Hyland v. Rochelle
Decision Date | 13 February 1913 |
Docket Number | 22,047 |
Citation | 100 N.E. 842,179 Ind. 671 |
Parties | Hyland et al. v. Rochelle |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied June 17, 1913.
From Marion Circuit Court (20,337); Charles Remster Judge.
Application for a writ of habeas corpus by Louis Rochelle against Martin J. Hyland and others. From a judgment for the applicant, the defendants appeal.
Reversed.
Joseph B. Kealing, Charles E. Averill, Roby & Watson, Baker & Daniels and Rowland Evans, for appellants.
Ira M Holmes and Henry Seyfried, for appellee.
The appellee made application by a duly verified petition to the Marion Circuit Court for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging he was unlawfully restrained of his liberty by the appellants. Motion to quash the writ was made by appellants, Hyland et al., overruled as to all except Collins, sustained as to him. Refusing to plead further, judgment against appellants, Hyland, Holtz and Cairl, that appellee be discharged from their custody, etc. The error relied on for reversal is the overruling of appellants' separate motions to quash the writ.
Appellee avers that appellants Martin J. Hyland, Superintendent of Police, William A. Holtz, Captain of Detectives of the city of Indianapolis, apprehended him, the appellee, upon a warrant issued by Thomas R. Marshall, Governor of the State of Indiana, which warrant was issued by such governor upon the presentation to him of a requisition issued by Judson Harmon, Governor of the state of Ohio, which was a requisition for the issuance of a writ and warrant for the apprehension of the appellee, and for his delivery as a fugitive from justice, to one of the appellants, Emmet C. Cairl, as the agent of the state of Ohio, and that the said Cairl was duly appointed and commissioned to receive and convey the appellee to the county of Lucas, in the state of Ohio, as such fugitive; that he was taken before appellant, James A. Collins, judge of the City Court of Indianapolis; that the judge of the City Court of the City of Indianapolis illegally, wrongfully, and oppressively pretended to examine into the question of the identity of the appellee without authority and jurisdiction so to do, did find he was the person named in the writ and warrant and remanded and delivered him over to the appellant, Emmet C. Cairl, agent of the state of Ohio.
Was the hearing before James A. Collins, judge of the City Court of Indianapolis authorized by the statute of the State of Indiana? If so, then the apprehension and detention of appellee was regular and appellants' separate motions to quash the writ should have been sustained. Section 1893 Burns 1908, Acts 1905 p. 584, § 26, approved March 9, 1905, relating to fugitives from justice, reads: "Upon the demand of the executive authority of any state or territory of the United States upon the governor of this state, to surrender any fugitive from justice from such state or territory, pursuant to the constitution and laws of the United States, he shall issue his warrant, reciting the fact of such demand and the charge upon which it is based, with the time and place of the alleged commission of the offense, directed generally to any sheriff or constable of any county of this state, commanding him to apprehend such fugitive and bring him before the circuit, superior or criminal court or judge of this state nearest or most convenient of access to the place at which the arrest may be made; and such warrant may be executed by any sheriff or constable in this state, in his own county or in any other county in this state." This section of the statute contains the words, "or judge of this state." Do these words include judges of city courts and are judges of city courts judges of this State within the meaning of the above section? The lower court decided this case upon the theory that the judge of the City Court of the City of Indianapolis within this statute was not a judge of this State.
The office of judge of the city court was created by an act approved March 6, 1905, Acts 1905 p. 219, § 215, § 8840 Burns 1908. At the same session of the General Assembly of this State and three days prior thereto the above section of the statute was enacted. Section 215, Acts 1905 p. 219, § 8840 Burns 1908 reads: Section 216, Acts 1905 p. 219, § 8841 Burns 1908 reads: . § 217, Acts 1905 p. 219, § 8842 Burns 1908. Section 1, Art. 7, of the Constitution of Indiana, provides, "The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in Circuit Courts, and in such other courts as the General Assembly may establish". Section 2, Art. 4, Constitution of United States, reads: "A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime."
In construing a statute the intent of the legislature is the object sought, and in determining such intent, the entire statute, as well as other acts in pari materia, whether repealed or not, and whether passed before or after the act in question, will be considered. Johnson v City of Indianapolis (1910), 174 Ind. 691, 699, 93 N.E. 17. Guided by this rule let us proceed to examine the several acts enacted by the Indiana legislature concerning the apprehension of fugitives from justice from other states. The act approved January 22, 1824, R. S. 1824, chap. 46, p. 219, was the first law enacted on this question. It reads in part, "That if any person shall commit any crime in any of the United States or the territories thereof, and shall flee into this state, it shall be lawful for any judge of the supreme or circuit court, or justice of the peace, within this state, on the oath or affirmation of any person charging such fugitive with a crime, to issue his warrant, and cause such fugitive to be arrested and brought before him." This act further provides for the removal of the fugitive if found guilty. This act remained in force and unchanged until 1867, when the legislature, by act approved March 8, 1867, amended to read in part, "Section 1. * * * and bring him before the circuit or common pleas judge of this State who may be nearest or convenient of access to the place at which the arrest may be made." Acts 1867 p. 126. Section 26, Acts 1881 (s. s.) p. 114, § 1599 R. S. 1881, followed the language of § 1, Acts 1867, supra, except the clause set out above was changed to read, "the circuit or criminal judge of this State who may be nearest or most convenient of access," etc. This section remained in force until 1905, when the legislature changed it to read as set out, supra. Acts 1905 p. 584, § 26, § 1893 Burns 1908, viz., "Apprehend such fugitive and bring him before the circuit, superior or criminal court or judge of this...
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Hyland v. Rochelle
...179 Ind. 671100 N.E. 842HYLAND et al.v.ROCHELLE.1No. 22,047.Supreme Court of Indiana.Feb. 13, Appeal from Circuit Court, Marion County; Charles Remster, Judge. Application for writ of habeas corpus by Louis Rochelle against Martin J. Hyland and others. From a judgment discharging the applic......
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Coal Creek Coal Co. v. Chicago, T.H. & S.E. Ry. Co.
...... be treated [114 Ind.App. 636] as together constituting one. law, although they were enacted at different times. Hyland v. Rochelle, 1913, 179 Ind. 671, 100 N.E. 842; Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 1911, 221 U.S. 286, 31 S.Ct. 578, 55 L.Ed. 738; Vane v. Newcombe ......
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Coal Creek Coal Co. v. Chicago, T.H.&S.E. Ry. Co., 17189.
......This being true, they must be treated as together constituting one law, although they were enacted at different times. Hyland v. Rochelle, 1913, 179 Ind. 671, 100 N.E. 842;Tiger v. Western Investment Co., 1911, 221 U.S. 286, 31 S.Ct. 578, 55 L.Ed. 738;Vane v. Newcombe and ......