts to engage in the following inquiry:

First, the court must determine that there is a state procedural rule that is applicable to the petitioner's claim and that the petitioner failed to comply with the rule. . . . Second, the court must decide whether the state courts actually enforced the state procedural sanction. . . . Third, the court must decide whether the state procedural forfeiture is an adequate and independent state ground on which the state can rely to foreclose review of a federal constitutional claim.

Maupin, 785 F.2d at 138 (internal quotations omitted). Finally, if "the court determines that a state procedural rule was not complied with and that the rule [has] an adequate and independent state ground, then the petitioner" may still obtain review of his or her claims on the merits if the petitioner establishes: (1) a substantial reason to excuse the default and (2) that he or she was actually prejudiced by the alleged constitutional error. Id. "Cause" under this test "must be something external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to him[;] . . . some factor external to the defense [that] impeded [ ] efforts to comply with the State's procedural rule." Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. This "cause and prejudice" analysis also applies to failure to raise or preserve issues for review at the appellate level or failure to appeal at all. Id. at 750.

Nevertheless, "'[i]n appropriate cases' the principles of comity and finality that inform the concepts of cause and prejudice 'must...