IBP, Inc. v. Harpole

• Decision Date: 18 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99-0578.,99-0578.
• Citation: 621 N.W.2d 410
• Parties: IBP, INC., Appellee, v. Linda HARPOLE, Appellant. Perry Manor and Allied Mutual Insurance Company, Plaintiffs, v. Iowa District Court for Polk County, Defendant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

621 N.W.2d 410

IBP, INC., Appellee, v. Linda HARPOLE, Appellant.

Perry Manor and Allied Mutual Insurance Company, Plaintiffs, v. Iowa District Court for Polk County, Defendant.

No. 99-0578.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

January 18, 2001.

Thomas M. Werner, Des Moines, and Robert McKinney of McKinney Law Offices, P.C., Waukee, for appellant.

Christopher J. Godfrey of IBP, Inc., Dakota City, Nebraska, for appellee. Michael L. Mock and D. Brian Scieszinski of Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave, P.C., Des Moines, for plaintiffs.

Considered en banc.

SNELL, Justice.

An injured employee, Linda Harpole sought disability benefits for injuries she suffered while employed by both IBP, Inc. and Perry Manor. Her individual claims against each business were consolidated for one agency hearing. Harpole appeals the district court's decision on judicial review which overturned her 40% permanent partial disability award against IBP. By writ, Perry Manor seeks a ruling that an individual judgment received in a consolidated case, appealed by no party, does not continue to be litigated by virtue of another consolidated party's appeal of its judgment. We reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for entry of judgment affirming the agency's ruling. We also sustain the writ.

I. Factual Background and Proceedings

Harpole was employed at IBP when her first knee injury occurred in October 1991. From this fall, she required knee surgery and thereafter, a knee brace. In May 1993, Harpole received a settlement of 20% permanent partial disability from IBP for her injury. Harpole exacerbated her injury on two more occasions while employed at IBP. One was on an icy sidewalk not connected with work in February 1993, and the other occurred in the IBP cafeteria in May 1993. Also, in April 1994, Harpole left work at IBP as a result of severe pain in her left knee. Harpole filed claims against IBP for the subsequent work-related fall and her pain-related work leave.

Harpole eventually left the employ of IBP and began work at Perry Manor. In 1996, she again injured her left knee while at work. She filed a disability claim against Perry Manor for this injury. Harpole also petitioned to re-open the settlement she had made with IBP for her first knee injury in 1991. Harpole claimed she now had additional injuries to both knees, her lower back, and hips tracing back to her initial 1991 fall. A description of her injuries is provided below.

1) October 11, 1991—The first injury to Harpole's left knee occurred at IBP. Harpole was unable to return to her regular duties until February 5, 1993. She obtained a settlement award from IBP for this injury in May 1993.

2) December 1991—Harpole underwent arthroscopic surgery by Dr. David Wirtz on her left knee.

3) April 1992—Harpole received patellar realignment and Dr. Wirtz removed a screw from her left knee.

4) December 1992—Dr. Wirtz removed Harpole's left patella. Dr. Wirtz also prescribed that Harpole wear a leg immobilizer on her left leg at home and at work. The immobilizer did not allow her to bend her left leg.

5) February 15, 1993—Harpole slipped and fell outside a private business, re-injuring her left knee. She was wearing her immobilizer on her left knee at this time. She was unable to return to work until April 13, 1993.

6) February 1993—Because Dr. Wirtz was out of town, Dr. Sinesio Misol performed left knee surgery on Harpole to repair a torn tendon due to her slip and fall.

7) May 20, 1993—Harpole slipped and fell in the IBP cafeteria. X-rays did not show any new injury. However, Harpole did suffer increased pain. She was unable to return to work until August 20, 1993.

8) April 31, 1994—Harpole left work because of extreme knee pain. No new injury occurred at this time. She was off work until June 15, 1994.

9) August 1994—Harpole began working at Perry Manor. 10) September 1, 1994—Harpole injured her left knee again while working at Perry Manor. She returned to work on September 6, 1994, only to leave on September 11, 1994 with severe swelling. She has never returned to work after that day.

11) September 1994—Harpole again underwent knee surgery, this time by orthopedic surgeon, Dr. David Tearse to repair scar tissue in her left knee.

12) December 1995—Harpole developed right knee pain.

13) June 1996—Harpole developed lower back and hip pain and was treated by her family physician, Dr. John Beattie, and neurosurgeon, Dr. Douglas Koontz.

In summary, by 1996, Harpole had four individual claims pending before the industrial board: two disability claims against IBP for her 1993 cafeteria fall and 1994 pain-related work leave; one disability claim against Perry Manor for her 1994 knee injury; and one petition to re-open the settlement she made with IBP for her 1991 injury. These claims were consolidated for hearing before the deputy industrial commissioner.

A. The Initial Ruling by the Deputy Industrial Commissioner

The deputy commissioner ordered IBP to pay permanent total disability to Harpole for her 1991 injury, instead of the previously agreed upon partial disability. IBP was also required to pay various healing period benefits for her cafeteria fall and pain-related work leave. Perry Manor was assessed one day of temporary total disability benefits to be paid in addition to the emergency room medical expenses Harpole incurred as a result of her fourth knee injury at Perry Manor.

B. The Ruling on Appeal to the Industrial Commissioner

IBP appealed the deputy's ruling to the industrial commissioner who affirmed in every area except for the assessment of permanent total disability. The commissioner reduced that award to 40% permanent partial disability or 200 weeks of disability. On this appeal, Perry Manor argued the commissioner had no authority to review the deputy's decision against Perry Manor because neither it nor Harpole appealed. The commissioner assumed authority and affirmed in full the deputy's award against Perry Manor.

C. The Ruling on Judicial Review to the District Court

IBP appealed to the district court. Harpole filed her own cross-appeal. Perry Manor did not appeal nor did any party question the validity of the judgment against Perry Manor. The district court reversed the award against IBP in its entirety. IBP was required to pay no additional disability to Harpole. The district court then remanded the case back to the industrial commissioner for a re-examination of Perry Manor's liability in conjunction with its assessed disability payments. Harpole appeals this decision. Perry Manor petitioned our court for a writ of certiorari. We granted this petition and now hear both arguments.

II. Scope and Standard of Review

A. Writ of Certiorari

This court restricts review of a decision on writ of certiorari for correction of errors at law. Halverson v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 532 N.W.2d 794, 797 (Iowa 1995). "A petition for a writ of certiorari is proper when the district court is alleged to have exceeded its jurisdiction or to have acted illegally." State Pub. Defender v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 594 N.W.2d 34, 36 (Iowa 1999). We will sustain the writ when the trial court has exceeded its authority. Iowa Dep't of Transp. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 588 N.W.2d 102, 103 (Iowa 1998). If we decide that Perry Manor was not a party to the district court decision because no specific appeal had been taken, it is authorized to seek review by writ. Shannon by Shannon v. Hansen, 469 N.W.2d 412, 414 (Iowa 1991)

. However, if we find the district court had authority and Perry Manor was a party in the district court suit, we will treat Perry Manor's case as a direct appeal. Iowa R.App. P. 304 ("If any case is brought by appeal, certiorari, or discretionary review, and the appellate court is of the opinion that another of these remedies was the proper one, the case shall not be dismissed, but shall proceed as though the proper form of review had been sought.").

B. Direct Appeal

Statutory law dictates how we review appeals from administrative actions. Iowa Code § 17A.19(8) (1999). "On review of agency actions, this court functions solely in an appellate capacity to correct errors of law on the part of the agency." Ahrendsen ex rel. Ahrendsen v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs., 613 N.W.2d 674, 676 (Iowa 2000) (citing Glowacki v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 516 N.W.2d 881, 884 (Iowa 1994)).

The subsequent appeal of the district court's review of the agency decision "is limited to determining whether the district court correctly applied the law in exercising its section 17A.19(8) judicial review function." Id. However, the district court, as well as this court, is "bound by the commissioner's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record." Bergen v. Iowa Veterans Home, 577 N.W.2d 629, 630 (Iowa 1998). The district court may reverse the agency finding if it is not supported by substantial evidence. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f). Upon our review of the district court's reversal, "we apply the standards of section 17A.19(8) to the agency action to determine whether our conclusions are the same as those of the district court." IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d 621, 627 (Iowa 2000). We will affirm if the district court satisfied its standard of review.

III. Issues on Appeal

A. Writ of Certiorari

We are asked to consider whether the district court acquires authority to review awards against an employer in a consolidated disability claim when petitioned for judicial review by only one of the two employers, and the claimant does not seek review. This is an issue of first impression before this court.

It is clear that neither Perry Manor nor Harpole appealed the decision made by the deputy commissioner ordering Perry Manor to pay certain disability benefits. Because Harpole's case against Perry Manor was consolidated with Harpole's case against IBP, when IBP appealed, the reviewing industrial commissioner passed judgment on both awards even though no party argued...