Hydrick v. Hunter
| Citation | 449 F.3d 978 |
| Decision Date | 01 June 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-56712.,03-56712. |
| Parties | James Allen HYDRICK; David Lanphere; Shaundale Griffin; Frank Cisneros; Paul Pederson; Steven Robert Cerniglia; Gary Price; Daniel Mrowici; Kenneth Ciancio; Michael McClure; James Mata; Richard Bishop; Melvin Fields; Ron Lee; Leonard Pierre; Thomas Price; Jimmy Guthrie; Brian Kelly; Woodrow Jones; Vashon Jackson; Bruce Riley; Fred Scott; Dean Danforth; Sammy Page; James Peters; Grayling Mitchell; Carlos Saucedo; Anthony Dacayona; Charles Salas, et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Melvin E. HUNTER, aka/Jon DeMorales; Craig Nelson; Grenda Ernst, Defendants-Appellants, and Robert McDaniel; Jerry Reynolds; Robert Penate; Samuel Robinson; Mark Mahhoney; Stephen Mayberg; Anita Judd; Michael Hughes; Jim Vess; Jack Townsend; Mark Palmer; Rocky Spurgeon; Arnie Gobbell; Jim Wiley; Mark Kalionzes; Elaine Sherrill; Glan Mikel; Jan Maire Alarcon; Baruch Margalit; William Knowlton; Diane Imram; Carmel Muller; Dale Arnold; Gabriella Paladino; Jean Dansereau et al.; William Charles Thiel; Robert Douglas Lefort; Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor of California, Defendants. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
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Randall R. Murphy, Deputy Attorney General, Los Angeles, CA, for the defendants-appellants.
Kathryn M. Davis, Latham & Watkins, Los Angeles, CA, for the plaintiffs-appellees.
Before MARY M. SCHROEDER, Chief Judge, HARRY PREGERSON and STEPHEN S. TROTT, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiffs-Appellees represent a class of approximately 600 civilly committed persons and those awaiting commitment at Atascadero State Hospital pursuant to California's Sexually Violent Predators Act ("SVP Act"). In this suit, Plaintiffs allege that the conditions of their confinement violate their constitutional rights. They request declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss based largely on qualified immunity, but their motion was summarily denied by the district court. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm in part, and reverse in part.
The SVP Act defines an SVP as a person "convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims for which he or she received a determinate sentence and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others" i.e., is "likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior." See Cal. Welf. & Inst.Code § 6600(a).2 At least six months before a person who has committed the predicate offenses is to complete his sentence, he is evaluated by the Department of Corrections and Department of Mental Health. Id. § 6601. If those two departments agree that the person evaluated may be an SVP, a petition for commitment may be filed by the district attorney or counsel for the county in which the evaluated person was convicted. Id. § 6601(i). If that person is found by a jury to be an SVP who poses a danger to the health and safety of others, he is civilly committed for an indefinite period to commence after his criminal sentence is fulfilled. Id. §§ 6602-6604.
Once civilly committed, Plaintiffs undergo a five-phase treatment program. Phase One comprises group sessions that educate the SVP about California's SVP Act. During Phase One, the SVP is required to attend and participate in the treatment sessions. If he does not, his access level3 is reduced and he is not allowed to advance to Phase Two of the treatment program. In addition, an SVP's failure to attend or participate in the treatment sessions is used against him at future probable cause and confinement hearings. The SVP cannot advance beyond Phase One unless he signs a statement in which he acknowledges that he has an "illness" that requires "treatment." Plaintiffs allege that the signed statements are often used against the SVP in future probable cause and confinement hearings.
Phases Two through Five of the treatment plan involve "cognitive" treatment. This treatment includes viewing videos that depict violent or other inappropriate sexual activities while a repugnant odor or other unpleasant sensation is applied to elicit a negative association.
Each year, a committed person has a right to a show cause hearing to determine whether his commitment should be continued. Id. § 6605(a)-(b). If it is found that the SVP continues to be a danger to the health or safety of the community, the person is committed for two years from the date of the finding. Id. § 6605(e). These successive periods of commitment can be continued indefinitely, or until the SVP completes all five phases of treatment. Upon successful completion of Phase Five, the SVP is conditionally released under the supervision of the California Mental Health Department. According to Plaintiffs, "only a handful of SVPs have been allowed into Phase Four and no SVP has progressed to Phase Five or has been found to be ready for release under the treatment protocol."4
On September 2, 1998, Plaintiffs filed a pro se class action, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in district court against Defendants-Appellants Stephen Mayberg (Director of the California Department of Mental Health), Cal A. Terhune (Director of the California Department of Corrections), Jon DeMorales (former Executive Director at Atascadero State Hospital), Grenda Ernst (Clinical Administrator at Atascadero State Hospital), and Craig Nelson (Senior Psychologist Specialist at Atascadero State Hospital) (collectively "Defendants"). Plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief, as well as monetary damages, on the grounds that the policies and procedures that govern Plaintiffs' confinement and treatment at Atascadero State Hospital violate Plaintiffs' constitutional rights.
In March 1999, the district court appointed pro bono counsel for Plaintiffs. Counsel filed an amended complaint approximately five months later. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The motion to dismiss raised Eleventh Amendment and qualified immunity defenses. The district court denied Defendants' motion in a one line order.
Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on August 14, 2002.5 Both the first and second amended complaints alleged that Defendants violated Plaintiffs' rights by, inter alia: (1) force-medicating Plaintiffs in non-emergency situations; (2) reducing Plaintiffs' access levels and other privileges as a form of punishment for refusing to participate in treatment sessions or as retaliation for filing lawsuits; (3) putting Plaintiffs in restraints for non-threatening and/or nondisruptive conduct, including the refusal to participate in treatment or therapy; (4) subjecting Plaintiffs to public strip-searches (sometimes while in four-point restraints); (5) failing to protect Plaintiffs from abuse of other patients or of Atascadero employees; (6) failing to provide Plaintiffs with constitutionally satisfactory conditions of confinement; (7) forcing Plaintiffs to participate in treatment; and (8) denying Plaintiffs adequate treatment, thereby converting Plaintiffs' civil confinement to a de facto extension of their prison sentence.
Once again, Defendants moved to dismiss the second amended complaint, on the same grounds presented in their first motion to dismiss. The district court again denied Defendants' motion to dismiss in a one line order. Defendants timely filed their notice of appeal. Defendants contend that the district court erred by failing to rule that the Eleventh Amendment, state abstention doctrine, or qualified immunity barred Plaintiffs' suit.
We review de novo the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss. Decker v. Advantage Fund, Ltd., 362 F.3d 593, 595-96 (9th Cir.2004). Immunity under the Eleventh Amendment presents a question of law, which we review de novo. See Demshki v. Monteith, 255 F.3d 986, 988 (9th Cir.2001). To determine if Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, we review de novo whether governing law was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation and whether the specific facts alleged constitute a violation of established law. See Mabe v. San Bernardino County Dept. of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.2001).
Although a district court's denial of a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not ordinarily appealable, the denial of a claim for immunity is appealable before final judgment under the collateral order doctrine and is reviewed de novo. See Morley v. Walker, 175 F.3d 756, 759 (9th Cir.1999). All allegations of material fact are accepted as true and should be construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir.2000). The "complaint should not be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief." Thompson v. Davis, 295 F.3d 890, 895 (9th Cir.2002).
We note, again, the special difficulty of deciding the motion to dismiss a Defendant on qualified immunity grounds at this stage. Under the notice pleading standard of the Federal Rules, plaintiffs are only required to give a "short and plain statement" of their claims. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). Thus, Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974).
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