I.C.C. v. Mr. B's Services, Ltd.

• Decision Date: 26 October 1990
• Docket Number: No. 90-1101,90-1101
• Citation: 934 F.2d 117
• Parties: INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MR. B'S SERVICES, LIMITED, doing business as Caddy Cab, Bobbie Wilson and Marlo Wilson, Defendants-Appellees. . Submitted *
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 117

934 F.2d 117

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MR. B'S SERVICES, LIMITED, doing business as Caddy Cab Bobbie Wilson and Marlo Wilson, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 90-1101.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

Submitted ^* Oct. 26, 1990.

Decided June 6, 1991.

Joseph P. Bohn, Barbara J. Welsch, I.C.C., Compliance & Consumer Assistance, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.

William P. Dineen, Milwaukee, Wis., for defendants-appellees.

Before BAUER, Chief Judge, and CUMMINGS and RIPPLE, Circuit Judges.

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge.

The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) instituted this litigation against a taxicab company. The ICC sought an injunction to prohibit the company from operating as an interstate motor carrier without having the requisite license, insurance, and security on file with the ICC. The district court denied the ICC's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case because the company was not under the ICC's jurisdiction. For the following reasons, we reverse the judgment of the district court and

remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Mr. B's Services, Ltd., is a Wisconsin corporation with its principal offices located in Beloit, Wisconsin. It is engaged in business as Caddy Cab and holds itself out as a taxicab service to the communities of Beloit and Janesville, Wisconsin. Caddy Cab has never possessed a certificate, permit, or license from the ICC granting it authority to transport passengers in interstate commerce for compensation, nor has it maintained on file with the ICC proof of appropriate public liability insurance or security for the interstate transportation of passengers. Nonetheless, for the past several years, Caddy Cab has transported employees of the Chicago and North Western Transportation Company (CNW) from the CNW facility in Janesville, Wisconsin, to CNW locations in Chicago, Illinois and Northlake, Illinois. Under the arrangement between Caddy Cab and CNW, transportation was provided to the described locations; passengers were exclusively CNW train crew members; and CNW made monthly payments of $150 per trip to Caddy Cab, pursuant to a voucher system. At the time of these events, public transportation was unavailable between Janesville and Chicago or Northlake.

The distance between Janesville and either Chicago or Northlake is approximately 100 miles. During July through December 1988, Caddy Cab transported CNW crews to those locations on fifty-six separate occasions. And, from January through June 1989, Caddy Cab carried the CNW crews to those locations thirty-one times. As might be expected, Caddy Cab traveled on the interstate highway system while transporting CNW crews. At no time, however, has Caddy Cab provided taxicab services from anywhere in Illinois to Wisconsin.

Caddy Cab's total gross revenue for all of its taxicab operations in 1987 was $143,000. Of that total, Caddy Cab earned $1,400 as a result of providing CNW taxicab services. Gross revenue for 1988-89 was $167,000, and taxicab services provided for CNW accounted for $13,050. On average, Caddy Cab receives 100-150 daily requests for local cab services within the Janesville-Beloit-South Beloit area. Caddy Cab's vehicles are operated pursuant to licenses granted by these municipalities, and, in order to be licensed, Caddy Cab must carry the requisite amount of public liability and property damage insurance.

On June 16, 1989, the ICC filed a complaint for an injunction against Caddy Cab. The ICC alleged that Caddy Cab had been operating and was continuing to operate as an interstate motor carrier of passengers without having the required public liability insurance or security on file with the ICC, in violation of 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10927(a), and 49 C.F.R. Sec. 1043, and without having an appropriate certificate, permit, or license from the ICC, in violation of 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10921. The ICC requested the district court permanently to enjoin Caddy Cab from so operating. After Caddy Cab answered the complaint, the ICC moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion and dismissed the complaint because it found that, as a matter of law, the ICC lacked jurisdiction over Caddy Cab. The ICC filed a timely notice of appeal.

B. District Court Opinion

The court observed that generally the ICC has jurisdiction over motor carriers that transport passengers " 'between a place in a State and a place in another State.' " Mem.Op. at 4 (quoting 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10521(a)(1)(A) ). The court noted, however, that there is an exemption for "taxicab services." See 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10526(a)(2). ¹ In the court's estimation, the pertinent issue was whether Caddy Cab qualified for this exemption. The ICC interpreted "taxicab service" as requiring "inherently local" activity. Transportation of passengers The court then observed that Caddy Cab did not forfeit taxicab status when it made infrequent trips to Chicago and Northlake. The court reasoned that, while no precise definition of "local" existed, the circumstances of this case, supported by the "scarce" case law on the subject, rendered Caddy Cab's services local. See id. Influencing the court's decision was the fact that the interstate component of Caddy Cab's business accounted for a small portion of its total revenue and operation. Moreover, in the court's view, the presence of regulation by local municipalities in this case eliminated the need for national regulation by the ICC. See id. at 7-8. Indeed, the court noted that it would have decided the case differently if a "substantial portion" of Caddy Cab's services involved numerous interstate trips or if Caddy Cab had avoided local regulation. See id. at 8.

                over a distance in excess of seventy miles was not considered a local activity, in the ICC's view.  See Mem.Op. at 5.  While recognizing the deference afforded an administrative body charged with interpreting a statute it administers, the court rejected the ICC's interpretation of "taxicab service."    The court believed "equally compelling arguments" supported a finding that Caddy Cab's operations were clearly a "taxicab service" when performing services in the Janesville-Beloit-South Beloit area.  Id. at 6
                

II ANALYSIS

This is a case of statutory interpretation. The ICC has general jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. Sec. 10521(a), which provides in relevant part:

[T]he Interstate Commerce Commission has jurisdiction over transportation ... to the extent that passengers, property, or both, are transported by motor carrier--

(1) between a place in--

(A) a State and a place in another State.

49 U.S.C. Sec. 10521(a)(1)(A). However, the ICC's general jurisdiction is subject to several exemptions, ² including section 10526(a), which states in pertinent part:

The Interstate Commerce Commission does not have jurisdiction under this subchapter over--

....

(2) a motor vehicle providing taxicab service and having capacity of not more than 6 passengers and not operated on a regular route or between specified places.

49 U.S.C. Sec. 10526(a)(2). ³ The narrow issue presented is whether Caddy Cab qualifies under this exemption. Caddy Cab essentially adopts the district court's analysis. The ICC argues that its interpretation of the statutory exemption was reasonable.

In any statutory interpretation case, our ultimate goal is to "discern the will of Congress and to apply it to the particular facts of the case." Illinois Dep't of Pub. Aid v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 428, 431 (7th Cir.1990). The methodology that we must employ is well established. We begin by examining the language of the statute itself. If it is unambiguous, "our inquiry is at an end; the congressional intent embodied in that plain wording must be enforced." Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bush, 918 F.2d 1323, 1326 (7th Cir.1990). Here, the statute is ambiguous. The phrase "taxicab service" is left undefined, and that definition is pivotal to the resolution of the present dispute. ⁴

When a "syntactical analysis" of the statutory language fails to produce a satisfactory answer regarding Congress' intent, "we must employ other less satisfactory means to ascertain, as best we can, the legislative will." Id. at 1327. One of those means, long recognized by the judiciary, is to consider an administrative agency's interpretation of the statute. "An administrative agency has discretion to interpret a statute that is not crystal clear." Board of Trade v. S.E.C., 923 F.2d 1270, 1273 (7th Cir.1991). The Supreme Court has instructed that courts are to accord "considerable weight ... to an executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer." Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). ⁵ Absent contrary congressional intent, the agency's interpretation should be upheld, when it is "based on a permissible construction of the statute." Id. at 843, 104 S.Ct. at 2782. We need not conclude that the agency's construction is the only one it could have adopted, or that we would have reached the same result. See id. at 843 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 2782 n. 11; Larimore v. Comptroller of Currency, 789 F.2d 1244, 1248 (7th Cir.1986) (en banc). The agency's construction need only constitute "a reasonable interpretation of the statute." Philbin v. General Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 929 F.2d 321, 323 (7th Cir.1991) (per curiam) (emphasis supplied); see Abercrombie v. Clarke, 920 F.2d 1351, 1359 (7th Cir.1990). The rationale underlying this deference is that, when a statute is ambiguous, the agency charged with its administration "can determine better than we generalist judges" whether the statutory purpose "is advanced, or retarded" by activities or procedures with which the agency is intimately familiar. Board of Trade, 923 F.2d at 1273.

Applying these principles to the present case, we must conclude that the district court,...