Iaciofano v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty.
| Decision Date | 10 January 2017 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16-cv-60963-BLOOM/Valle |
| Parties | CAROL IACIOFANO, Plaintiff, v. SCHOOL BOARD OF BROWARD COUNTY, FLORIDA, and FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Florida Department of Education ("FDOE"), ECF No. [45] ("FDOE's Motion"), and School Board of Broward County ("School Board"), ECF No. [54] ("School Board's Motion") (collectively, the "Motions"). The Court has reviewed the Motions, all supporting and opposing filings, the record in this case, and is otherwise fully advised in the premises. For the reasons that follow, the Motions are granted.
Plaintiff Carol Iaciofano ("Plaintiff") suffers from cerebral palsy. See ECF Nos. [45] ¶¶ 1-35 (FDOE's Facts) ¶ 1; [50] (Plaintiff's Facts) (collectively, "Undisputed Facts"). As a result of her disability, Plaintiff often uses a wheelchair and experiences weakness in her lower extremities and balance problems. ECF Nos. [55] (School Board's Facts) ¶ 1; [57] (Plaintiff's Additional Facts) ¶ 1 (collectively, "Additional Facts"). FDOE is an agency of the State of Florida designated for the purpose of effecting compliance with the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act") (29 U.S.C. § 701, et. seq.), while School Board operates various schools in Broward County. See Undisputed Facts ¶ 2; Additional Facts ¶ 2. FDOE's Division of Vocational Rehabilitation (the "Division") is the administrative unit designated under the Rehabilitation Act to provide vocational rehabilitation programs and services to persons who have disabilities, and to this end, receives federal financial assistance. See Undisputed Facts ¶ 4. Plaintiff has been a client of the Division since 1996, and from 2006 to June 2014, was employed as a substitute teacher with the School Board. See id. ¶ 5; Additional Facts ¶ 5. Plaintiff applied for new vocational rehabilitation services in 2010, and the Division assigned Sharon Wood ("Wood") to be her counselor. See Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 6, 7. After undergoing a Preliminary Assessment, Plaintiff and Wood jointly developed, agreed upon, and signed an Individualized Plan for Employment ("IPE") oriented toward achieving an employment outcome of Adult Education Instructor. See id. ¶¶ 9-10. However, on September 24, 2014, Plaintiff and Wood jointly amended the IPE toward achieving an employment outcome of Court Reporter, approved by the Division supervisor shortly thereafter. See id. ¶¶ 11, 15. Plaintiff began a court reporting program with funding from the Division at Atlantic Technical College ("ATC") - an entity operated by School Board - on October 27, 2014. See id. ¶ 16. Pursuant to the September 24, 2014 amendment, Plaintiff was required to attend class regularly and maintain a minimum "C" or 2.0 grade point average, and Wood received monthly progress reports from ATC. See id. ¶¶ 17, 18. The ATC court reporting program contemplates students attaining a required 225 word per minute skill level within 28 months, though some students take as long as four years to develop the skill. See Additional Facts ¶ 10. Plaintiff's instructors were Susan Williams ("Williams") and Deborah Berg ("Berg"), and Williams authored many of the evaluation reports Wood received. See id. ¶ 15.
Wood received one such report on July 22, 2015, relaying that Plaintiff "seem[ed] to be progressing at a slower pace as lessons get more difficult." Undisputed Facts ¶ 19. Two weeks later, Wood received a telephone call from Meryl Eisenberg ("Eisenberg"), Disability Services Advisor at ATC, regarding ATC's concerns that Plaintiff was approximately ten lessons behind and that there existed "problems" with her progression. See id. ¶¶ 21-22. Specifically, Eisenberg advised Wood that "Plaintiff was having difficulty grasping the material as the course became progressively more difficult, that Plaintiff lacked speed and accuracy, and that Plaintiff had been crying and complaining that her hands were hurting her." Id. ¶ 22. Around that time, Plaintiff met separately with Williams and Berg, who expressed their concern that Plaintiff was not a "good fit" for court reporting. Additional Facts ¶ 25. At the meeting, Williams stated that her opinion of Plaintiff had nothing to do with Plaintiff's disability. See id. Following the meeting, Eisenberg, Plaintiff, Williams, and Berg participated in a conference call with Wood, relaying the difficulties Plaintiff had been experiencing and explaining that at the current rate, Plaintiff would take much longer than 28 months to complete the court reporting program. See Undisputed Facts ¶ 23; Additional Facts ¶ 26. The instructors noted that Plaintiff was behind in her lessons, and that the course was becoming increasingly challenging. Additional Facts ¶¶ 26, 27. They told Wood that Plaintiff is "very smart" and her "mobility limitations were not an issue," and suggested that she consider becoming a paralegal. Id. ¶ 27. On August 26, 2015, Wood received another monthly report indicating that Plaintiff was "struggling with accuracy and speed as lessons become more difficult," and that Plaintiff's anticipated grade was a "C." Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 24-25. Nevertheless, Williams and ATC authorized Plaintiff to enroll in classes for the Fall term, and Plaintiff did. See Additional Facts ¶ 24. Plaintiff did not, however, attend classes in the Fall or at any time thereafter. See id. ¶ 28.
Plaintiff and Wood met to discuss ATC's concerns in early August, and Plaintiff agreed to participate in a worksite evaluation to assess her skills and abilities. See Undisputed Facts ¶ 27. In early September, Wood and Plaintiff amended the IPE to include a worksite evaluation, which the Division unit supervisor approved. See id. ¶ 29. Plaintiff chose the entity, Stand Among Friends ("SAF"), as the vendor to conduct the worksite evaluation. SAF conducted the evaluation over a two-day period beginning September 29, 2015. See id. ¶¶ 30-31; Additional Facts ¶ 30. Following the evaluation, SAF concluded that "[t]o address the original goal of court reporter, becoming a court reporter using a stenotype machine is not recommended." Undisputed Facts ¶ 31. Plaintiff and Wood discussed the worksite evaluation report on October 21, 2015, and re-amended the IPE toward an employment outcome of Adult Basic and Secondary Education and Literacy Teacher and Instructors. See id. ¶¶ 32-33. Plaintiff signed the amended IPE, and the Division unit supervisor approved the amendment. See id. ¶¶ 33-34. Plaintiff remains a client of the Division and receives vocational funding from FDOE. See id. ¶ 35.
Plaintiff brings claims against School Board under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA") (Count I), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Count III). See ECF No. [24]. She brings identical causes of action against FDOE at Counts II and IV, respectively. See id. FDOE filed its Motion for Summary Judgment on November 17, 2016, and School Board filed its Motion on January 4, 2017. Thereafter, Plaintiff's Responses and Defendants' replies timely followed. See ECF Nos. [51], [58], [62], [66].
A court may grant a motion for summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The parties may support their positions by citation to the record, including, inter alia, depositions, documents, affidavits, or declarations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is genuine if "a reasonable trier of fact could return judgment for the non-moving party." Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 516 F. 3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)). A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48). The Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in the party's favor. See Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party]." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. The Court does not weigh conflicting evidence. See Skop v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 485 F.3d 1130, 1140 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Carlin Comm'n, Inc. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir. 1986)).
The moving party shoulders the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008). If a movant satisfies this burden, "the nonmoving party 'must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'" Ray v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 327 F. App'x 819, 825 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). Instead, "the non-moving party 'must make a sufficient showing on each essential element of the case for which he has the burden of proof.'" Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The non-moving party must produce evidence, going beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories,and admissions on file, designating specific facts to suggest that a reasonable jury could find in the non-moving party's favor. Shiver, 549 F.3d at 1343. But even where an opposing party neglects to submit any alleged material facts in controversy, a court cannot grant summary judgment unless it is satisfied that all of the evidence on the record supports the uncontroverted material facts that the movant has proposed. See Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1268-69,...
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