Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare & Judy Hoffman v. John (2010-25) Doe (In re Jane Doe)

• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: MELANSON, Judge.
• Citation: Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare & Judy Hoffman v. John (2010-25) Doe (In re Jane Doe), 150 Idaho 195, 245 P.3d 506 (Idaho App. 2010)
• Decision Date: 20 December 2010
• Docket Number: No. 38026.,38026.
• Parties: In the Matter of Jane Doe, A Child Under Eighteen Years of Age. IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & WELFARE and Judy Hoffman, Guardian Ad Litem, Petitioners–Respondents, v. John (2010–25) DOE, Respondent–Appellant.

150 Idaho 195

245 P.3d 506

In the Matter of Jane Doe, A Child Under Eighteen Years of Age.

IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & WELFARE and Judy Hoffman, Guardian Ad Litem, Petitioners–Respondents,

v.John (2010–25) DOE, Respondent–Appellant.

No. 38026.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Dec. 20, 2010.

Williams Law Office, Chtd., Twin Falls, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Tom Baird, Deputy Attorney General, Twin Falls, for respondent, Department of Health and Welfare.

Jamie LaMure, Kimberly, for respondent, Judy Hoffman.

MELANSON, Judge.

John Doe appeals from the magistrate's decree terminating the parental rights of Mother and Father to their daughter, Jane Doe. Specifically, John challenges the magistrate's determination that John was not a proper party to the termination proceedings because he did not possess parental rights subject to termination. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

I.FACTS AND PROCEDURE

At the time of Jane's birth, John and Mother were in a relationship. John is listed on Jane's birth certificate as her father. In 2005, the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare initiated a child protective proceeding involving Jane, due to John and Mother's use of methamphetamine. John and Mother subsequently agreed to allow Jane's grandparents to become her legal guardians. Six months later, Jane's grandmother died and Jane's grandfather relinquished his guardianship of Jane because he could no longer care for her. Jane was placed in foster care while the Department conducted a six-month investigation to determine a proper placement for Jane. After the investigation, Jane was returned to the custody of John and Mother in 2007. John and Mother later ended their relationship and separated. Sometime after their separation, John and Mother stipulated that John would have primary legal custody of Jane. Pursuant to the stipulation, the magistrate issued a custody order in favor of John.¹

In 2009, the Department initiated another child protective action involving Jane. At that time, John and Mother lived in separate units of the same apartment complex. Jane spent time at both John's home and Mother's home. While at Mother's apartment, Jane indicated that "Daddy" had sexual contact with her.² Mother notified the authorities, and Jane was placed in the custody of the Department pending an adjudicatory hearing.

At the adjudicatory hearing, the magistrate determined that it was in Jane's best interest to remain in the custody of the Department and required John and Mother to comply with a case plan for reunification with Jane. Mother declined to participate in the case plan. John chose to participate and began attending counseling and treatment for his mental health issues and visited Jane weekly. As part of the case plan, John was required to submit to a paternity test, which later determined that he was not Jane's biological father.

The Department initiated termination proceedings and identified John and Father as Jane's possible fathers and alleged that John had been excluded as the biological father by DNA testing. Mother stipulated to the termination of her parental rights and expressed her desire to have Jane adopted by one of her relatives. Father did not appear at the termination hearing. The Department requested that John be dismissed as a party to the termination proceedings because he did not meet the definition of "parent" under I.C. § 16–2002(11). The magistrate treated the Department's request as a motion for summary judgment, found that John was a proper party to the action, and allowed him to participate in the hearing. However, in its memorandum decision and in its decree terminating Mother and Father's parental rights, the magistrate determined that John did not meet the statutory definition of a parent and, therefore, was not a proper party to the termination action. John appeals.

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court exercises free review over a trial judge's conclusions of law. Opportunity, L.L.C. v. Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 605, 38 P.3d 1258, 1261 (2002). The determination of the meaning of a statute and its application is a matter of law over which this Court exercises free review. Woodburn v. Manco Prods., Inc., 137 Idaho 502, 504, 50 P.3d 997, 999 (2002).

In an action to terminate parental rights, an appellate court will not disturb the trial court's findings unless they are not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Roe Family Servs. v. Doe, 139 Idaho 930, 934, 88 P.3d 749, 753 (2004). Only clearly erroneous findings will be overturned. Opportunity, 136 Idaho at 605, 38 P.3d at 1261.

III.ANALYSIS

John asserts that the magistrate erred when it determined that John was not a parent for purposes of the parental termination proceedings involving Jane. John argues that he is a parent under the equitable doctrines of in loco parentis and equitable adoption (also referred to as adoption by estoppel). In addition, John contends that the equitable doctrine of judicial estoppel should prevent the Department from objecting to John's participation in the parental termination proceedings. Finally, John argues that his constitutionally protected rights of access to the courts and the right to parent have been violated.

A. John's Status as a Parent

John contends that he comes within the purview of the Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act, I.C. §§ 16–2001 to 16–2014. In the alternative, John asserts that he has parental rights subject to termination under the equitable doctrines of in loco parentis and equitable adoption.

1. Statutory definition

Idaho Code Section 16–2005 permits the Department to petition the court for termination of the parent-child relationship when it is in the child's best interest and any one of the following five factors exist: (a) the parent has abandoned the child; (b) the parent has neglected or abused the child; (c) lack of a biological relationship between the child and a presumptive parent; (d) the parent is unable to discharge parental responsibilities for a prolonged period which will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or (e) the parent is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated for a substantial period of time. Each statutory ground is an independent basis for termination. State v. Doe, 144 Idaho 839, 842, 172 P.3d 1114, 1117 (2007).

Idaho Code Section 16–2002(11) states in relevant part that a "parent" is either the adoptive father, the biological father of a child conceived or born during the father's marriage to the mother, or the unmarried biological father whose consent to an adoption of the child is required pursuant to I.C. § 16–1504. Idaho Code Section 16–2002(12) defines a "presumptive father" as a "man who is or was married to the birth mother and the child is born during the marriage or within three hundred (300) days after the marriage is terminated."

During the termination hearing, John did not argue that he and Mother were married or that he was Jane's adoptive father. In addition, the paternity test established that John was not Jane's biological father. Therefore, substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate's determination that John was never married to Mother and was not Jane's adoptive or biological father. As a result, the magistrate did not err when it determined that John did not meet the statutory definition of a "parent" or "presumptive father" under the Termination of Parent and Child Relationship Act.

2. Equitable parental rights

In the alternative, John argues that the magistrate erred when it determined that John did not possess equitable parental rights under the doctrines of in loco parentis and equitable adoption. The doctrine of in loco parentis is defined as "relating to, or acting as a temporary guardian or caretaker of a child, taking on all or some of the responsibilities of a parent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 803 (8th ed.2004). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a couple stood in loco parentis to a child once the Department transferred custody of the child to the couple. Craven v. Doe, 128 Idaho 490, 493, 915 P.2d 720, 723 (1996). Due to the couple's status as prospective adoptive parents acting in loco parentis, the Court held the couple had standing to file a petition for the termination of the biological parents' rights to the child under I.C. § 16–2004. Craven, 128 Idaho at 493, 915 P.2d at 723. Idaho Code Section 16–2004 specifically permits a person standing in loco parentis to file a petition for termination of parental rights.³

John asserts that, like the couple in Craven, he is a nonbiological parent who should be permitted to defend his parental rights in a termination proceeding. However, the Court's holding in Craven narrowly applies to a party's ability to file a petition for termination of parental rights. Craven does not stand for the proposition that a party acting in loco parentis possesses parental rights subject to termination under I.C. § 16–2005.

John also argues that he possesses parental rights under the doctrine of equitable adoption. The doctrine of equitable adoption applies equity to create a status which confers certain benefits to a child, such as child support or an inheritance. Poncho v. Bowdoin, 138 N.M. 857, 126 P.3d 1221, 1226–28 (N.M.Ct.App.2005). The doctrine allows a child to enjoy part of the advantage of an adoptive status in cases where no formal adoption has taken place. Id. For example, in certain jurisdictions, the doctrine of equitable adoption allows a child to receive an inheritance from a presumed adoptive parent, even if the parent had yet to formalize the adoption prior to his or her death. See In re Estate of Ford, 32 Cal.4th 160, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 541, 82 P.3d 747, 753–54 (2004) (law of equitable adoption in intestate succession case requires proof of intent to adopt); see also

Osterkamp v. Stiles, 235 P.3d 193, 196 n. 14 (Alaska 2010) (equitable adoption doctrine applied in Alaska in intestate succession and...