Iannotti v. Mustang

• Decision Date: 06 July 2021
• Docket Number: 20-cv-958-DWD
• Parties: CHRIS IANNOTTI, individually and for others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. WOOD GROUP MUSTANG, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois

CHRIS IANNOTTI, individually and for others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. WOOD GROUP MUSTANG, Defendant.

No. 20-cv-958-DWD

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois

July 6, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

DAVID W. DUGAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Chris Iannotti, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, brings this complaint against Defendant Wood Group Mustang, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), the Illinois Minimum Wage Law ("IMWL"), and the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act ("IWPCA"). Plaintiff seeks to bring the FLSA claim as a nationwide collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and the Illinois-law claims as a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.

Now before the Court is Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 22). Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's IWPCA claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and moves to dismiss Plaintiff's FLSA claim for a lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). Plaintiff timely opposed the Motion (Doc 37), and the parties also submitted supplemental briefing (Doc. 40; Doc. 41). On June 1, 2021, the Court held a hearing on Defendant's Motion. At the hearing, the Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim1 The Court took the remaining arguments under advisement (Doc. 46). Having considered the parties^[1] arguments and as further detailed below, Defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction will be denied without prejudice to renewal after a ruling on conditional certification.

Background

Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff's FLSA claim for a lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2). Defendant does not seriously dispute this Court's personal jurisdiction over the claims brought by the named plaintiff, Iannoti, but instead contends that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over potential claims brought by employees who did not live or work in Illinois (the "out-of-state opt-ins")^[2]. When challenged Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. N. Grain Mktg., LLC v. Greving, 743 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 2014). Where, as here, the Court rules on a motion to dismiss "based on the submission of written materials without holding an evidentiary hearing Plaintiff 'need only make out a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction/" Id. (citing Purdue Res. Found v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Hyatt Int'l Corp. v. Coco, 302 F.3d 707, 712 (7th Cir. 2002)); see also Curry v. Revolution Laboratories, LLC, 949 F.3d 385, 392-393 (7th Cir. 2020). Further, the Court takes as true all well-plead facts in the Complaint and resolves any factual disputes in Plaintiffs favor. Greving, 743 F.3d at 491; Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 700 (7th Cir. 2010).

As alleged in Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant for Defendant's alleged failure to pay overtime compensation (Doc. 1). According to Plaintiff, Defendant is an international organization operating around the world, and in states across the country, including Illinois (Doc. 22, ¶ 18)^[3]. While employed by Defendant, Plaintiff worked for Defendant in Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, and Missouri (Doc. 1, ¶ 30). Plaintiff alleges that he, and others similarly situated, worked as day rate employees of Defendant, and were paid a flat amount for each day worked, regardless of the number of hours worked (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 2, 31-38). As a result of this "day rate scheme", Plaintiff was not paid overtime compensation for hours worked over 40 in a work week (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 2, 31-38).

Discussion

This case involves claims under both federal law and state law, so this Court's jurisdiction rests on a federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C § 1367. See Curry, 949 F.3d at 393. "In a case involving federal question jurisdiction, 'a federal court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant if either federal law or the law of the state in which the court sits authorizes service of process to that defendant/" Curry, 949 F.3d at 393 (citing Mobile Anesthesiologists Chicago, LLC v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Houston Metroplex, P.A., 623 F.3d 440, 443 (7th Cir. 2010)).

As the FLSA does not authorize nationwide service of process4, this Court may only exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendant if "authorized by Illinois law and by the United States Constitution." Curry, 949 F.3d at 393 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.^[4] (k)(1)(A)); uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Group, Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2010); Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 699 ("Where no federal statute authorizes nationwide service of process, personal jurisdiction is governed by the law of the forum state"). The Illinois long-arm statute provides that a court may "exercise jurisdiction on any other basis now or hereafter permitted by the Illinois Constitution and by the United States Constitution." 735 ILCS 5/2-209(c); see also Curry, 949 F.3d at 393 (the Illinois long-arm statute permits the exercise of jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause); Mobile Anesthesiologists, 623 F.3d at 443 ("there is no operative difference between" the constitutional limits of the Illinois Constitution and the United States Constitution in terms of subjecting a defendant to personal jurisdiction).

Although two types of personal jurisdiction (general and specific) exist, here the parties focus only on specific personal jurisdiction (see Doc. 22, p. 7; Doc. 38, p. 9). For specific personal jurisdiction, "the defendants'] contacts with the forum state must directly relate to the challenged conduct or transaction." Dworkin, 601 F.3d at 702. "Specific personal jurisdiction is appropriate where (1) the defendant has purposefully directed his activities at the forum state or purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in that state, and (2) the alleged injury arises out of the defendant's forum-related activities." Matlin v. Spin Master Corp., 921 F.3d 701, 705-06 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 702 (relying on Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)).

Defendant does not specifically object to this Court's personal jurisdiction over the claims brought by Plaintiff and potential Illinois opt-ins (See Doc. 22, p. 8). However, Defendant argues that specific jurisdiction is lacking over potential claims brought by employees who did not live or work in Illinois, i.e. the out-of-state opt-ins. In support, Defendant argues that Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S.Ct. 1773 (2017) (“Bristol-Myers") applies here. Bristol-Myers involved an aggregate mass tort action arising under California law, where there was no connection between the forum state (California) and the specific claims asserted by non-resident plaintiffs. Bristol-Myers, 137 S.Ct. at 1781. Accordingly, the high court held that the state court lacked specific jurisdiction over the non-resident plaintiffs' claims asserted against non-resident defendants. Id. at 1777.

Here, Defendant compares Plaintiff's FLSA claims to the collective action in Bristol-Myers and argues that the party status of the non-Illinois opt-ins requires each potential opt-in plaintiff to establish personal jurisdiction over their claims against Defendant. Specifically, Defendant argues that because the non-Illinois opt-ins would be considered full parties to the FLSA lawsuit upon consent^[5], then Bristol-Myers requires each potential opt-in plaintiff to show minimum contacts between Defendant and the forum state, Illinois. Defendant further argues that a motion to dismiss is a proper stage at which to raise this personal jurisdiction argument because jurisdiction is a threshold matter.

Plaintiff, however, likens the representative nature of FLSA claims to Rule 23 class actions. More specifically, Plaintiff maintains that the claims of the opt-in plaintiffs are established solely by the named Plaintiff. In other words, once personal jurisdiction is established for the claims of the named Plaintiff, Iannoti, then personal jurisdiction over Defendant exists without further analysis into the potential opt-ins. Alternatively, Plaintiff argues that any jurisdictional analysis over the out-of-state opt-ins should be made after conditional certification once potential opt-ins are identified and elect to join this matter.

In support, Plaintiff argues that Bristol-Myers has no bearing on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by federal courts because it did not address the due process limits of the Fifth Amendment. See Bristol-Myers, 137 S.Ct. at 1783-84 ("Since our decision concerns the due process limits on the exercise of specific jurisdiction by a State we leave open the question whether the Fifth Amendment imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a federal court."); see also Mussat v. IQVIA, Inc., 953 F.3d 441 (7th Cir. 2020) (confirming that the question of whether Bristol-Myers extended to federal courts at all was "expressly reserved."). Further, the Seventh Circuit recently held that Bristol-Myers is not applicable to nationwide class actions filed in federal court under federal statutes. Mussat, 953 F.3d at 441. Plaintiff also contends that applying Bristol-Myers to FLSA collective actions would trespass on the broad remedial and representative nature of the FLSA, which was designed to "address employment practices nationwide" and "limit duplicative lawsuits where numerous employees have been harmed by the same employers." See Waters v. Day & Zimmerman NPS, Inc., 464 F.Supp.3d 455, 460-61 (D. Mass. 2020), motion to certify appeal...