Hydrick v. Hunter
Decision Date | 30 August 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 03-56712.,03-56712. |
Citation | 500 F.3d 978 |
Parties | James Allen HYDRICK; David Lanphere; Shaundale Griffin; Frank Cisneros; Paul Pederson; Steven Robert Cerniglia; Gary Price; Daniel Mrowici; Kenneth Ciancio; Michael McClure; James Mata; Richard Bishop; Melvin Fields; Ron Lee; Leonard Pierre; Thomas Price; Jimmy Guthrie; Brian Kelly; Woodrow Jones; Vashon Jackson; Bruce Riley; Fred Scott; Dean Danforth; Sammy Page; James Peters; Grayling Mitchell; Carlos Saucedo; Anthony Dacayona; Charles Salas, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, Melvin E. Hunter, aka/Jon DeMorales; Craig Nelson; Grenda Ernst, Defendants-Appellants, and Robert McDaniel; Jerry Reynolds; Robert Penate; Samuel Robinson; Mark Mahhoney; Stephen Mayberg; Anita Judd; Michael Hughes; Jim Vess; Jack Townsend; Mark Palmer; Rocky Spurgeon; Arnie Gobbell; Jim Wiley; Mark Kalionzes; Elaine Sherrill; Glan Mikel; Jan Maire Alarcon; Baruch Margalit; William Knowlton; Diane Imram; Carmel Muller; Dale Arnold; Gabriella Paladino; Jean Dansereau et al.; William Charles Thiel; Robert Douglas Lefort; Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of California, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Randall R. Murphy, Deputy Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA, for the defendants-appellants.
Kathryn M. Davis, Latham & Watkins, Los Angeles, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California; Terry J. Hatter, Chief District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-98-07167-TJH.
Before: MARY M. SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, HARRY PREGERSON and STEPHEN S. TROTT, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge PREGERSON; Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge TROTT.
The opinion in this case published at 466 F.3d 676 (9th Cir.2006), is withdrawn and replaced by the new opinion and dissent filed concurrently with this order.
Chief Judge Schroeder and Judge Pregerson voted to deny appellant's petition for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc. Judge Trott voted to grant the petition for panel rehearing and recommended granting the petition for rehearing en banc. The full court has been advised of the petition for rehearing en banc, and no judge of the court has requested en banc rehearing. See Fed. R.App. P. 35(b). The petitions for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc are DENIED.
No further petitions for rehearing will be entertained.
Plaintiffs-Appellees represent a class of approximately six hundred civilly committed persons and those awaiting commitment at Atascadero State Hospital pursuant to California's Sexually Violent Predators Act ("SVP Act"). Plaintiffs allege that the conditions of their confinement violate their constitutional rights. They request declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss based largely on qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, which the Defendants now appeal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291; we affirm in part and reverse in part.
The SVP Act defines an SVP as a person "convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims for which he or she received a determinate sentence and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others" i.e., is "likely [to] engage in sexually violent criminal behavior." Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code § 6600(a).1 The Department of Corrections and the Department of Mental Health evaluate convicts who committed predicate offenses at least six months before those convicts complete their sentences. See id. § 6601. If those two departments agree that the convict might qualify as an SVP, the district attorney (or counsel for the county in which the evaluated person was convicted) may file a petition for commitment. See id. § 6601(i). If a jury finds someone to be an SVP, that person is civilly committed for an indefinite period to commence after his criminal sentence is fulfilled. Id. §§ 6602-6604.
Once civilly committed, SVPs undergo a five-phase treatment program. Phase One consists of group sessions that educate the SVP about California's SVP Act. During Phase One, the SVP must attend and participate in the treatment sessions. If he does not, his access level2 is reduced and he is not allowed to advance to Phase Two of the treatment program. In addition, an SVP's failure to attend or participate in treatment sessions is used against him at future probable cause and confinement hearings. The SVP cannot advance beyond Phase One unless he signs a statement in which he acknowledges that he has an "illness" that requires "treatment." Plaintiffs allege that the signed statements are often used against them as admissions of illness in future probable cause and confinement hearings.
Phases Two through Five of the treatment plan involve "cognitive" treatment. This treatment includes viewing videos that depict violent or other inappropriate sexual activities while a repugnant odor or other unpleasant sensation is applied to elicit a negative association.
Each year, an SVP has a right to a "show cause hearing" to determine whether his commitment should be continued. Id. § 6605(a)-(b). If it is found that the SVP continues to be a danger to the health or safety of the community, the person is committed for two years from the date of the finding. Id. § 6605(e). Successive periods of commitment can be continued indefinitely, or until the SVP completes all five phases of treatment. Upon successful completion of Phase Five, the SVP is conditionally released under the supervision of the California Mental Health Department. According to the Plaintiffs, "only a handful of SVPs have been allowed into Phase Four and no SVP has progressed to Phase Five or ha[s] been found to be ready for release under the treatment protocol."3
On September 2, 1998, the Plaintiffs filed a pro se class action, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants-Appellants Stephen Mayberg (Director of the California Department of Mental Health), Cal A. Terhune (Director of the California Department of Corrections), Jon DeMorales (former Executive Director at Atascadero State Hospital), Grenda Ernst (Clinical Administrator at Atascadero State Hospital), and Craig Nelson (Senior Psychologist Specialist at Atascadero State Hospital). The Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as monetary damages, on the grounds that the policies and procedures governing their confinement and treatment at Atascadero State Hospital violate their constitutional rights.
In March 1999, the district court appointed pro bono counsel for the Plaintiffs. Counsel filed an amended complaint approximately five months later. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss raised Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity defenses. The district court denied the motion.
The Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on August 14, 2002.4 Both the first and second amended complaints alleged that the Defendants violated the Plaintiffs' rights by, inter alia: (1) force-medicating the Plaintiffs in non-emergency situations; (2) reducing the Plaintiffs' access levels and other privileges as a form of punishment for refusing to participate in treatment sessions or as retaliation for filing lawsuits; (3) putting the Plaintiffs in restraints for nonthreatening and/or non-disruptive conduct, including the refusal to participate in treatment or therapy; (4) subjecting the Plaintiffs to public strip-searches (sometimes while in four-point restraints); (5) failing to protect the Plaintiffs from abuse by other patients or by Atascadero employees; (6) failing to provide the Plaintiffs with constitutionally satisfactory conditions of confinement; (7) forcing the Plaintiffs to participate in treatment; and (8) denying the Plaintiffs adequate treatment, thereby converting the Plaintiffs' civil confinement to a de facto extension of their prison sentence.
The Defendants moved to dismiss the second amended complaint, on the same grounds presented in their first motion to dismiss. The district court again denied the motion. The Defendants timely appealed. The Defendants contend that the district court erred by failing to rule that the Eleventh Amendment, state abstention doctrine, or qualified immunity barr the Plaintiffs' suit.
We review de novo the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss. Decker v. Advantage Fund, Ltd., 362 F.3d 593, 595-96 (9th Cir.2004). Immunity under the Eleventh Amendment presents a question of law, which we review de novo. See Demshki v. Monteith, 255 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir.2001). To determine if the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, we review de novo whether governing law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation and whether the specific facts alleged constitute a violation of established law. See Mabe v. San Bernardino County Dept. of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.2001).
Although a district court's denial of a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not ordinarily appealable, the denial of a claim for immunity is appealable before final judgment under the collateral order doctrine and is reviewed de novo. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir.1999). All allegations of material fact are accepted as true and should be construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000). A "complaint should not be dismissed [under Rule 12(b)(6)] unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir.2002).
We note, again, the special difficulty of deciding the motion to dismiss a Defendant...
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