Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez

• Citation: 189 S.W.3d 743
• Decision Date: 10 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. 03-0914.,03-0914.
• Parties: HYUNDAI MOTOR CO. and Hyundai Motor America, Inc., Petitioners, v. Victor Manuel VASQUEZ and Brenda Suarez Vasquez, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of Alyssa Amber Vasquez, Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

189 S.W.3d 743

HYUNDAI MOTOR CO. and Hyundai Motor America, Inc., Petitioners, v. Victor Manuel VASQUEZ and Brenda Suarez Vasquez, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of Alyssa Amber Vasquez, Respondents.

No. 03-0914.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued January 6, 2005.

Argued February 15, 2006.

Decided March 10, 2006.

Rehearing Denied May 26, 2006.

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Brendan K. McBride, David M. Prichard, Kevin M. Young, Prichard Hawkins & Young, LLP, Thomas H. Crofts Jr., Crofts & Callaway, P.C., San Antonio, David E. Keltner, Jose Henry Brantley & Keltner, Fort Worth, for Petitioners.

Michael A. Caddell, Cynthia Bodendieck Chapman, James Juranek, Caddell & Chapman, Houston, Ricardo G. Cedillo, L. J. Strieber, Davis Cedillo & Mendoza, Inc., San Antonio, Ezequiel Reyna Jr., Law Offices of Ezequiel Reyna, Jr., Weslaco, for Respondents.

Harvey G. Brown Jr., Wright Brown & Close, LLP, Houston, Vincent S. Walkowiak, O. Rey Rodriguez, Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., Dallas, TX, Hugh F. Young Jr., Reston, VA, Brent M. Rosenthal, Baron & Budd, P.C., Dallas, G. Alan Waldrop, Locke, Liddell & Sapp LLP, Austin, for Amicus Curiae.

Justice BLAND delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justice HECHT, Justice O'NEILL, Justice BRISTER, Justice WILLETT, and Justice CAYCE joined.^*

In this case, we decide whether a trial court abuses its discretion in refusing to allow a voir dire question from counsel that previews relevant evidence and inquires of prospective jurors whether such evidence is outcome determinative. We hold that it does not. The court of appeals held that it does. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

I. Background

Four-year-old Amber Vasquez died in a low-speed neighborhood traffic collision, after the passenger-side airbag in her aunt's Hyundai Accent deployed with enough force to catch Amber's chin and break her neck. The driver of the other car had turned unexpectedly in front of the Hyundai, and the force of the collision threw Amber forward in her seat. It is undisputed that Amber was not buckled into her front-seat seat belt at the time of the accident.

Amber's parents, Victor and Brenda Vasquez, sued Hyundai Motor Company and Hyundai Motor America, Inc. (together "Hyundai"), contending that Hyundai had placed the airbag incorrectly, and that the airbag had deployed with too much force in this low-impact accident. Hyundai responded that the airbag that killed Amber was not defective because a child wearing a seat belt — as state law requires² — or sitting in the back seat — as the car's warnings cautioned — would not have been injured by its deployment.

In placing Amber unbuckled in the front seat, Amber's aunt, Valerie Suarez, disregarded airbag warnings on both sunvisors, a hangtag from the rearview mirror, a decal on the dashboard, and a notification in the owner's manual. Suarez ignored the warnings because she planned a short neighborhood trip and believed that the airbags would deploy only at higher speeds. Hyundai conceded that it knew some occupants would ignore the airbag warnings about placing children unbuckled in the front seat,³ but maintained the risk was outweighed by the benefits of the airbag to all others.⁴ Hyundai named Suarez and the driver of the other car as responsible third parties.⁵

The trial judge dismissed two jury panels before seating the jury in the case from a third. During the first voir dire, Amber's counsel asked jurors⁶ whether the fact that Amber was not wearing her seat belt would determine their verdict.⁷ After numerous jurors indicated that the lack of a seat belt would determine their verdict, the trial court dismissed the jury panel. During the second voir dire, the trial judge questioned the jurors along similar lines,⁸ with slightly fewer, but nonetheless significant, affirmative responses.⁹ The court again dismissed the panel.

Before the third voir dire, the trial judge discussed with counsel her concern that the previous jury panels had misunderstood the inquiry about placing a child in the front seat without a buckled seat belt to be one about the weight they could give to particular evidence in the case rather than whether they could fairly consider all of the evidence presented.¹⁰ As a result, during the third general voir dire, in response to counsel's request to ask general questions "about belting, seat belting, and seat belting habits much akin to what I did the last time I did general voir dire," the trial court responded, "I am going to let you ask those questions." Thereafter, the trial court allowed counsel to ask "general questions about belting" and to inquire about jurors' personal seat belt habits, but she did not allow disclosure that Amber was not wearing one at the time of the accident.¹¹ Counsel asked questions about whether the jurors buckled their seat belts on short trips, before leaving the garage, before exiting a driveway, and before leaving a parking spot. At the conclusion of the third voir dire, the trial court excused 3 of the first 28 jurors for cause and seated a 12 member jury and one alternate.

The jury heard evidence for three weeks and returned a verdict in favor of Hyundai. It found no design defect and assessed liability for Amber's death to the two drivers (75 percent to Suarez, and 25 percent to the other driver). The trial court rendered a take-nothing judgment.

The Vasquezes appealed, contending the trial court erred in disallowing voir dire inquiry into whether the jurors would be "predisposed, regardless of the evidence," against the Vasquezes because "there is no seat belt in use," to a point that "[the jurors] could not be fair and impartial." Hyundai responded that the proposed voir dire inquiry is improper in that it asks jurors about the weight they would place on a particular piece of relevant evidence, and thus the trial court properly refused to allow it. A panel of the Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. Upon rehearing en banc, however, the court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in disallowing the inquiry because the proposed question focuses "on the ability of the jurors to be fair."¹² This Court granted Hyundai's petition for review.¹³

II. The Purpose of Voir Dire

The Bill of Rights in the Texas Constitution guarantees litigants a right to trial by a fair and impartial jury¹⁴ and authorizes the Legislature to pass laws "to maintain its purity and efficiency."¹⁵ The Legislature thus has authority to pass laws establishing those qualified to serve, consistent with the right to a jury trial.¹⁶ To that end, the Legislature has established general juror qualifications relating to age, citizenship, literacy, sanity, and moral character.¹⁷ The Legislature also has established bases for juror disqualification, including those relating to witnesses, relatives, and interested parties.¹⁸ Among these bases, the Legislature has disqualified from jury service anyone who "has a bias or prejudice in favor of or against a party in the case."¹⁹

Voir dire examination protects the right to an impartial jury by exposing possible improper juror biases that form the basis for statutory disqualification.²⁰ Thus, the primary purpose of voir dire is to inquire about specific views that would prevent or substantially impair jurors from performing their duty in accordance with their instructions and oath.²¹

In addition, this Court recognizes that trial courts should allow "broad latitude" to counsel "to discover any bias or prejudice by the potential jurors so that peremptory challenges may be intelligently exercised."²² "A peremptory challenge commonly referred to as a `strike,' is defined by rule 232 as one `made to a juror without assigning any reason therefor.'"²³ Peremptory challenges allow parties to reject jurors they perceive to be unsympathetic to their position.²⁴ The long-established practice of voir dire inquiry for use in exercising peremptory challenges acknowledges the subjectivity inherent in jury selection voir dire does not lend itself to formulaic management. As one authority has observed:

[T]he scope of the voir dire examination quite obviously can not be bounded by inflexible rules of thumb, for of all the delicate psychological factors inherent in a jury trial perhaps none is more essentially subjective and hence less submissive to dogmatic limitations.²⁵

Peremptory strikes are not intended, however, to permit a party to "select" a favorable jury.²⁶ Counsel's latitude in voir dire, while broad, is constrained by reasonable trial court control.²⁷ Such control is necessary because, "[t]hough the motive of a peremptory challenge may be to protect a private interest, the objective of jury selection proceedings is to determine representation on a governmental body."²⁸ Thus, the exercise of jury strikes is not solely a private endeavor: "[W]hen private litigants participate in the selection of jurors, they serve an important function within the government and act with its substantial assistance."²⁹

III. Voir Dire Inquiry Regarding Facts in a Case

Voir dire inquiry into potential juror bias and prejudice thus is proper to determine whether jurors are disqualified by statute³⁰ and to seek information that allows counsel to intelligently exercise their peremptory strikes. Because the statute does not define "bias" or "prejudice," we defined them in Compton v. Henrie, using their ordinary meanings:³¹

Bias, in its usual meaning, is an inclination toward one side of an issue rather than to the other, but to disqualify, it must appear that the state of mind of the juror leads to the natural inference that he will not or did not act with impartiality. Prejudice is more easily defined, for it means prejudgment, and consequently embraces bias; the converse is not true.³²

Other sources confirm that "bias" generally relates to inclinations, while "prejudice" is associated with prejudgment.³³ Although...