Idaho Dept. of Water Resources v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 30 March 1992
• Docket Number: No. 19407,19407
• Citation: 832 P.2d 289,122 Idaho 116
• Parties: In re the General Adjudication of Rights to the Use of Water From the Snake River Basin Water System. State of Idaho, ex rel. R. Keith Higginson, in his official capacity as Director of the IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant, and Idaho Power Company, Twin Falls Canal Company, North Side Canal Company, Defendants-Respondents. Boise, January 1992 Term
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 289

832 P.2d 289

122 Idaho 116

In re the General Adjudication of Rights to the Use of Water From the Snake River Basin Water System.

State of Idaho, ex rel. R. Keith Higginson, in his official capacity as Director of the IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellant, and Idaho Power Company, Twin Falls Canal Company, North Side Canal Company, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 19407.

Supreme Court of Idaho,

Boise, January 1992 Term.

March 30, 1992.

Maurice O. Ellsworth, U.S. Atty., and Warren S. Derbidge, Asst. U.S. Atty., Boise, and William B. Lazarus, Dept. of Justice (argued), Washington, D.C., for appellant U.S.

Larry J. EchoHawk, Atty. Gen., and Clive J. Strong, Deputy Atty. Gen. (argued), for respondent Idaho Dept. of Water Resources.

Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, James C. Tucker (argued), Twin Falls, for respondents Idaho Power Co., Twin Falls Canal Co., and North Side Canal Co.

McDEVITT, Justice.

This case arises out of the Snake River Basin Adjudication. The United States filed a Petition for a Writ of Mandamus, requesting the district court to issue an order requiring the director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources (the agency in charge of receiving notice of claims to water rights in the adjudication) to accept the filing of the United States' Notices of Claims to a Water Right without payment of the required filing fees. The district court denied the petition. We affirm.

The Snake River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA") is being conducted pursuant to I.C. § 42-1406A. On June 30, 1989, the United States of America filed a petition for a Writ of Mandamus, or alternatively, declaratory or injunctive relief. The United States sought an order from the district court requiring the director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources ("the director") to accept the filing of its claims without payment of the filing fees as required by I.C. § 42-1414. The United States contends that the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666, does not waive sovereign immunity from the payment of filing fees.

Subsequent to the filing of the petition, on July 6, 1989, the United States submitted its Notices of Claim to a Water Right on behalf of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Department of the Interior without payment of the filing fees to the director. The director refused to file the notices of claims. On July 10, 1989, the district court entered an order requiring the director to accept the notices for lodging, but not for filing.

The district court required the United States to submit a list of issues to be litigated concerning the issue of filing fees. Several motions for summary judgment were filed by the parties. The trial court issued two separate memorandum opinions. The first was filed December 27, 1990. The district court also granted the State's Motion for Summary Judgment as to several issues and then limited the issues to be considered at trial. The remaining issues were tried to the district court without a jury, after which, the district court denied the United States' petition for a Writ of Mandamus. From this denial the United States appeals.

ISSUE ON APPEAL

DOES THE McCARRAN AMENDMENT, 43 U.S.C. § 666, ALLOW THE STATE OF IDAHO TO COLLECT FILING FEES FROM THE UNITED STATES FOR CLAIMS FILED IN THE SNAKE RIVER BASIN ADJUDICATION?

A little background on the SRBA and on general water adjudications in the State of Idaho is helpful in understanding the dispute between the parties. In 1985, the Idaho Legislature passed I.C. § 42-1406A. ¹ This statute required the director Once the district court entered the order commencing the adjudication, Idaho statutes provide the procedure to be followed in the adjudication. Idaho Code § 42-1406A(2) required the director to perform an investigation to determine the various water rights among the water users of the Snake River Basin. Idaho Code §§ 42-1408 and 42-1408A instruct the director to prepare a notice and to serve notice upon all claimants. Claimants are then required by I.C. § 42-1409 to file Notices of Claim to a Water Right with the director. Idaho Code § 42-1414 sets the filing fees to be paid at the time of filing the Notice of Claim to a Water Right. The director then must investigate each separate claim. After investigating all claims, I.C. § 42-1411 requires the director to prepare a report determining what rights have been acquired under state law and then to file this report with the district court. Idaho Code § 42-1412 allows any claimant to object to any portion of the director's report. The district court then proceeds to trial on any contested matters. Id. Those portions of the director's report that receive no objection are admitted as true. I.C. § 42-1412(9). The district court then enters the final decree determining the water rights of each claimant. I.C. § 42-1413.

[122 Idaho 118] to file a petition in district court to commence an adjudication of the water of the Snake River Basin. The director filed a petition seeking a court order commencing the adjudication in the district court on June 17, 1987. In this petition, the director named the United States and all other water users as defendants. The district court entered an order on October 14, 1987, commencing the Snake River Basin Adjudication. This Court then affirmed the district court's order commencing the adjudication. In re Snake River Basin Water Sys., 115 Idaho 1, 764 P.2d 78 (1988), cert. denied, Boise-Kuna Irri. Dist. v. United States, 490 U.S. 1005, 109 S.Ct. 1639, 104 L.Ed.2d 155 (1989).

The United States contends that the McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666, which waives the United States' immunity from suit in water adjudications, does not waive immunity from filing fees. On the other hand, the State of Idaho asserts that the plain language of the McCarran Amendment waives any obstruction to the payment of filing fees. The State of Idaho asserts that the issue of whether the McCarran Amendment waives immunity to filing fees has been previously adjudicated in United States v. Oregon Water Resources Dep't, 774 F.Supp. 1568 (D.Or.1991); In re the General Adjudication of all Rights to Use Water on the Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo.1988), affirmed by an equally divided court, 492 U.S. 406, 109 S.Ct. 2994, 106 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989); and, United States v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo.1983).

[122 Idaho 119] These cases fail to fully address the contentions of the United States, therefore, we deem it necessary to discuss at some length the issue on appeal.

Both the United States and the State of Idaho urge that this is a "simple" case of statutory construction.

It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence that the United States is immune from suit unless it consents to be sued. Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 59 S.Ct. 516, 83 L.Ed. 784 (1939). This immunity extends to barring an individual state from suing the United States unless the federal government consents to such suit. Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 59 S.Ct. 292, 83 L.Ed. 235 (1939). Only the United States Congress can grant such consent to be sued. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941); Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481, 45 S.Ct. 149, 69 L.Ed. 394 (1925). Absent a waiver of sovereign immunity by Congress, the United States cannot be sued. Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 108 S.Ct. 1965, 100 L.Ed.2d 549 (1988). ² The waiver of immunity must be expressed in the statutory text in question and not from extraneous sources. United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 1011, 117 L.Ed.2d 181 (1992); Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228-29, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 2400, 105 L.Ed.2d 181 (1989); Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985).

Once a waiver of sovereign immunity is found to exist, "those conditions must be strictly observed, and exceptions are not to be lightly implied." Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 1820, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983). The extent of the waiver is not to be extended beyond the "clear and unambiguous" language of the statute. Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179, 96 S.Ct. 2006, 2013, 48 L.Ed.2d 555 (1976). While being careful not to enlarge a waiver of sovereign immunity beyond that which is expressed in the language that Congress used in the statute, a court should remember the "broad and just purpose which the statute was designed to effect" to help in determining the extent of the waiver. Indian Towing v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68, 76 S.Ct. 122, 126, 100 L.Ed. 48 (1955).

Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 106 S.Ct. 2957, 92 L.Ed.2d 250 (1986), involved a lawsuit involving Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The act authorized an award of back pay and reasonable attorney fees. The act also contained the language that "the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The plaintiff, Shaw, prevailed in the action and was awarded attorney fees. The trial judge increased the award by 30% to compensate the attorney for the delay in receiving payment for the services rendered. The Library of Congress appealed, alleging that the increase in compensation was disguised interest and was therefore, improperly awarded. The United States Supreme Court recognized the long-standing rule that the United States was immune from an interest award. In determining whether Congress had waived immunity from interest, the Court turned to two different phrases in the statute.

First, the Court looked at the phrase, "the same as a private person." The Court determined that this phrase had to be construed with the long-standing prohibition against an interest award. The Court determined that this was not an express waiver of immunity.

The Court also declined to find a waiver of immunity in the statutory requisite of awarding "reas...