Hydro-Hercules Corp. v. Gary Excavating, Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 July 1974
• Docket Number: HYDRO-HERCULES
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CORPORATION v. GARY EXCAVATING, INC., et al.

Page 714

353 A.2d 714

166 Conn. 647

HYDRO-HERCULES CORPORATION v. GARY EXCAVATING, INC., et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

July 23, 1974.

[166 Conn. 648] Howard F. Zoarski, New Haven, for appellants (defendants).

Rolland Castleman, Manchester, with whom was Jules A. Karp, Manchester, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and SHAPIRO, LOISELLE, MacDONALD and BOGDANSKI, JJ.

BOGDANSKI, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff, a subcontractor, brought this action to recover damages for the breach of an express contract against the defendant Gary Excavating, Inc., hereinafter Gary, the general contractor for the construction of a sewage system for the town of North Haven. The case was referred to Hon. John R. Thim, state referee, who, exercising the powers of the Superior Court, rendered judgment for the plaintiff. The defendants have appealed from that judgment.

The defendants have assigned error in the referee's finding of facts without evidence; in his rulings on evidence; in his overruling of their claims of law; and in his conclusions.

The finding ¹ discloses the following pertinent facts: The plaintiff was engaged in the deep-well dewatering business and, in conjunction therewith, sold and rented pumps and associated equipment. In the summer of 1966, the defendant Gary began to prepare its bids to obtain contracts for the installation of sanitary sewers in the town of North Haven. Initially the town of North Haven had divided the sewer project into two segments and contractors were invited to bid on either or both, designated as contracts 100-8 and 100-9. The proposed project called for the sewer pipe to be laid in dry trenches, requiring dewatering of the area. Following discussions with Gary, the plaintiff prepared a proposal for the predewatering of the project area, the cost of which was to be incorporated by Gary in its bids. Upon the acceptance of the plaintiff's proposal by Gary, the parties entered into a subcontract agreement dated April 18, 1967, with an addendum dated May 3, 1967. ² Thereafter Gary submitted its bids for proposed contracts 100-8 and 100-9.

The town of North Haven did not accept any of the submitted bids. Instead it modified the sewer project by redesignating some of the streets on which sewers were to be installed, combined the previously proposed contracts into a single contract, labeled it 100-9 and invited bids. Gary's bid on the new contract 100-9 was accepted by the town.

Gary did not enter into a new subcontract with the plaintiff. Both parties understood that their rights and obligations were governed by the terms of the subcontract of April 18, 1967, and the addendum. From June 6, 1967, to November 7, 1967, the plaintiff performed well-drilling operations and rented pumps and equipment to Gary pursuant to the terms of the subcontract and addendum. The plaintiff rendered monthly bills in accordance with the charges fixed in the subcontract for wells drilled and equipment rented. Gary never disputed the accuracy or reasonableness of those bills, and made three partial payments thereon. When Gary failed to make further payments, the plaintiff terminated its operations and removed its equipment from the sewer project site.

After the plaintiff commenced this action, the defendants filed two affirmative defenses and a counterclaim, which, among other things, alleged that the plaintiff failed to perform according to the terms of the subcontract agreement and therefore breached its agreement with Gary. The counterclaim specifically alleged the existence of the subcontract agreement of April 18, 1967.

The referee reached the following conclusions: (1) the plaintiff brought the proper cause of action in seeking recovery on the subcontract; (2) the plaintiff fully performed its contractual obligations; (3) the plaintiff was justified in terminating its subcontract with Gary; and (4) the defendants failed to establish the allegations of their special defenses and counterclaim. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff in the amount of $60,000.

Gary's principal claim is that the referee erred in concluding that the plaintiff had brought the proper cause of action. Gary argues that the subcontract of April 18, 1967, relates by its terms to contract proposals 100-8 and 100-9 only, and that when those contracts were not subsequently awarded to Gary, the subcontract became unenforceable and void. Although Gary concedes that the plaintiff performed work on the sewer project, it maintains that the work was not done under contracts 100-8 and 100-9.

' The intention of the parties manifested by their words and acts is essential to determine whether a contract was entered into and what its terms were. Nutmeg State Machine(ry) Corporation v. Shuford, 129 Conn. 659, 661, 30 A.2d 911, 147 A.L.R. 1168. This determination requires a finding of mutuality of obligation.' Hess v. Dumouchel Paper Co., 154 Conn. 343, 347, 225 A.2d 797, 799. Intention is an inference of fact, and the conclusion is not reviewable unless it was one which the trier could not reasonably make. Bianco v. Darien, 157 Conn. 548, 557, 254 A.2d 898; Grote v. A. C. Hine Co., 148 Conn. 283, 286-287, 170 A.2d 138.

The inclusion of a reference to contracts 100-8 and 100-9 in the subcontract did not automatically cause its termination when the contract subsequently awarded Gary was labeled 100-9. The subcontract required the plaintiff to drill wells and rent equipment when and where Gary directed. The parties agreed to a specific price per vertical foot drilled and to a specific schedule of rental rates for equipment leased. There was no need to consult contracts 100-8 and 100-9 for detailed plans and specifications since the mutual obligations of the parties were contained within the four corners of the subcontract and its addendum. The written words of the parties did not manifest any intent to abandon their subcontract merely because the sewer project was modified and combined under the single label 100-9. This is not a case, as claimed by Gary, in which 'substantial charges' were subsequently made to incomplete documents incorporated into the contract by reference, as in Randolph Construction Co. v. Kings East Corporation, 165 Conn. 269, 275, 334 A.2d 464.

The subsequent acts of the parties are also evidence of their intent. When the plaintiff began work on the sewer project, it did so under the direction of Gary. The plaintiff performed according to the terms of the subcontract and rendered monthly bills thereunder. Gary accepted those bills without objection and made partial payments. Moreover, the defendants' pleadings alleged the existence of the subcontract agreement of April 18, 1967. Those pleadings are inconsistent with their present claim and could properly be considered by the trier on the question of intent. See Haaser v. A. C. Lehmann Co., 130 Conn. 219, 222, 33 A.2d 135. Gary's treasurer, Vincent Giordano, summed it up when he was asked on direct examination, 'Did you...