Hydro-Line Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission

• Decision Date: 26 November 1958
• Docket Number: No. 34808,HYDRO-LINE,34808
• Citation: 154 N.E.2d 234,15 Ill.2d 156
• Parties: MANUFACTURING CO., Plaintiff in Error, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Darwin B. Brenbarger, Defendant in Error.)
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 234

154 N.E.2d 234

15 Ill.2d 156

HYDRO-LINE MANUFACTURING CO., Plaintiff in Error, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION et al. (Darwin B. Brenbarger Defendant in Error.)

No. 34808.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 26, 1958.

Foltz, Haye & Keegan, Rockford (Thomas A. Keegan, Rockford, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Russell Goldman, Rockford, for defendant in error.

DAVIS, Justice.

This case poses the question of whether the injuries of Darwin Brenbarger, herein called respondent, arose out of and in the course of his employment. The arbitrator found they did not, but his decision was reversed by the Industrial Commission which entered an award for temporary total disability and for permanent loss of use of 20 per cent of the right leg. On writ of certiorari, the circuit court of Winnebago County affirmed the Industrial Commission and we allowed the petition for writ of error.

There is no dispute concerning the material facts. Respondent, age 19, was employed by Hydro-Line Manufacturing Co. as a tester. For about three weeks prior to April 6, 1956, he, and other employees, had practiced softball in a vacant lot adjacent to the Hydro-Line plant. On April 5, 1956, he saw a notice on the bulletin board signed by C. J. McCain, a foreman, which, according to respondent, stated: 'that anyone wishing to participate in baseball games it was going to sponsor, by Hydro-Line, sign up their name on the list.' Respondent signed the notice and on the following day was injured during the lunch hour, while batting out fly balls. The bat was furnished by one of the employees, and several fellow employees contributed toward the purchase of the baseball. At the time, they were playing in the aforementioned vacant lot, had no captain or leader, but the respondent stated that the foreman, McCain, was 'supervising in a form.' However, no team was ever organized.

It appears from the record that McCain and another employee were interested in forming a baseball team, and had spoken to the president of Hydro-Line Manufacturing Co. who offered no objections to the plan and agreed to buy the equipment when the team was organized. However, at the time of respondent's injury, no equipment had been purchased by Hydro-Line. The organization of the team and when and where it would play, if at all, had been left to the determination of the employees.

In order for respondent to recover under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 48, pars. 138.1-138.28) he must prove, either by direct evidence or by evidence from which such inference can be fairly and reasonably drawn, that his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. Corn Products Refining Co. v. Industrial Comm., 6 Ill.2d 439, 128 N.E.2d 919; Le Tourneau, Inc., v. Industrial Comm., 396 Ill. 435, 72 N.E.2d 183. On this question the findings of fact of the Industrial Commission are conclusive upon this court unless manifestly against the weight of the evidence, but its legal conclusions based upon such findings are subject to review. Jewel Tea Co. v. Industrial Comm., 6 Ill.2d 304, 128 N.E.2d 699, 928; Dietzen Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill. 11, 116 N.E. 684. Since the evidence is uncontroverted, we are therefore presented with a question of law-whether such evidence, together with the legitimate inferences drawn therefrom, is sufficient to prove that respondent's injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. Hill-Luthy Co. v. Industrial Comm., 411 Ill. 201, 103 N.E.2d 605; Math Igler's Casino, Inc., v. Industrial Comm., 394 Ill. 330, 68 N.E.2d 773.

As a general principle, an injury 'arises out of' employment when there is apparent to the rational mind a causal connection between the employment and the accident, and is 'in the course of' the employment when it occurs while the employee is at work or while engaging in an activity reasonably incidental to his work. Christian v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Railway Co., 412 Ill. 171, 105 N.E.2d 741; Hill -Luthy Co. v. Industrial Comm., 411 Ill. 201, 103 N.E.2d 605; Chicago Hardware Foundry Co. v. Industrial Comm., 393 Ill. 294, 65 N.E.2d 778; Board of Education v. Industrial Comm., 321 Ill. 23, 151 N.E. 499; United States Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm., 310 Ill. 85, 141 N.E. 401; Chicago, Wilmington & Franklin Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm., 303 Ill. 540, 135 N.E. 784; Dietzen Co. v. Industrial Board, 279 Ill. 11, 116 N.E. 684. While these general principles are relatively simple, their application to the varying factual situations which are presented to the commission and the courts constitute a complex phase of the judicial process.

In Jewel Tea Co. v. Industrial Comm., 6 Ill.2d 304, 128 N.E.2d 699, 928, we recently applied these principles to a claim for an injury occurring while the claimant was participating in company sponsored athletics, and held that the employee was entitled to compensation. In that case, which we regarded as one of first impression in Illinois, a league of 15 teams had been organized from among the employees of the company's 153 Chicago stores and the claimant was injured while participating in a league softball game. Each team was named after a district manager of employer. Such manager appointed a captain, who in turn recruited...