Ida v. U.S.
| Decision Date | 04 June 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 00 Civ. 8544(LAK).,00 Civ. 8544(LAK). |
| Citation | 207 F.Supp.2d 171 |
| Parties | James IDA, Movant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Michael Rosen, New York City, Flora Edwards, Sewaren, NJ, for Movant.
Robert Buehler, Barbara Ward, Maria Barton, Assistant United States Attorneys, New York City, James B. Comey, United States Attorney, for United States.
Movant, reputedly the former consigliere of the Genovese organized crime family, was convicted after a lengthy jury trial of racketeering conspiracy, racketeering, eight substantive crimes which were alleged also as acts of racketeering, and conspiracy to defraud the United States. Three of the acts of racketeering, two of which were alleged also as substantive counts, were murders or conspiracies to commit murder. On October 7, 1997, he was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment, five years of supervised release, a mandatory special assessment, and a $1 million forfeiture. On April 30, 1999, the Second Circuit substantially affirmed the convictions, reversing only racketeering act 2(a) and count nine, the DeSimone murder conspiracy.1
On October 15, 1999, Ida moved for a new trial based on alleged newly discovered evidence. The Court denied the motion on December 14, 1999, and the Second Circuit affirmed on September 14, 2000.2
Ida has moved pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his conviction and sentence as well as for discovery in support of the motion and for a hearing. Much of the application focuses on alleged newly-discovered evidence concerning the murder of Hickey Dilorenzo and the conspiracy to murder Dominic Tucci, the evidence concerning which is summarized in the Second Circuit's opinion and need not be repeated here.3 Movant alleges also that the government violated its disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland4 and Giglio v. United States;5 that he was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel; that Apprendi v. New Jersey6 requires reversal of the criminal forfeiture verdict; and that the testimony of two of the government's witnesses should have been excluded under United States v. Singleton.7 Finally, he seeks to have the government's memorandum in opposition to his motion stricken on the ground that the Assistant United States Attorney who signed it is not a member of the New York Bar. As previously noted, however, the centerpiece of the motion consists of claims of jury tampering and juror misconduct. In a prior opinion, familiarity with which is assumed,8 the Court rejected all of the claims of jury tampering and all but one of the claims of juror misconduct and ordered a hearing as to the remaining juror misconduct claim. The hearing now having been concluded, the entire remaining part of the motion is ripe for disposition.
In Ida v. United States,9 the Court rejected all of the claims of jury tampering and juror misconduct Ida had raised thus far save his contention that Juror No. 3, now known to have been one John Lynch,10 improperly misled the Court during voir dire by failing to disclose his alleged belief that the defendants would not have been arrested and brought to trial unless they were guilty—in other words, that he approached the case not with acceptance of the presumption of innocence, but with a presumption of guilt. Ida's claim rested on the affidavit of one William Sullivan, formerly a proprietor and bar tender at a golf club at which Lynch's wife was employed, which claimed that Lynch told him during the trial that he was a juror in this case and, among other things, that the defendants would not have been arrested and brought to trial unless they were guilty.
The Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on this issue on April 30, 2002 during which Ida called both Sullivan and Lynch as witnesses. Sullivan's account largely followed that set forth in his affidavit.11 Lynch flatly denied having made any of the statements attributed to him by Sullivan or, for that matter, having discussed the case with him during or after the trial.12 Thus, the question whether Lynch misled the Court during the voir dire in the respect claimed by Ida comes down to a pure question of credibility.
The Court has considered carefully the respective accounts of these witnesses, the inherent probabilities of their accounts, and their demeanor on the witness stand. Without attempting to set forth all of the considerations that have entered into the Court's determination, a number of factors are worthy of mention.
To begin with, Sullivan's contention that Lynch discussed the matter with him at all is improbable. This was an organized crime case involving several murder charges. The jurors were aware that their identities were secret.13 They were taken from the courthouse each day in vehicles arranged by the United States Marshal Service and dropped at remote locations to avoid their being followed and identified. The likelihood that Lynch would have revealed even the fact that he was a juror in this case, let alone made the statements attributed to him, therefore is low.
This improbability is compounded by Sullivan's account. According to Sullivan, Lynch simply came into the bar and volunteered the series of points set forth in Sullivan's affidavit without Sullivan offering any comment at all,14 yet failed to mention any of a host of details concerning the case and the extraordinary treatment of the jurors that would have been at the very top of the list of points that someone in Lynch's position almost surely would have mentioned. Thus, Sullivan testified that Lynch did not tell him anything about what was going on in the case, did not tell him it was a murder case, did not tell him that the jury was anonymous, did not mention the extraordinary means taken to preserve the jurors' anonymity, and did not tell him who the defendants were.15 And there are other problems with Sullivan's story.
Sullivan's tale first came to light as a result of his reporting what Lynch allegedly told him to his brother-in-law, an attorney named Michael Negri, at a family function a couple of months after the trial ended.16 Negri's affirmation makes clear that when he heard whatever precisely Sullivan told him, he quickly contacted Jeffrey Hoffman, Esq., Ida's trial counsel.17 How, then, did Negri know to contact Hoffman? According to Sullivan, Lynch never told him who the defendants were.18 This information appeared only in the newspaper article Sullivan claims to have seen at the end of the trial.19 Yet the Court is asked to believe that Sullivan knew enough—from a brief look at a newspaper article—about who had been on trial and, for that matter, who Ida's lawyer was to give that information to Negri long afterward.
To be sure, one must consider how Ida and the defense team learned of Lynch's identity if Sullivan's story is a fabrication. But the question admits of several possible answers. For one thing, it is conceivable that Lynch or his wife told Sullivan, or Sullivan deduced from Lynch's long jury service, that Lynch was serving on this case but that nothing more was said. Even more likely is the possibility that the fact of Lynch's service on this jury became known as a result of his having been recognized in the courthouse. For example, during course of the trial, two police officers employed by a municipality in the area in which Lynch lives were outside the courtroom in which the trial took place and recognized Lynch as a juror. Indeed, the Assistant United States Attorney who tried the case on behalf of the government brought that fact to the Court's attention during the trial, and Lynch then acknowledged that he had recognized one of the officers.20 Thus, while the Court certainly does not suggest that the officers, who evidently had some affiliation with the prosecution in this case, informed Ida or others connected with him of the identity of this juror, it is far from unlikely that some perhaps inadvertent remark by one of them ultimately resulted in the defense identifying Lynch and learning of his location and of the fact that his wife worked at the same bar as did Sullivan. Thus, there were ample means by which the Ida team could have identified Lynch other than that which Sullivan advanced. Sullivan's story is improbable to begin with, and the fact that the defense found out Lynch's identity does not strongly corroborate it.
Ida argues that Sullivan nevertheless should be believed because some of the things he claims Lynch told him could have come only from Lynch, specifically, that Lynch's car had been vandalized at a train station, that Lynch took notes during the trial, and that Lynch discussed the trial with someone named John Walsh. But Ida overstates the evidence.
First, Lynch was not the only person from whom Sullivan could have learned the fact that Lynch's car was vandalized at a train station. Lynch made clear at the hearing that numerous people in his neighborhood knew of the damage his windshield sustained at the train station.21 And certainly Lynch's wife could have mentioned the fact in casual conversation with any number of people at the bar where Sullivan worked. Even if Lynch himself told Sullivan about his windshield, discussing what occurred to Lynch's car is wholly different than discussing the case on which Lynch was a juror. He was perfectly free to tell people that his car windshield had been broken at a train station and could have done so without violating his juror oath.
Second, the fact that Sullivan referenced Lynch's trial notes in his affidavit and that Lynch admitted to taking notes in the trial does not make Sullivan's account of the alleged conversation any more probable. Many jurors take notes, especially in trials as long as this one. And the fact that the juror sitting in...
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