Hyundai Electronics Co., Ltd. v. U.S.
| Citation | 53 F.Supp.2d 1334 |
| Decision Date | 19 May 1999 |
| Docket Number | Court No. 97-08-01409.,Slip Op. 99-44. |
| Parties | HYUNDAI ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. and Hyundai Electronics America, Inc., Plaintiffs, and LG Semicon Co., Ltd. and LG Semicon America, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. The United States, Defendant, and Micron Technology, Inc., Defendant-Intervenor. |
| Court | U.S. Court of International Trade |
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, LLP ), Washington, DC, for plaintiffs LG Semicon Co., Ltd., and LG Semicon America, Inc.
David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, David M. Cohen, Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice (Kenneth S. Kessler), Office of the Chief Counsel, Washington, DC, for Import Administration, United States Department of Commerce (Duane W. Layton), of counsel, for defendant.
Hale & Dorr, LLP (Gilbert B. Kaplan, Michael D. Esch, Paul W. Jameson, and Cris R. Revaz), Washington, DC, for defendant-intervenor Micron Technology, Inc.
In this action, the Court reviews a decision by the U.S. Department of Commerce ("Commerce") not to revoke an outstanding antidumping ("AD") order on dynamic random access memory semiconductors ("DRAMs") from Korea. Plaintiffs, LG Semicon Co., Ltd. and LG Semicon America, Inc. (collectively "LG Semicon"), and Hyundai Electronics Co., Ltd. and Hyundai Electronics America, Inc. (collectively "Hyundai"), are Korean producers of the subject merchandise and seek relief from Commerce's action under USCIT Rule 56.2. During the underlying administrative proceeding, plaintiffs separately asserted that the regulatory requirements for revocation had been met, and requested that Commerce revoke the outstanding AD order. Commerce rejected each invitation in its Notice of Final Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review: Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of One Megabit or Above From the Republic of Korea, 62 Fed.Reg. 39,809 (July 24, 1997) ("Final Results"). Plaintiffs contest this determination as both contrary to law and unsupported by substantial evidence.
The Court exercises jurisdiction to review the motions for judgment on the agency record pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1994). The Court sustains the Final Results.
Micron Technology, Inc. ("Micron"), a U.S. manufacturer of DRAM semiconductors, filed a petition with Commerce in April, 1992, alleging that Korean producers were selling DRAMs in the United States at less than fair value. Following an antidumping investigation, Commerce published an AD order on DRAMs from Korea in May, 1993. See 58 Fed.Reg. 27,520 (May 10, 1993).
In the first anniversary month of the AD order, plaintiffs and Micron both requested an administrative review. Commerce found de minimis dumping margins for both plaintiffs in this review. See Notice of Final Results of Antidumping Administrative Review of DRAMs from the Republic of Korea, 61 Fed.Reg. 20,216 (May 6, 1996).1 In the second anniversary month, the parties requested another administrative review, and Commerce again found de minimis dumping margins for both LG Semicon and Hyundai. See Notice of Final Results of Antidumping Administrative Review of DRAMs from the Republic of Korea, 62 Fed.Reg. 965 (Jan. 7, 1997).2
In the third anniversary month of the order, plaintiffs requested both a third annual review and a revocation in part of the AD order, pursuant to 19 C.F.R. § 353.25(a)(2) of Commerce's regulations. Notice of Initiation of Administrative Review: DRAMs from Korea, 61 Fed.Reg. 32,771 (June 25, 1996) (). In pertinent part, section 353.25(a)(2) provides that Commerce may revoke an order if it concludes that
value for a period of at least three consecutive years;
(iii) ... the producers or resellers agree in writing to their immediate reinstatement in the order, as long as any producer or reseller is subject to the order, if the Secretary concludes ... that the producer or reseller, subsequent to the revocation, sold the merchandise at less than foreign market value.
19 C.F.R. § 353.25(a)(2) (1996).3
Commerce issued the preliminary results of its third review on March 18, 1997. See Preliminary Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review and Notice of Intent Not to Revoke Order: Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors of One Megabit or Above From the Republic of Korea, 62 Fed.Reg. 12,794 (Mar. 18, 1997). Commerce again found de minimis dumping margins for both plaintiffs during the third review period. Commerce preliminarily determined not to revoke the AD order, however, because in its view plaintiffs each failed to meet the second of the three revocation criteria. That is, plaintiffs failed to satisfy Commerce that they were "not likely" to dump in the future. Commerce based its preliminary determination in part on evidence submitted by Micron regarding market trends during 1996. Importantly, Micron's data included information for the period after April 30, 1996, i.e., the last day covered under the third administrative review. In the Final Results, Commerce affirmed its decision not to revoke the AD order. See 62 Fed.Reg. at 39,811.
Plaintiffs challenge Commerce's decision not to revoke the order, alleging that it was neither in accordance with law nor supported by substantial evidence. More specifically, both plaintiffs assert that, as a matter of law, Commerce did not apply the proper standard to determine the likelihood of future dumping nor did it use data from an appropriate time period when it applied its faulty standard. Hyundai further challenges Commerce's characterization of the DRAM market and of Hyundai's behavior in that market as inconsistent with the record evidence. LG Semicon also challenges various conclusions regarding LG Semicon's current and future activities in the DRAM market as unsupported by record evidence.
Commerce opposes all of plaintiffs' challenges, as does Micron.
Commerce's determination will be sustained if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record and is otherwise in accordance with law. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B) (1994).
To determine whether Commerce's interpretation of the statute is in accordance with law, the court applies the two-prong test set forth in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Chevron first directs the court to determine "whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue." Id. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778 (internal quotations omitted). In doing so, the court must inquire "whether Congress's purpose and intent on the question at issue is judicially ascertainable." Timex V.I., Inc. v. United States, ___ Fed. Cir. (T) ___, ___, 157 F.3d 879, 881 (1998) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 & n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778); see also Micron Tech., Inc. v. United States, 44 F.Supp.2d 216, 218-19 (CIT 1999). Congress's purpose and intent must be divined using the traditional tools of statutory construction. Timex, 157 F.3d at 882 (citation omitted). Of course, the "first and foremost tool to be used is the statute's text," and "if the text answers the question, that is the end of the matter." Id. (citations and internal quotation omitted). In addition to the plain language of the statute, the other tools include the statute's structure, canons of statutory interpretation, and legislative history. See id. (citing Dunn v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 519 U.S. 465, 117 S.Ct. 913, 916-20, 137 L.Ed.2d 93 (1997)); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 859-63, 104 S.Ct. 2778; Oshkosh Truck Corp. v. United States, 123 F.3d 1477, 1481 (Fed.Cir.1997). If, using these tools, Congress's intent is unambiguous as to the issue at hand, the court must give effect to that intent.
On the other hand, if Congress's intent is "silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778. Thus, the second prong of the Chevron test directs the court to consider the reasonableness of an agency's interpretation.
If asked to review Commerce's factual findings, the court will uphold the agency if its findings are supported by substantial evidence. "Substantial evidence is something more than a `mere scintilla,' and must be enough reasonably to support a conclusion." Ceramica Regiomontana, S.A. v. United States, 10 CIT 399, 405, 636 F.Supp. 961, 966 (1986), aff'd, 5 Fed. Cir. (T) 77, 810 F.2d 1137 (1987). In applying this standard, the court sustains Commerce's factual determinations so long as they are reasonable and supported by the record as a whole, even if there is some evidence that detracts from the agency's conclusions. See Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 2 Fed. Cir. (T) 130, 138, 744 F.2d 1556, 1563 (1984).
In the discussion below, the Court first reviews plaintiffs' argument that Commerce's application of the "not likely" standard was not in accordance with law. The Court then considers plaintiffs' claim that Commerce unlawfully examined an inappropriate time period to make its "not likely" determination. In both instances, the Court rejects plaintiffs' arguments. The Court concludes its discussion by considering plaintiffs' claims that Commerce's decision not to revoke the order was unsupported by substantial evidence. Here, too, the Court sustains Commerce's determination.
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