Hynes v. Hale

• Decision Date: 22 June 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99–395.,99–395.
• Citation: 146 N.H. 533,776 A.2d 722
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court
• Parties: Stephen HYNES, as Trustee for Holiday Acres Joint Venture Trust d/b/a Holiday Acres Mobile Home Park v. Karen D. HALE and another.

146 N.H. 533

776 A.2d 722

Stephen HYNES, as Trustee for Holiday Acres Joint Venture Trust d/b/a Holiday Acres Mobile Home Park

v.Karen D. HALE and another.

No. 99–395.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

June 22, 2001.

Law Offices of John L. Allen and Associates, P.C., of Manchester (Denis O. Robinson, on the brief, and John L. Allen orally), for the plaintiff.

New Hampshire Legal Assistance, of Claremont (Patricia Wallace, on the brief, and Kenneth Barnes orally), for defendant Karen D. Hale.

Philip T. McLaughlin, attorney general (Walter L. Maroney, senior assistant attorney general, on the brief, and Mr. Maroney orally), for the New Hampshire Board of Manufactured Housing.

DALIANIS, J.

The plaintiff, Stephen Hynes, as Trustee of Holiday Acres Joint Venture Trust d/b/a Holiday Acres Mobile Home Park, appeals the Superior Court's (McGuire , J.) order affirming the decision of the New Hampshire Board of Manufactured Housing (board) regarding a park rule requiring the defendant, Karen D. Hale, to modify her fence. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

The following facts either were found by the board or appear in the record, and are not disputed by the parties on appeal. Hale is a tenant of Hynes' manufactured housing community. In April 1997, she purchased her manufactured housing unit from prior tenants. At the time of purchase, the unit was surrounded by a six-foot-high fence. Sometime thereafter, the fence fell into disrepair. To repair it, Hale replaced portions with six-foot-high fencing. In two notices of violation, issued in April and June 1998, Hynes notified Hale that the fence as repaired violated park rule 6(k), which requires all fences to be approved by park management and not exceed four feet in height. The notices informed Hale that she had to remove the new sections of fence and replace them with four-foot-high fencing. Hale did not comply with the notices and, accordingly, in July 1998, Hynes issued a notice to quit.

Hale then brought a complaint before the board, asserting that Hynes' enforcement of park rule 6(k) violated RSA 205–A:2, VIII(d) (2000), which restricts a manufactured housing park owner's ability to require a tenant to remove any personal property which the tenant had prior park owner permission to possess. Following a hearing, the board found that Hale had implied permission to maintain the fence at its original height because park management had approved her purchase and sale agreement, which described the fence as property included in the purchase of the unit. Accordingly, the board ruled the fence was "grandfathered" at its original height. The board enjoined Hynes from requiring Hale to install replacement fencing of less than six feet and from taking any legal action against her based upon the contention that the fence violated park rule 6(k). Hynes moved for rehearing, which the board denied, and then appealed to the superior court, which affirmed the board's decision.

On appeal, Hynes argues that: (1) the statutes establishing the board violate the separation of powers doctrine set forth in the New Hampshire Constitution, see N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 37 ; (2) the board's decision exceeded its jurisdiction because the issues raised in Hale's complaint were related to an eviction action; (3) the board erroneously found that park management had impliedly permitted Hale to maintain the fence's original height; and (4) the board erroneously issued injunctive relief.

The trial court's review of a decision of the board is governed by RSA 677:6 (1996). See RSA 205–A:28, II (2000). The appealing party has the burden of demonstrating to the trial court that the board's decision was unlawful or unreasonable. See Sundberg v. Greenville Bd. of Adjustment , 144 N.H. 341, 343, 740 A.2d 1068 (1999). "We, in turn, will not disturb the trial court's determination if there is evidence upon which the court's decision reasonably could be based and it was not erroneous as a matter of law." Id. (citation omitted). "The standard of review for this court is not whether we would find as the trial court did but whether the evidence reasonably supports the finding." Mt. Valley Mall Assocs. v. Municipality of Conway , 144 N.H. 642, 647, 745 A.2d 481 (2000) (quotation omitted).

I. Separation of Powers

Hynes asserts that the legislation establishing the board conflicts with the separation of powers doctrine found in Part I, Article 37 of the New Hampshire Constitution. Because the constitutionality of a statute involves a question of law, we review the superior court's determination de novo . Mt. Valley Mall Assocs. , 144 N.H. at 648, 745 A.2d 481. "[We] will never declare a statute void unless the nullity and invalidity of the act are placed, in [our] judgment, beyond all reasonable doubt." Petition of Boston & Maine Corp. , 109 N.H. 324, 325, 251 A.2d 332 (1969) (quotation omitted). "However, if upon examination of the statute, there is a clear conflict with the Constitution the court must declare the statute inoperative because the Constitution, and not the statute, is the paramount law." Id. at 326, 251 A.2d 332 (quotation omitted).

We first examine RSA chapter 205–A, the statutory scheme related to regulation of manufactured housing parks. RSA chapter 205–A governs evictions of manufactured housing park tenants, unfair trade practices by manufactured housing park owners, health and safety conditions of manufactured housing parks and manufactured housing park rules. RSA chapter 205–A vests jurisdiction over evictions in district courts and jurisdiction over complaints of unfair practices and health and safety violations in the superior court. See RSA 205–A:9,:13–a,:15 (2000); see also RSA 540:13 (Supp.2000) ; RSA 358–A:4, III (Supp.2000).

Pursuant to RSA chapter 205–A, the board has jurisdiction to "hear and determine matters involving manufactured housing park rules, specifically RSA 205–A:2, RSA 205–A:7, and RSA 205–A:8." RSA 205–A:27 (2000); see RSA 205–A:12,:12 a (2000). The rules to which RSA 205–A:27 refers relate to manufactured housing park owner conduct. RSA 205–A:2 lists prohibitions related to what a manufactured housing park owner may require of tenants and lists mandates related to the notice of park rules that the owner must provide to tenants. RSA 205–A:7 prohibits a manufactured housing park owner from requiring a security deposit of more than one month's rent. RSA 205–A:8 prohibits a park owner from compelling a tenant to purchase manufactured housing equipment from any particular vendor. The board is also empowered to adopt rules relative to its administration over these subdivisions, subject to the approval of the bureau chief of the consumer protection and antitrust bureau of the department of justice. See RSA 205–A:31 (2000).

Matters involving manufactured housing park rules may be brought to the board by petition of a resident or owner of a manufactured housing park, see RSA 205–A:27, IV, or by written complaint of the bureau chief of the consumer protection and antitrust bureau, see RSA 205–A:30 (2000). Complaints regarding manufactured housing park rules may also be brought in district court by "[a]ny police department or agency, or the consumer protection and antitrust bureau." RSA 205–A:12 ; see also RSA 205–A:12–a.

In addition, any violation of RSA 205–A:2 also constitutes an unfair trade practice and "may be enforced as provided in RSA 358–A." RSA 205–A:13–a.

Hynes argues that because the board's sole function is to resolve factual disputes, its existence and establishment violates the separation of powers doctrine set forth in Part I, Article 37. He asserts that the board's enabling legislation unlawfully usurps judicial power.

Part I, Article 37 provides:

In the government of this state, the three essential powers thereof, to wit, the legislative, executive, and judicial, ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of, each other, as the nature of a free government will admit, or as is consistent with that chain of connection that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of union and amity.

The drafters of Part I, Article 37 recognized, however, that the separation of powers doctrine "does not require the erection of impenetrable barriers between the branches of our government." Petition of Mone , 143 N.H. 128, 134, 719 A.2d 626 (1998) (quotation omitted). The doctrine thus "contemplates some overlapping and duality in the division as a matter of practical and essential expediency." McKay v. N.H. Compensation Appeals Bd. , 143 N.H. 722, 726, 732 A.2d 1025 (1999) (quotation omitted).

In support of his argument, Hynes relies principally upon Smith Insurance, Inc. v. Grievance Committee , 120 N.H. 856, 424 A.2d 816 (1980). In Smith Insurance, Inc., we addressed "the constitutionality of RSA 402:75 (Supp.1979), establishing [a] Grievance Committee empowered to review the termination by insurance companies of agency agreements between the companies and their agents." Id . at 857, 424 A.2d 816. The Grievance Committee was "solely empowered to hold hearings on private disputes between insurance agents and insurance companies relative to the termination of their contracts and to give some equitable relief in the form of an order requiring the insurance company to rescind its termination of the agency contract." Id. at 862, 424 A.2d 816. Although the Grievance Committee's decisions could be appealed to the superior court, we ruled that the legislation empowering it to hear agency contract disputes violated the separation of powers doctrine. Id. We observed that "[i]f ... the duty of an executive board is primarily to decide questions of legal rights between private parties that are unconnected to any regulatory function ... such function belongs to the judiciary." Id.

Hynes also relies upon Opinion of the Justices , 87 N.H. 492, 179 A. 357 (1935). At issue in Opinion of the Justices was proposed legislation that would have created a commission to...