Hyman v. Coe
Decision Date | 29 October 1956 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 2075-49. |
Citation | 146 F. Supp. 24 |
Parties | George HYMAN et al., Plaintiffs, v. Theodore I. COE et al., Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
James C. Wilkes, Norman M. Glasgow, Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs.
Vernon E. West, Corp. Counsel for the District of Columbia, Milton D. Korman, J. Hampton Baumgartner, Jr., Asst. Corp. Counsel for the District of Columbia, Washington, D. C., for defendants.
Plaintiffs are owners of an apartment building located on the west side of Sixteenth Street, N.W., between K and L Streets, directly opposite the main entrance to the Statler Hotel, in an area zoned Residential 90' "D." The premises are known as 1016 Sixteenth Street, N. W. They desire to convert the apartment building to an office building. Since the property is located in the aforementioned area this conversion cannot be accomplished unless the defendants, members of the Board of Zoning Adjustment, grant an exception for this purpose.
Three appeals for such exception, which the plaintiffs had filed with the Board, were denied in 1947, 1948 and 1949. On May 11, 1949 plaintiffs originated this action in this Court, seeking a mandatory injunction. This matter was heard by Judge Morris who, on January 25, 1952, filed a memorandum opinion, D.C., 102 F.Supp. 254. On May 2, 1952 Judge Morris signed an order in which he determined: "the order of the Board of Zoning Adjustment complained of is invalid * * * and the same is hereby vacated and set aside and the said Board of Zoning Adjustment is hereby directed to reopen said proceedings * * *"
Thereafter the defendants appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and the plaintiffs filed a cross appeal. On April 8, 1954 the Court of Appeals handed down the following order:
Pursuant to the order of the District Court, the Board of Zoning Adjustment, on April 21, 1954, and again on January 19, 1955, heard further testimony in the matter of this appeal, and on April 19, 1955 issued its order again denying plaintiffs' application for a special exception.
On January 23, 1956 plaintiffs filed in this Court a supplemental complaint for injunctive relief. On June 22, 1956 defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and on August 22, 1956 plaintiffs filed their motion for summary judgment. It is these motions for summary judgment that are now before this Court. The pleadings, admissions and affidavits on file show there is no genuine issue of any material fact.
Plaintiffs' appeal, along with others, has been considered by the Board of Zoning Adjustment under the authority granted to it by the Zoning Act of 1938, as amended, D.C.Code 1951, § 5-413 et seq., to consider appeals brought under Section XXIII, Part 2, Paragraph 29 of the Zoning Regulations of the District of Columbia. This regulation is as follows:
Pursuant to an Act of Congress zoning was first adopted in the District of Columbia in 1920, D.C.Code 1929, Tit. 25, § 521 et seq. That Act provided for the establishment of a Zoning Commission empowered to adopt zoning maps and promulgate zoning regulations. The Commission was authorized to fix the zoning boundaries and to specify and limit the specific uses that could locate within the fixed zoning boundaries. The Commission could change the zoning boundaries as well as the uses located within the fixed boundaries, but there was little flexibility under the system to deal with the individual problems of the property owners. Spot zoning proved undesirable. So that more flexibility could be had under the zoning regulations and maps, and in order to establish machinery to deal with specific properties, Congress passed a new Zoning Act in 1938. Under that Act the Zoning Commission retained the power already vested in it to establish zoning boundaries and zoning regulations. A Board of Zoning Adjustment was established which the Commission could empower to make special exceptions to the provisions of the zoning regulations "subject to appropriate principles, standards, rules, conditions, and safeguards set forth in the regulations" and to hear and decide requests for special exceptions in accordance with the provisions of the zoning regulations, D.C.Code, § 5-420. A special exception is part of the zoning plan and the instant case involves a special exception.
The decisions of a zoning adjustment board are discretionary and should not be reversed by the Courts unless clearly arbitrary and unreasonable. Leventhal v. District of Columbia, 69 App. D.C. 229, 100 F.2d 94; Lewis v. District of Columbia, 89 U.S.App.D.C. 72, 190 F. 2d 25; Selden v. Capitol Hill Southeast Citizens Association, 95 U.S.App.D.C. 62, 219 F.2d 33.
But where such a Board's decision, upon review, is clearly unreasonable and arbitrary it will be set aside. Robinson v. Town Council of Narragansett, 60 R.I. 422, 199 A. 308, 314. The Court is not bound by an arbitrary or capricious action of the Board or where there has been a manifest abuse of discretion. Berard v. Board of Adjustment of City of St. Louis, Mo.App., 138 S.W.2d 731, 734.
Burr v. Rago, 120 Conn. 287, 180 A. 444, 446; Coleman v. Board of Appeals, 281 Mass. 112, 183 N.E. 166. Such a board is "required to act judicially on facts lawfully ascertained." Robinson v. Town Council of Narragansett, supra 60 R.I. 422, 199 A. 314.
It is not the intent of Section XXIII, Part 2 of the Zoning Regulations that an appeal for an exception must be granted if certain requirements are met. An "exception" in a zoning ordinance is one allowable where facts and conditions detailed in the ordinance, as those upon which an exception may be permitted, are found to exist. Application of Devereux Foundation, Inc., 351 Pa. 478, 41 A.2d 744, appeal dismissed Devereux Foundation v. Lea, 326 U.S. 686, 66 S.Ct. 89, 90 L.Ed. 403. The Board is to decide whether or not the exception sought meets the requirements of the regulation, but this decision must result from an exercise of sound discretion, that is, legal discretion, and must not be arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. Robinson v. Town Council of Narragansett, and Berard v. Board of Adjustment of City of St. Louis, supra. As Judge Morris so aptly said in his opinion of January 25, 1952:
"* * * every one upon whom any organ of government acts has a right to have that agency make its decision upon evidence, which is open to question and correction, and the exercise of discretion and the consequent judgment of the agency must be controlled by the same principles that control such agency's action in its dealings with others." Hyman v. Coe, 102 F.Supp. 254, at page 257.
Reading the Preamble of Part 2 of Section XXIII, together with Paragraph 29, it is clear that the limitations on the use of the property in the neighborhood for office building purposes are that such use will not render less desirable other property in the neighborhood used for residential purposes.
Paragraph 29 was adopted by the Zoning Commission on April 22, 1947. . Pursuant to its provisions the owners of certain parcels of land on Sixteenth Street between H and M Streets, N.W.,...
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