I.P. v. Pierce

• Decision Date: 24 April 2020
• Docket Number: No. 5:19-CV-228-M,5:19-CV-228-M
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
• Parties: I.P., a minor child, by his grandfather and Next Friend DONALD G. NEWSOME, MICHAEL PRICE and CHANDLER PRICE, Plaintiffs, v. WAYNE COUNTY SHERIFF LARRY M. PIERCE, in his official capacity; SERGEANT SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER BRANDY JONES, in her individual capacity; SERGEANT SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER SHATANA LATICE JONES, in her individual capacity; LIEUTENANT SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER WILLIAM KATES in his individual capacity; SERGEANT SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER MARION WALTON in his individual capacity; WESTERN SURETY COMPANY; MARK ARMSTRONG, individually and as employee for BUTTERFLY EFFECTS, LLC; BRITTNE BROOKS, individually and as employee for BUTTERFLY EFFECTS, LLC, BUTTERFLY EFFECTS, LLC, JOHN DOE 1 and JOHN DOE 2, Defendants.

I.P., a minor child, by his grandfather and Next Friend DONALD G. NEWSOME,MICHAEL PRICE and CHANDLER PRICE, Plaintiffs, v. WAYNE COUNTY SHERIFF LARRY M. PIERCE, in his official capacity; SERGEANT SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER BRANDY

JONES, in her individual capacity; SERGEANT SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER SHATANA LATICE JONES, in her

individual capacity; LIEUTENANT SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER WILLIAM KATES in his individual capacity; SERGEANT SCHOOL

RESOURCE OFFICER MARION WALTON in his individual capacity; WESTERN SURETY COMPANY; MARK

ARMSTRONG, individually and as employee for BUTTERFLY EFFECTS, LLC; BRITTNE BROOKS, individually and as employee for

BUTTERFLY EFFECTS, LLC, BUTTERFLY EFFECTS, LLC, JOHN DOE 1 and JOHN DOE 2, Defendants.

No. 5:19-CV-228-M

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA WESTERN DIVISION

April 24, 2020

OPINION AND ORDER

RICHARD E. MYERS II, District Judge.

Defendants in the above-captioned action have filed two separate motions to dismiss [DE-72, 77] the Second Amended Complaint [DE-63 ("Complaint" or "AC")]. First, Defendants Mark Armstrong, Brittne Brooks, and Butterfly Effects, LLC (the "Butterfly Defendants") moved to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, respectively. [DE-72.] In this Court's prior opinion [DE-86], it resolved the Butterfly Defendants' arguments pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and regarding Plaintiffs' Monell claim for failure to investigate. Left unresolved were 12(b)(6) challenges to Plaintiffs' claims arising out of negligence and fiduciary duty and for breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages, which are addressed in the instant opinion. Second, Defendants Sergeant Brandy Jones, Sergeant Shatana Latice Jones, Lieutenant William Kates, and Sergeant Marion Walton (the "Officer Defendants") moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' causes of action for unreasonable seizure, violations of free speech and kidnapping or false imprisonment under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. [DE-77.] For the reasons discussed herein, the Butterfly Defendants' motion to dismiss [DE-72] is granted in part and the Officer Defendants' partial motion to dismiss [DE-77] is granted in part. The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the facts alleged.

I. Motion to Dismiss Legal Standard

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain facts sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility," and therefore must be dismissed. Id. (citation and internal quotation marksomitted). In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court shall "'accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,' and 'draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.'" Covey v. Assessor of Ohio Cty., 777 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted). "While a plaintiff is not charged with pleading facts sufficient to prove her case, as an evidentiary matter, in her complaint, a plaintiff is required to allege facts that support a claim for relief." Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003); see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-80. However, in making this determination, the Court need not rely on "labels," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, "nor need [] 'accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments,'" Philips v. Pitt Cty. Memorial Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Kloth v. Microsoft Corp., 444 F.3d 312, 319 (4th Cir. 2006)).

II. The Butterfly Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

A. Claims arising out of Negligence and Fiduciary Duty (Counts 10-11 and 14-17)

The Butterfly Defendants challenge Plaintiffs' causes of action against them for negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED") (Count 10), negligence (Counts 11 and 15), breach of fiduciary duty (Count 14), negligent hiring (Count 16), and negligent training and supervision (Count 17). Defendants argue that each of these claims fails as a matter of law because Brooks had no duty to intervene in the SROs' activities during the school lockdown or as Minor I.P. was escorted to the lobby. [DE-73 at 17-19.]

i. Legal Standard

To establish each of these claims, Plaintiffs must adequately allege that Defendants had a duty, that Defendants breached that duty, causation and damages. See Estate of Mullins byDixon v. Monroe Oil Co., Inc., 349 N.C. 196, 201, 505 S.E.2d 131, 135 (1998) (negligence) ("under common law negligence principles, a plaintiff must offer evidence of four essential elements in order to prevail: duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and damages." (citations omitted)); Green v. Freeman, 367 N.C. 136, 141, 749 S.E.2d 262, 268 (2013) (fiduciary duty) ("that [defendant] breached a fiduciary duty owed to plaintiffs, proximately causing injury to them"). Plaintiffs must allege a causal connection between the alleged breaches of duty and the alleged injuries suffered. See Smith v. Whitley, 223 N.C. 534, 535, 27 S.E.2d 442, 443 (1943) (negligence) ("There must be a causal connection between the ... negligence relied upon, and the injury inflicted. . . . The breach of duty must be the cause of the damage" (internal quotation mark and citations omitted)); Dove v. Harvey, 168 N.C. App. 687, 691, 608 S.E.2d 798, 801 (2005) (fiduciary duty) (affirming dismissal of complaint, "[e]ven assuming these alleged actions constituted a breach of fiduciary duty by defendant, plaintiff did not allege defendant's actions caused plaintiff damage.").

Putting aside the question of whether some independent duty to act or intervene existed, this Court finds that Plaintiffs' negligence and fiduciary duty-based claims against the Butterfly Defendants should be dismissed for failure to allege causation and damages. First, Defendant Brooks' failure to intervene as school officials escorted Minor I.P. to the lobby was superseded and insulated by the allegedly negligent actions of the Officer Defendants. "The general rule is that the intervening or superseding criminal acts of another preclude liability of the initial negligent actor when the injury is caused by the criminal acts." Tise v. Yates Const. Co., Inc., 345 N.C. 456, 460, 480 S.E.2d 677, 680 (1997). "The test by which the negligent conduct of one is to be insulated as a matter of law by the independent negligent act of another[] is reasonable unforeseeability on the part of the original actor of the subsequent intervening act and resultantinjury. . . . This is true whether or not the alleged superseding act is criminal in nature." Holt v. N. Carolina Dep't of Transp., 245 N.C. App. 167, 177, 781 S.E.2d 697, 704, aff'd sub nom. Holt v. N. Carolina Dep't of Transp., 369 N.C. 57, 791 S.E.2d 458 (2016); see also Al-Hourani v. Ashley, 126 N.C. App. 519, 485 S.E.2d 887 (1997) (granting motion to dismiss on basis of intervening cause). Second, Brooks' failure to advocate on Minor I.P.'s behalf during his altercation with the Officer Defendants is not causally related to any injuries ultimately suffered as a result of that altercation. Although Plaintiffs fault Brooks for not alerting the Officer Defendants to Minor I.P.'s disability [AC ¶ 55], according to the Complaint, the Officer Defendants already knew of Minor I.P.'s autism [AC ¶ 57].

ii. Analysis

First, any purported negligence resulting from Brooks' failure to inform or intervene as the school officials escorted Minor I.P. to the lobby has not been adequately pled because the subsequent actions of the Officer Defendants and the resultant injury to Minor I.P. were unforeseeable. The negligent conduct of an individual is superseded and insulated as a matter of law by the intervening and unforeseeable negligent or unlawful act of another that causes the injury. See Holt, 245 N.C. App. At 177, 781 S.E.2d at 704. Based on the Complaint, while it may have been foreseeable to Brooks that Minor I.P. would have some difficulty calming down in the lobby because it was not a "separate and segregated space" [AC ¶ 47], the chain of events which occurred could not have been: (1) school officials chose to escort Minor I.P. to the lobby rather than a quiet classroom [AC ¶ 47]; (2) the lobby was the center of lockdown activity [AC ¶ 47]; (3) the SROs escorted a seized student through the lobby [AC ¶ 48]; (4) this student was "at one point good friends" with Minor I.P. [AC ¶ 49]; (5) Minor I.P.'s condition significantly worsened as a result [AC ¶ 49]; (6) Minor I.P. failed to comply with the SROs lawful orders tobe quiet [AC ¶ 50]; and, as a result, (7) the SROs, allegedly, so abused their power as to constitute Fourth Amendment and state false imprisonment and battery violations [AC ¶¶ 50-57]. Although Brooks' inaction might have enabled Minor I.P.'s location in the lobby, that alone is insufficient to state a claim. See Williams v. Smith, 68 N.C. App. 71, 314 S.E.2d 279 (1984) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendant whose earlier negligence caused plaintiff to be in the location that he was eventually harmed by a third party).

Second, to the extent Plaintiffs attempt to recover for Brooks' failure to advocate for Minor I.P. by failing "to inform Defendant SROs that Minor I.P. had a disability which prevented him from following their commands given his emotional state" [DE-84 at 25; see also AC ¶ 55 ("Defendant Brooks of Butterfly Effects stood by in silence")], this, too,...