Idaho Press Club, Inc. v. State Legislature

• Decision Date: 20 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. 31667.,31667.
• Citation: 142 Idaho 640,132 P.3d 397
• Parties: IDAHO PRESS CLUB, INC., an Idaho non-profit corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE of Idaho; Robert L. Geddes, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the Senate; and Bruce Newcomb, in his official capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

132 P.3d 397

142 Idaho 640

IDAHO PRESS CLUB, INC., an Idaho non-profit corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. STATE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE of Idaho; Robert L. Geddes, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the Senate; and Bruce Newcomb, in his official capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 31667.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, January 2006 Term.

March 20, 2006.

Givens Pursley, LLP, and Allen R. Derr, Boise, for appellant. Debora K. Kristensen argued.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondents. James D. Carlson argued.

EISMANN, Justice.

This is an appeal from a decision holding that Article III, § 12, of the Idaho Constitution does not apply to legislative committee meetings. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 27, 2004, the Idaho Press Club, Inc., (Press Club) filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment holding that the conduct of the Senate and House in closing legislative committee meetings to the public violates Article III, § 12, of the Constitution of the State of Idaho. The Press Club alleged that during the 2003 and 2004 legislative sessions the Senate had closed four meetings of its legislative committees and the House of Representatives had closed three meetings of its legislative committees. The district court held that Article III, § 12, did not apply to meetings of legislative committees, and the Press Club appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

Article III, § 12, of the Idaho Constitution provides, "The business of each house, and of the committee of the whole shall be transacted openly and not in secret session." The issue before us is whether that provision requires all meetings of legislative committees to be open to the public. Our task is not to decide whether such meetings should be open. It is solely to decide whether the Constitution requires that they must be open.

"In construing the constitution, the primary object is to determine the intent of the framers." Williams v. State Legislature, 111 Idaho 156, 158-59, 722 P.2d 465, 467-68 (1986). That intent comes from the words approved by the drafters and later adopted by the people. "The presumption is that words used in a constitution are to be given the natural and popular meaning in which they are usually understood by the people who adopted them." Taylor v. State, 62 Idaho 212, 217, 109 P.2d 879, 880 (1941). "It must be kept in mind that the Constitution of the State of Idaho is not a delegation of power to the legislature but is a limitation on the power it may exercise, and that the legislature has plenary power in all matters for legislation except those prohibited by the constitution." Idaho Tel. Co. v. Baird, 91 Idaho 425, 428, 423 P.2d 337, 340 (1967). Thus, the question before us is whether Article III, § 12, limits the power of the legislature to close legislative committee meetings.

At the time Section 12 was adopted, a legislative house (which in this context refers to both the Senate and the House of Representatives) typically utilized two types of committees: (a) the committee of the whole and (b) smaller committees comprised of specified members of the house (herein "legislative committees"). Neither the committee of the whole nor a legislative committee can vote to pass a bill. That can only be done by the house when it is in session. Although there is some overlap in the functions of the committee of the whole and of legislative committees (e.g., they can both recommend the adoption of a bill), they are two distinctly separate entities. The committee of the whole is a parliamentary device for facilitating the legislative process in which all members of the house meet in the form of a committee. The legislative committees have a more limited function and are comprised of a smaller number of the house members. Both the parliamentary device of the committee of the whole and legislative committees have been in use in Congress from its inception. It is clear that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention understood that they were distinctly different types of committees. Its rules provided both for forming a committee of the whole and for forming smaller committees ranging in size from five to nine members. Proceedings and Debates of the Constitutional Convention of Idaho 1889, Vol. I, pp. 37-41, 52-53 (I.W. Hart ed.1912). Indeed, the Press Club admits that the committee of the whole and a legislative committee are two entirely different types of committees.

At the time the Constitution was drafted and adopted, the legislative process involved the work of three distinctly different groups: the house, the committee of the whole, and legislative committees. Those three groups were recognized in the rules of the territorial legislature that first convened in 1863. Article III, § 12, specifies that its provisions apply to "each house" and to "the committee of the whole" of each house, but it makes no mention of legislative committees. "It is a universally recognized rule of construction that, where a constitution or statute specifies certain things, the designation of such things excludes all others." Local 1494 of Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 99 Idaho 630, 639, 586 P.2d 1346, 1355 (1978), quoting Peck v. State, 63 Idaho 375, 380, 120 P.2d 820, 822 (1941). This rule of construction, which is typically stated in the Latin expressio unius est exclusio alterius, was first recited by this Court in Shoshone County v. Profit, 11 Idaho 763, 84 P. 712 (1906), and was recognized by the United States Supreme Court long before Idaho became a state, The Adeline, 9 Cranch 244, 3 L.Ed. 719 (1815).

"Our State Constitution is a limitation, not a grant of power, and the Legislature has plenary powers in all matters, except those prohibited by the Constitution." Rich v. Williams, 81 Idaho 311, 323, 341 P.2d 432, 439 (1959). Because the Constitution is not a grant of power, there is no reason to believe that a Constitutional provision enumerating powers of a branch of government was intended to be an exclusive list. The branch of government would inherently have powers that were not included in the list. The converse is true, however, with a respect to provisions limiting power. When the framers drafted a provision expressly limiting certain powers, there is no reason to believe that they intended the limitation to be broader than they drafted it. The purpose of such provision is to define the limitations. It is not reasonable to assume that they intended to impose other, unstated limitations. Had they wanted to impose limitations in addition to those stated, they could easily have done so. Therefore, the rule of construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies to provisions of the Idaho Constitution that expressly limit power, Clayton v. Barnes, 52 Idaho 418, 16 P.2d 1056 (1932); Shoshone County v. Profit, 11 Idaho 763, 84 P. 712 (1906), but it does not apply to provisions that merely enumerate powers, Penrod v. Crowley, 82 Idaho 511, 356 P.2d 73 (1960); Eberle v. Nielson, 78 Idaho 572, 306 P.2d 1083 (1957). The provision at issue here is a limitation on the power of the legislature to close its proceedings. Thus, expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies as a rule of construction. Under this well-recognized rule of construction, Article III, § 12, does not apply to legislative committees because the drafters did not include such committees in its provisions. In fact, the Press Club correctly admits, "Significantly, the ability to close committee meetings was never discussed or raised as a concern by the constitutional delegates." (Emphasis in original.) None of the delegates argued that legislative committee meetings should be either open or closed. That is simply not a matter they were concerned about. The drafters could have written Section 12 to require that the business of each house and of all committees shall be transacted openly and not in secret session, but it did not do so.

The Press Club contends that the phrase "business of each house" should be construed to include legislative committees. It argues that because each house utilizes legislative committees in order to function, the work of such committees is included in the phrase "business of each house." There are three problems with this argument.

First, both houses also utilize the committee of the whole as part of the legislative process. If the "business" of each house was intended to include the work of all committees, then it would also include the committee of the whole, which is a committee. If the word "business" included the work of all committees, then there would have been no reason to expressly include the committee of the whole within the provisions of Article III, § 12. The reference to the committee of the whole would be mere surplusage. We should avoid an interpretation which would render terms of a constitution surplusage. Westerberg v. Andrus, 114 Idaho 401, 757 P.2d 664 (1988).

Second, adopting the Press Club's definition of "business" would create an inconsistency. Article III, § 10, states, "A majority of each house shall constitute a quorum to do business." If legislative committees are included within the "business" of each house, then a majority of each house would have to be present at each meeting of a legislative committee because such committee meetings would constitute doing the business of the house. Nobody contends that a majority of the members of each house are required to be present at meetings of legislative committees. There is certainly no indication that the framers of the Constitution thought that the business for which a quorum was required by Article III, § 10, included conducting legislative committees. For example, Rule 23 of the rules adopted by the Constitutional Convention to govern its proceedings provided, "A majority of members elected to the convention...